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

Ultimate Democracy and Its Making

Ultimate Democracy and Its Making

BY

Newell L. Sims, A.M., Ph.D.

Professor of Sociology and Political Science,
The University of Florida; Author
of "A Hoosier Village"

Solon—"I hold that city or state happy and most likely to remain democratic in which those that are not personally injured are yet as forward to question and correct wrongdoers as that person who is more immediately wronged."

Bias—"Where all fear the law as they fear a tyrant."

Thales—"Where the citizens are neither too rich nor too poor."

Anacharsis—"Where, though in all other respects they are equal, yet virtuous men are advanced and vicious men degraded."

Cleobulus—"Where the rulers fear reproof and shame more than the law."

Pittacus—"Where bad men are prohibited from ruling and good men from not ruling."

—PLUTARCH.

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

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To

Florence McNutt Sims

WISE COUNSELOR, FAITHFUL COLABORER,
AND DEVOTED WIFE, THIS BOOK IS
AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED

PREFACE

MARK TWAIN once declared that the great difficulty in writing books is that the author must compete not only with the living but also with the dead. In no field can this be truer than in the one before us. So much has been written and so much is being written on the subject of democracy that it is pertinent to ask, Why another book at all? Certainly it cannot be presumed that anything really new remains to be said about it, or that what has already been said can be said any better. Neither the claim of originality nor of literary superiority can be put forth to justify this volume. Still, new situations are ever arising, new phases of old movements are always appearing, and new attitudes are constantly developing in present-day society. Change, transition, and crisis hold sway. An account faithful today becomes untrue tomorrow. The perennial discussion of democracy is therefore rendered necessary. This monograph, then, makes no apology for being; on the contrary, it assumes that its message is needed. That much of permanent value has been contributed is perhaps too much to expect. Such merit as the book does claim consists largely in bringing together certain things hitherto unrelated in a way to make them more serviceable and stimulating to the general reader.

This work has its genesis in the author's desire for clearness as to the meaning and aims of democracy. It was given first form in a series of public lectures delivered a few winters ago in and about New York City. It was later developed through other lectures, and in two or three published essays, then further enlarged for the basis of a classroom course. Finally it took present shape by the addition of material designed to give unity and coherence to the whole.

Preface

Books are not made; they grow. This one has grown. Its flesh and blood is the extract of many materials from many sources. But the free alchemy whereby this substance has all been transmuted into the being of one volume renders it quite impossible to accord to its sources due credit for all. However, to such writings as have been knowingly employed, indebtedness has been recognized in the text; to all others let it be here acknowledged in full measure.

If this work shall inform, serve, arouse, inspire, or otherwise seriously interest any, its publication will be worth while and its mission fulfilled.

NEWELL LE ROY SIMS.

The University of Florida,
Gainesville, February, 1917.

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Ultimate Democracy and Its Making

ULTIMATE DEMOCRACY AND ITS MAKING

CHAPTER I

Original Democracy

Each one of us entrusts his person and his whole power to the common management of the general will, and we as a connected whole regard each member as an indivisible part of that whole. — ROUSSEAU.

1. *The Spirit of the Age*

A TALE is told of an English merchantman that was once stranded in mid ocean. Suddenly, without rock, bar, or bottom in sight, she had lurched to one side and stood fast. A diver was sent down to explore and found she had struck on the wreckage of two ships of the sixteenth century, a Spanish galleon and an English man-of-war, that evidently had gone down in an engagement. He searched the galleon for treasure, but found nothing except a cargo of hogsheads, empty of all material contents. He was about to ascend when he began to gasp for breath. No air was reaching him. He pulled at the signal rope and to his horror drew it to him. It had been cut. In a moment he would perish. Then an idea flashed through his mind — there might be at least air in those hogsheads. He seized the supply tube and quickly pulled it to him till the cut end was in his hand. Knocking out the plug of a cask he thrust in the tube. It just filled the bung

and he could breathe. Somehow he had never inhaled such an element before. It made his nerves tingle with a new sensation; it fairly intoxicated him with energy. For an hour he breathed from these barrels as he thought out a way of escape. Then, climbing to the bow of the old hulk, he threw off his diving suit and shot upward to the surface of the sea. With a few strokes he reached some ropes dangling over the side of the ship and by their aid crawled on board. He discovered that the crew had mutinied and were fighting in the forecastle. He slipped into the cabin, donned a suit of armor that hung upon the wall, and, armed with a capstan bar for a cutlass, charged the forecastle, felled several of the crew, threw the ringleaders overboard, and in a trice made himself master of the ship.

That diver had breathed the air of the sixteenth century, for four hundred years stored up in those barrels at the bottom of the sea, and was drunken with the spirit of the age. We breathe the air of the twentieth century and are filled with its spirit of democracy. From literature, art, religion, ethics, economics, and politics we imbibe it, and if we be not yet drunken, it is, forsooth, because the hour of the century is young. But the high noon cometh when Demos is to be crowned king of the earth, and in that wild revelry we all shall join. If it be thought that no age ever had such a spirit as this one and such a full intoxication from it, a descent into the past will show our error, for it will disclose others that were surcharged with democracy. It will reveal an Athenian age and a Roman age more or less astir with it; and if we descend to the bottom we shall find that the first age of organized society was democratic. So it will be discovered that the wine of our age is not new, but very old. In order, therefore, fully to understand the really unusual intoxication we are experiencing, it will be well to consider the character of this old, old wine of the

world in its first and second and third and final stages of fermentation.

2. *Primitive Democracy*

Primitive society was democratic. To be sure, this statement involves a big assumption; but in the absence of any strictly primitive society to consult it can at least be made with impunity. It is one necessitated, however, by the pointing of the evidence at hand, as well as by the demands of the theory that dominates the thinking of this generation. Evolution starts with the undifferentiated, with what socially would seem to be an order of dead-level equality. Indeed, in cases of social regression we note that people become more alike in every way as they sink in the scale of civilization. They seem to approach a flat plane; a fact which suggests that it was from such that they originally sprang.

The champions of Natural Law could think of primitive society only as democratic. By nature, as Hobbes held, men were equal in qualities of soul and body. Inequality was declared to be introduced by civil law. Locke and Rousseau went so far as to idealize that original order of things. We may, however, agree with these doctrinarians as to its form without accepting it as ideal or in any way desiring its return. Some present-day scientists are so agreeing, and from the glimpses given by ancient observers, together with the photographic accounts of contemporaneous savagery, are reconstructing that primitive state of mankind.

Tacitus, the Roman historian, observed the customs of our ancestors in the German forests. There is no more ancient sketch than his. He was present at their assemblies. He heard their debates over tribal undertakings. He listened to them vote upon questions and heard them declare war by clashing together their shields in sanction of the tribal vote. It seemed to be a group, an assembly, a government of equals that he

witnessed. There was no hereditary rank and no permanent chieftain. Only age or wisdom received honor. He tells us, "The leader was the first among equals."

Modern observation of peoples similar to those Tacitus saw adds many facts to fill out the picture of primitive society. E. Grosse, for instance, in *Die Formen der Familie* describes the primitive huntsmen. He says:

> There are no essential differences of fortune among them, and thus a principal source for the origin of differences in station is lacking. Generally, all grown men within the tribe enjoy equal rights. The older men, thanks to their greater experience, have a certain authority; but no one feels himself bound to render them obedience. When in some cases chiefs are recognized — as with the Batokude, the Central Californians, the Weddas, and the Mincopie — their power is extremely limited. The chieftain has no means of enforcing his wishes against the will of the rest. Most tribes of hunters, however, have no chieftain. The entire society of the males still forms a homogeneous, undifferentiated mass, in which only those individuals achieve prominence who are believed to possess magical powers.

Sir Henry S. Maine from his studies of ancient law and village communities became convinced of the democratic character of primitive society. He says:

> But Ancient Law, it must again be repeated, knows next to nothing of Individuals. It is concerned not with Individuals, but with Families, not with single human beings, but groups. Even when the law of the State has succeeded in penetrating the small circles of kindred into which it had originally no means of penetrating, the view it takes of Individuals is curiously different from that taken by jurisprudence in its maturest stage. The life of each citizen is not regarded as limited by birth and death; it is but the continuation of the existence of his forefathers, and it will be prolonged in the existence of his descendants.

Judging from the village customs of India, Russia, and the Slavic countries, he concludes further that property was originally held in common. Of the Slavic villages he states:

> The villages are also brotherhoods of persons who are at once co-owners and kinsmen. . . . . The substance of the common property is

in this case neither divided in practice nor considered in theory so divisible, but the entire land is cultivated by the combined labor of all the villagers, and the produce is annually distributed among the households, sometimes according to their supposed wants, sometimes according to rules which give to particular persons a fixed share of the usufruct. All these practices are traced by jurists of the East of Europe to a principle which is asserted to be found in the earliest Sclavonian laws, the principle that the property of families cannot be divided for a perpetuity.

Maine's studies confirmed the opinion which Blackstone expressed in saying, "Thus the ground was in common, and no part was the permanent property of any man in particular." De Tocqueville's remark, "It is man who makes monarchies and establishes republics, but the commune seems to come directly from the hand of God," is apparently justified both in logic and in fact.

Lewis H. Morgan has shown that the ancient organization of the American Redskins was communistic. Of the Pueblos, the Iroquois, the Hurons, and other representative tribes, the Jesuit Charlevoix, quoted by Letourneau, notes—

the fact that mine and thine, those icy words as Saint Chrysostom calls them, are not yet known among these savages. The care they take of orphans, widows, and the infirm; the hospitality they exercise so admirably, are merely a consequence of their persuasion that all ought to be in common amongst men.

From all available evidence, the Eskimo, like the Redskin, has a pretty thorough-going communistic equality. Likewise among the Australian Aborigines the communal order prevails. In Africa, too, surviving customs point to a similar social organization.

Letourneau, the author of *Property: Its Origin and Development,* makes it clear that agriculture was originally communistic. It was for this reason, he points out, that the Jesuit missionaries in Paraguay were able to organize the natives under their famous despotic communism. Abundant evidence

relative to original agricultural groups gathered by Maine, Gomme, Seebohm, and others confirms this position, and the German Mark and the Russian Mir, as they survive in records or in present-day practice, afford conclusive proof of this nature of primitive agriculture. Throughout Western Europe most certainly, and very likely elsewhere, generally among primitive men, a communistic, democratic social order held sway.

With the help of M. Durkheim, the following rather impressionistic picture of original democracy may be drawn. Savage society was homogeneous like a household. All were alike in blood; they were kinsmen. To be without kin was to be without country. Patriotism was consanguine loyalty, and to disown one's blood-kin was treason. All looked alike. The face of one was the face of all. It is no mere accident that the earliest art we know had but one picture for a man, for it had but one type of man in any tribe for a model. There was little individuality in looks. All acted alike. Custom was queen when Demos was king. Personal liberty was lacking in primitive life, for there were no personalities. There was only a common consciousness, eddying in almost the same way, with much the same velocity, and with a like circumference, in each one of the group. The will of all was the will of each, and the deed of one was the deed of all. No man went his own way to hunt, to fish, to fight, to love, to learn, to pray; for the tribe's way was every man's way. No man did wrong alone or suffered its penalty by himself; for if one of a tribe sinned, all were responsible, and if one suffered, all suffered with him. All thought alike. Speech, therefore, was stereotyped. Primitive man spoke in proverbs. The Bantu people of Congo Belge today, for example, use hundreds of proverbs in daily speech. The savage's few thoughts were soon conventionalized and rolled smooth like pebbles by the common tongue. Such tabloid talk was adequate to his needs,

Civilized man does not find it so, save about the weather; for his experiences are unlike those of his fellows, and his ideas do not agree with theirs. He is not, therefore, satisfied to bandy common sayings, but must express in varying verbiage notions all his own. But the savage, having no individual ideas, can fully speak his mind by calling up a suitable proverb from the common store. All were alike in wealth. However, probably absolute communism in all goods did not generally prevail. Each had something of his own, such as trinkets and weapons, but it was not more or less than his fellow's. Franz Oppenheimer, the author of *The State,* quotes Ratzel's conclusion on this point as follows: "The more peaceable, aboriginal, and genuine the nomad is, the smaller are the tangible differences of possession." Trade is supposed to have sprung up between tribes because the members of one tribe had something no one of another tribe had. "In the immediate circle of their own bloodkinsmen every one had the same kind of property, and, in their natural communism, on the average about the same amount." This equality in goods, says Oppenheimer, was destroyed by robbery and conquest, or by what he calls "political means." Thus was great inequality in wealth eventually created, and thus it is, in a highly sublimated manner, maintained in modern society.

There was in primitive society equality in blood, in looks, in deeds, in words, in goods, and in everything. Inequality, that bastard son of civilization and conquest, was not yet born. When savage Adams delved and primal Eves span, there were as yet no gentlemen. There was likeness with little liberty; fraternity with slight freedom. Pressed by the struggle for existence and advantage into a closely conforming type, and kept by custom and tribal law in bondage thereto, the original undifferentiated group was a democracy of the dead-level equality kind.

Such, at least, seem to have been primitive conditions. Per-

haps, though, this sketch is altogether too fanciful. If so, it may well be discarded for one more rational, if such can be produced from the data. But however we may choose to draw the picture of really primitive life, fanciful in a large measure it must and will be.

3. The Downfall of Primitive Democracy

Tribal democracy came to an end. Civilization arose, and civil democracy eventually made its appearance. The downfall of tribal society and the rise of a civil order is a story not yet written. While we may not write it and show just how it happened and where the scene was laid, we may be assured that the advent of civilization, the passing of the first kingdom of Demos and the subsequent appearance of civil democracy, is the great epic of the ages prehistoric and historic. We may take a few facts, add to them some "maybe's," and arrive at a probability, or at least a possibility, as to the manner of the transition from primeval democracy to that democratic system which first enthroned itself in the civil state.

There are, first of all, ancient bodies of law from which we get a glimpse of society in the process of passing from the tribal to the civil order. The early Anglo-Saxon codes and the Brehon-laws of old Ireland especially are rich sources of information. Here we see cattle stealing, or "lifting," as the Brehons called it, flourishing in tribal times. A venturesome brave or chieftain leads a raid on the herds of a neighboring tribe and "lifts" a bunch of cattle over the border. When the spoils of the expedition are divided, the successful leader as a reward of his skill gets a larger share than any member of his marauding gang. However, he has no more rights of pasturage on the tribal domains than has any other tribesman. But the border lands are no man's land and free to whosoever will defend them. On these borders squatters, who are not members of the tribe, are always found dwelling.

They are the "Kinreckt" men — that is, outlaws, fragments of broken clans and remnants of tribes shattered by war, and without group allegiance. These border ruffians or "Fuidhuirs" are offered protection by the cattle chieftain or "Bo-air" on condition that they take stock on shares as his herdsmen. So the "Kinreckt" men become "Fuidhuirs" or cattle tenants and are thus attached to the "Bo-airs" by a new bond — the bond of personal allegiance instead of blood. The "Bo-air" waxes rich from the increase of his stock and mighty through the men to whom he has let his cattle, who are now his retainers, till he is even able to exact a share of the herds of all the tribesmen and to claim authority by virtue of the fact that he and his tenants are in the majority over all the tribal territory. After this manner social inequality had its genesis. The dead level of primitive society came to an end through cattle stealing. Wealth as a private possession thus came into existence, and aristocracy with all its attendant evils arose. Private property was unimportant, if at all existent, until violence and robbery were practiced. Lords, under-lords, and "Fuidhuirs" of various grades appeared first at this juncture in society. So primitive society became feudal in organization, and the way was opened for the development of full-grown civilization.

It is pretty certain that tribal democracy in Ireland terminated thus. Very probably the Greek tribes of the Homeric Age were undergoing a like change. Tacitus hints at a similar development among the Germanic tribes. Letourneau points out a like transition among the Mongolian tribes of Northern Asia. Whether or not this was the manner of the downfall of primitive democracy in all the world cannot be determined. Probably it was not, however, for it is likely that instead of undergoing internal reconstruction, the tribal order was sometimes changed by external agencies.

There is much evidence that conquest and subjugation had

a part in ending primitive democracy. The conquest theory explains many cases, though perhaps it is not of such universal application as Gumplowicz and his school insist. One tribal group, endeavoring to plunder the possessions of another, ends its aggressions by complete conquest. Instead of exterminating the vanquished or making them captive slaves, the conquerors exact tribute. The surplus of the flocks and herds of the defeated becomes the victor's regular source of gain. The subjugated toil and win their livelihood from nature, while the dominant group rules and exacts its toll from the subjected people. Thus social and economic inequality arises. The homogeneous tribe gives way to the stratified group which has its bond of union in an economic relationship instead of in kinship. The two groups gradually draw together for common interests, and become a new order in a civil organization. This may have been the case among the Semitic and Hamitic tribes. And to a certain extent at least it may be the history of the origin of the Roman state and of many other states of the ancient world.

Again, the social change which we are considering may have come from the pressure of environment compelling many tribes to share a common lot. Geographers like Ellsworth Huntington and others have written of the carefully surveyed basin of Central Asia. They have discovered that region to be a land of alternating deluge and desiccation. They have demonstrated that for ages unknown it has been such; now swept by floods and submerged by seas, now licked dry by drought and parched to desert waste again. So regular, in cycles both short and long, has been this process that it has been named "The Pulse of Asia." Abundant evidence shows that in the intervals between its throbbings, when neither extreme dampness nor drought forbade, when conditions were most favorable, vast populations arose and flourished there, only to be driven out by the recurring ravages of flood or the

encroachment of the desert. During that immemorial past, from out that cradle of the race, these pulsations must have rolled wave after wave of humanity into the regions to the eastward, westward, and southward. Their rhythmic beat must have been the great stimulus of man in his migrations; and eventually must have become the prime cause of history. Perhaps it was this in the last analysis that caused the dispersions of the Aryans. It was evidently due to these same pulsations that great hordes of migratory peoples swept into Europe near the beginning of the Christian era. The impulse that cast Alaric, the Goth, and Attila, the Hun, with their multitudes of followers into Europe came from the same source. And the swamping of the Roman Empire by barbarian invaders also had its primary cause here.

May it not have been these self-same pulsations of the physical environment that first brought savagery to an end and made civilization possible? At least it does not seem improbable. For certainly when old tribal homes and habitable places were rendered desolate, and the refugees of many breeds and many tongues were forced out to hunt them new places of abode, they must often have found themselves huddled together in the favored valleys and fertile oases that remained undried and undrowned. These new haunts must have been the Babylons of confused and confounded tongues and conditions concerning which we read in biblical tradition. In them the old tribal order was broken; old relations, religions, customs, and traditions were shattered. The bond of blood was lost; there were left remaining no common ties save the most instinctive consciousness of kind. All was chaos, and chaos meant conflict, and conflict doubtless came out of this ruthless mixing of men and mingling of tongues, this forced crossing of cultures and sharing of fate; but it was not unending and exterminating conflict. For, it is said, even the beasts of the jungle let one another drink from an only pool, and in the desert the

owl, the rattlesnake, and the prairie dog will dwell together in a common den. And much more must necessity have driven strange men to some sort of mutual respect and given a tacit agreement that they would live and let live. Perhaps one group won the mastery over the others and imposed order upon the whole. Such indeed is one very plausible theory of the origin of the civil state. According to it, if true, the pristine democracy was supplanted by despotism; but, the blessing of nature lost, art came in to restore Eden. In some manner harmony must have sprung from discord, and a new unity have taken shape, binding men who had no more the tie of common blood into a society whose bond inhered in a like fate and a similar behavior. And the new order was not the tribe, but the state; not savagery, but civilization.

The cause of civilization then in this case was the earth's unstable environment. Its birthplace was probably somewhere on the borders of the great basin of Central Asia. Its germination was in some melting pot of many tribal races. Of these melting pots there have been not a few. Every quarter of the globe has had them. Among them are the vales of Turkestan, the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, the isles of the Aegean, the Italian peninsula, the parklands of the Danube, the delta of the Nile, and the Isles of Britain. In each of these places a civilization has been born — that is to say, a form of society whose unity lies in something other than common blood, as perhaps a common territory or a like behavior. But our interest is in democracy and we may ask, In which of these localities did the civil democratic order first appear? So far as we know it was in the Aegean region, particularly in Athens.

CHAPTER II

Ancient Democracy

But a city ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars. — ARISTOTLE.

Liberty will not descend to a people, a people must raise themselves to liberty. — COLTON.

1. Athenian Democracy

ATHENIAN democracy was the triumph of the most rational, the best-blended and most-balanced human stock the world has ever known. It was the product of a long struggle for just social and governmental conditions in the then prevalent city-state. Wrought out, not in isolation, but in the midst of scores of other states wrestling with similar problems, it is probably well within the truth to say that the Athenian form of government was not the work of her genius alone. Her statesmen profited by the successes and failures of neighboring commonwealths as well as of their own, and thus little by little gleaning political wisdom from experience, were enabled to bring their state to a democratic basis. The chief stages of development leading to this may be pointed out.

The laws of Draco mark the real beginning of a breaking away from oligarchy in Athens. They were enacted in 621 B. C. and attempted to make the rights of full citizenship dependent upon wealth instead of birth. While Aristotle attached very little significance to them — and no doubt with justice too, since they were perhaps of little practical importance — nevertheless Draco's legislation laid the theoretical foundation for radically new departures from the established

order. It opened the door potentially to all classes. It was the beginning of the end of aristocracy, and the first milepost on the road to democracy. Thucydides gives us a clue to the explanation of this change. He tells of the rise of the merchant class to fortune and influence. In the midst of the *Eupatridae,* or nobles, this class had acquired some land along with other forms of wealth. It then began to demand rights in governmental affairs. It was large enough to exert an irresistible pressure upon the blooded nobility. Thus the political monopoly was forced to yield and the old aristocracy was compelled to admit a new element to governmental privilege. As in most reforms, the rich upstarts in Athens got a sop thrown to them in the admission of the principle for which they contended in Draco's law. The real triumph of property over birth as a practical measure had yet to be won.

Solon, however, in 594 B. C., carried out the Draconian principle by making the property basis of citizenship effective and by even lowering the property requirements for public office. He thus conferred plenary citizenship upon a greater number than had ever before enjoyed it. Moreover, he established popular courts, providing even that the supreme court be elected from all the citizens. He left to the people the choice of their magistrates and the right to call them to account. The father's power to dispose of the liberty of his wife and children was greatly limited. Enslavement for debt was ended and all such enslavements were remitted. The rich and the *Eupatridae* were compelled to cancel all past debts and mortgages. A progressive land tax which freed the small farmer from undue taxes was laid. The maximum interest rate was fixed at eighteen per cent. The rich were forbidden to live in luxury and idleness without rendering service to the state or to the community. Above all, Solon made the Ecclesia, elected from all the citizen class, supreme in the state. The Areopagus alone remained the great oligarchic power. Solon was really the author

of government by the people in Athens. His constitution put the state fairly on a democratic basis.

Solon's reforms were carried by Clisthenes to much greater lengths than he anticipated or perhaps intended in the revolution of 509 B. C. By that reform movement the power of the people was still greatly enhanced. The realms of custom and religion were invaded, and old aristocratic conventions and institutions were broken down in the interest of social equality and unity. Of utmost significance was the reorganization of the Athenian state on a new basis of citizenship. Hitherto it had been theoretically the gentile or kinship organization, but now a territorial basis was established. All dwelling on the territory of Attica were made citizens for political, juridical, and military purposes. In this manner Clisthenes cut the last bit of ground from under the feet of the blooded aristocracy. Aristotle thought ill of these changes and considered them state tyranny, for they seemed to him to foster popular excesses. It was no wonder at all that excesses attended such reforms, since much popular liberty was new and must needs be reveled in until it became familiar. Demos has been dangerously excessive whether in Greece or elsewhere only when first unleashed. He has always become a very tame beast if let run.

Ephialtes, assisted by Pericles, in 460 B.C. finally overthrew the Areopagus. For two hundred years this oligarchical senate had withstood the assaults of a rising popular sovereignty. Its influence, however, had gradually waned until the Periclean government summarily ended its power. The Ecclesia meanwhile was strengthened under Pericles by the provision that the poorer classes should receive pay for attendance while the rich should not. The tendency of the plutocratic element to dominate the assembly was thus checkmated. Poverty and labor were given an equal chance with property and leisure to participate in the law-making body. The Age of Pericles,

461 to 432 B. C., was the Golden Age of Athenian democracy. Democratic government came then to the zenith of its power in Greece.

This first democracy achieved in civil society was chiefly political and juridical. However complete it was in form, it was far from ideal. Many were not full citizens at all. Whether any above the slave class were denied the rights of citizenship may perhaps be questioned, but evidence would seem to indicate that some were. The artisans were probably free men though not really citizens. Be this as it may, there were at least four slaves to every free man. In Alcibiades' day, it is said, there were 20,000 citizens and 400,000 slaves in Athens. Howbeit, slavery was greatly restrained in Athens. Says Xenophon: "At Athens slaves live in an incredible freedom; you are not allowed to strike them. A slave will quarrel with you over precedence." Yet at best there could only be a government of the many by the few under such conditions. Still, it was the rule of the people in contrast to absolutism. For it is evident that Athens had reached the point where law emanated from those who lived under it, and not from some transcendental source, not from some "lawgiver," or some imperial monarch. Laws originated with the people and were made effective by their fiat. The attainment of this stage of social progress was the glory of Athens. Excellent though this popular rule was, and significant though it still is that the citizens of that ancient Greek city-state decided upon peace and war, elected magistrates, acted as judges, and discharged the duties incumbent upon them as sharers in the governance of the state, the fact must not be overlooked that the democracy of Athens went little beyond strictly juridical and political liberty and equality. Freedom and equality in the social realm, taken in their broad sense, were not achieved. G. L. Scherger in *The Evolution of Modern Liberty* has remarked:

There was no sphere of life to which the interference of the government might not be extended. The despotism of the state prevented the growth of private rights. The Greek was primarily a citizen. He existed for the state, not the state for him.

But there is little or nothing to indicate that this was in any sense really the case. Instead, the fault of Athenian democracy in this particular was more a failure to interfere enough in the sphere of social life in the interest of equality. Political liberty and equality were not exercised sufficiently to establish personal and economic liberty and equality, guaranteed by constitutional enactments, in all spheres of society. The best political and social thinking of that deep-thinking age had not conceived that a large measure of economic equality is necessary if democracy is to exist and long endure. Aristotle seems only to have dimly seen the dangers of great economic extremes when he observed that it were well if the citizens of the state were neither too rich nor too poor. Though he thought the rich should be prevented from giving public entertainments and debauching the people by their philanthropy, he did not think of limiting their property holdings. In his judgment, inequality was necessary, and its abolition would mean the destruction of the social order. He tells us that there were a few plutocrats who had all the wealth while the people had none. In this fact unquestionably inhered the force destructive of Athenian society. The wealthy drew apart from public interests and devoted themselves to private gain. The exploited people lost that noble patriotic zeal in which once they had gloried. Individualism grew apace; wealth accumulated and men decayed. When the Peloponnesian and Macedonian wars came, the plutocrats sold out to the enemies of Athens. Likewise when Rome's armies came they gave over the state to these invaders. Thus there was no social equality in Attica, nor any constitution-making seriously directed toward its attainment. For this reason the democracy

of Athens had decided limitations and great and fatal weaknesses. The constitution was wanting in the breadth necessary to maintain and safeguard social and industrial democracy. As a consequence, political democracy was exploited by demagogues, and the state became the plaything of tyrants and ambitious men. The crowd mind, heedless of the philosopher and the expert in knowledge but eager to follow the popular leader, chose men rather than laws, made ever powerful the demagogue rather than the constitution. Thus it came about, so Plato and Aristotle inform us, that Athenian liberty prepared its own bondage, and democracy played into the hands of a waiting despotism.

2. Roman Democracy

Democracy in Athens was succeeded by democracy in Rome. It was, however, attained with much more difficulty in the latter place, and reached only step by step through five centuries of fighting for it.

From the founding of the Republic until 494 B. C. the magistrates and Senate were almost absolute. A great unrest, however, had been brooding in Roman society, and now set going a tidal impulse of reform that was irresistible. That unrest was the real beginning of the democratic movement. Livy has left us a record of it in a dramatic incident which he relates. One day there appeared in the Forum an old man, pale, poor, and clothed in rags. Gathering about him, the people heard his tale. It was one of patriotism, for he had been a Roman soldier; of misfortune, for his goods had been pillaged while he fought with the legion; of oppression, for taxes had devoured his land while he toiled; of poverty, for he had been thrown into prison for debt and scourged when he could not pay; of slavery, for he had sold himself to live and must die to gain liberty. The marks of the scourging received in prison and the scars of wounds received in battle

he displayed to the bystanders. Thereupon indignation spread through the throng; a great tumult was aroused, and a multitude poured into the Forum from all sides. Revolt and secession swayed the masses. The government could not quell the riot; the plebeians voted to separate from Rome, and marched away to found a new city on the Sacred Mount.

That was the first labor strike in history. It was a general strike, too, and paralyzed the imperial city. Brutal wealth had filched the bread of poverty, patrician had preyed upon plebeian, and classes had exploited the masses of Rome until special privilege had brought down upon her sacred head the wrath of outraged justice, and turned a situation that had long been intolerable for the many into one now intolerable for the few. That strike brought Rome to her knees, praying at the feet of those of her citizens she had cursed. Peace was purchased by the granting of tribunes to the plebs to be the guardians of their interests. That was but the first victory for the people, though, for there was from now on in the Forum a class conflict that only centuries of yielding on the part of autocracy could end.

The success of this first plebeian revolt led to further efforts at reform through the Tribunate. A notable advance was made under the tribune Volero Publilius in 471 B. C. By his efforts the plebeian Assembly of Tribes was freed from patrician domination and turned into a popular assembly. This step has been justly pronounced "one of the most important in its consequences with which Roman history has to deal," for it marks the beginning of the end of exclusive patrician government.

Further progress toward democracy in Rome was achieved in the Twelve Tables of 451-450 B. C. This codification of precedents and laws gave a written constitution as a safeguard against unlimited personal government. Civil and social equality between patricians and plebeians was in a measure

given legal establishment. However, it was only those plebs who had become rich that as yet enjoyed much privilege. Still the rights of private property in houses and lands were at this time clearly established. All the important offices of the state were filled by nobles as a hereditary right. The Assembly of Tribes elected only some minor officials. The Senate had the veto power over all elections, legislation, and administration.

In 450 B.C. oppression again resulted in a plebeian revolt. Remembering how a half-century before their fathers had brought the ruling class to its knees, the plebs again seceded from the city to the Sacred Mount. Their movement caused an overturn of the government and the restoration of the Tribunate. It lead, moreover, to the Valero-Horatian Statute of the following year, which has been called the "Magna Charta of Rome." By this act the tribal assembly was constituted a lawmaking body whose resolutions became law when approved by the Senate. By it also the right to listen to the deliberations of the Senate was conferred upon the tribunes, and thus was opened the way to their final power of veto over the acts of that body.

The Licinian Laws of 367 B.C. came as another plebeian victory. By them the plebeians were granted admission to the consulate; and from this time on they easily won the right to other offices, such as the dictatorship and the censorship in 350, and the praetorship in 337. So it came about, as Ferrero, the historian, says, that—

> the old hereditary and exclusive aristocracy was gradually transformed into a mixed nobility of rich proprietors, who felt no difficulty in making concessions to the democratic spirit of the middle class, as it grew in importance with its increase in wealth and numbers.

However, though the old blooded nobility had been superseded by a rich class big enough to take in the plebeians who could qualify, Rome's real fight for democracy—that against

this aristocracy of wealth — was still to come. The Licinian Laws made only a beginning in the regulation of wealth. They forbade any to possess more than 500 *jugera* of public land, and provided that each poor citizen should have seven *jugera*. They further threw safeguards about the free laborer's right to employment by decreeing that employers must have free laborers in proportion to slaves.

In 358 B. C. began the age of legislative and juridical activity on the part of the popular assembly. The qualifications of candidates for public office were prescribed, the powers and functions of magistrates declared, fiscal laws enacted, and the conditions of citizenship laid down. This period culminated in 287 B. C. with the Lex Hortensia, which decreed that the approval of the Senate was no longer necessary for the making of laws. It ended the veto power of the Roman lords. Here again victory was scored by an incipient revolution, by the pressure brought to bear upon the dominant class by a third secession of the plebs. This triumph, however, did not signify much, for the nobles contrived to get control of the plebeian tribunate and to hold the people in check by a corrupting patronage. They were able to manage the tribunes more easily now, perhaps for the reason indicated by Professor Botsford, namely, that the expanding empire and citizenship made these magistrates no longer adequately representative. As Ferrero significantly remarks, "The constitution of the Republic remained fundamentally aristocratic, for the new mixed nobility of patricians and plebeians well understood how to retain their predominant position."

Caius Flaminius, called the first great leader of Roman democracy, came to the Tribunate in 132 B. C., and launched out upon an agrarian policy for the relief of the plebs. The Gallic War resulted, and the common people led Rome through it to victory. The nobles admitted the principle of popular sovereignty. Perhaps the constitution was at its best at this

time. Political and legal democracy was probably more nearly realized than at any period of the Roman Republic. From now until the Empire the course of democracy was uncertain. Now and then there were temporary gains, but there were no real constitutional victories. The Gracchi were, of course, great democrats, and when in 133 B. C. the first of them came to the Tribunate with his far-reaching land policy, it looked like the dawn of a new day for the Roman masses. Tiberius Gracchus, says Plutarch, had traveled through Etruria and seen a deserted country tilled, if at all, only by barbarian slaves. This sight of a people dispossessed of their land by the rich suggested his agrarian policy. That program involved not only the restoration of the public domain to the propertyless, but also a decided limiting of the amount of land that anyone could own. The Agrarian Law, enacted in 119 B. C., seemed therefore to be the real beginning of economic equality. It had little effect, however, and was speedily swept away in 111 B. C. by the aristocracy; and Rome found herself launched upon a course of private exploitation never before or since paralleled. The land monopoly grew more and more extensive and social conditions steadily more desperate.

Withal, Roman government was most democratic after the establishment of the Empire. It was a constitutional state—an imperial democracy. The development of Roman law in its democratic aspects might be traced, but the purpose of this chapter is only to indicate the rise of democracy in Rome and to note its general character. That has been done; and nothing new in principle that need detain us was brought forth in the imperial period.

When all is said, Rome's achievement, like that of Athens, was only an approach to political and legal liberty and equality. Superior to that of Athens in its scope and in the extent of its constitution, it was yet a very limited democracy. Despite all the struggles, all the revolutionary efforts, and all the

reforms that had taken place in centuries, Rome remained divided into two sharply separated classes — the Optimates and the Populares — the rich and the poor. The aristocratic patrician and the enslaved plebeian had passed. The alignment was no longer on blood, but on wealth. And that wealth was a most brutal institution. It prevailed over all Roman life. All the concessions that had given political and legal liberty had not really widened the opportunities of the many. Ferrero says:

> From an absolutely unmeasured luxury, which was possible only to the very richest, life passed down at one step, to a primitive level, where food was of the very simplest and pleasure meant a rare evening of dissipation or inebriety, or a free festival provided by the priests or the plutocrats or the government.

From the plateau of wealth there was a plunge into the abyss of poverty. There were no gradations in the social scale. The rich are estimated as consisting of about two thousand families. Cicero gave tribune Philippus as authority for the statement that the entire commonwealth could not muster over two thousand property-owners. The land and the wealth were their almost exclusively. Varro tells that some of the domains of the Roman nobility were so great in extent that they could not ride around them on horseback. Their estates ranged in value from $100,000 to $8,000,000 and $10,000,000. Though not large in terms of the wealth of the present age, they were enormous in terms of the wealth of ancient Rome. Throughout the Italian Peninsula there was a population of some six or seven million free men and some thirteen or fourteen million slaves. During the second and third centuries of the Christian era the slaves increased until they outnumbered free men three to one. These were the proletariat. One-fifth of the state's revenue was at times doled out to them in free breadstuff that they might not starve. In the city of Rome itself a third of a million sometimes lived off public charity.

The rich grew ever richer and the poor ever more desperate, until during the last days of the Republic and the early years of the Empire this commonwealth of millionaires and beggars confronted an economic situation that could not have been more deplorable and a social problem unequaled in past or present civilization. And this condition of affairs had arisen notwithstanding the development of a fairly democratic constitution.

It is pertinent to inquire why this was so. Why had the wealth of Rome gravitated into the hands of a very few while the ranks of the wretched had swelled to such prodigious proportions that the tumultuousness of their misery, of their unrest, and of their bitter plaint made Rome tremble from her foundations? The answer is by no means simple, but the explanation may be sought in that sequence of events which had forced Rome into certain positions and had forged upon her the shackles of a policy that means inevitable destruction for any society — namely, a militaristic policy. From early days she had been compelled to fight for her life against the powerful Etruscan League on the north. No sooner had she broken the Etruscan supremacy than the central Italian cities called on her for protection against the Celtic invasion. Accepting the responsibility of this position of natural protector, she was not slow to exact tribute and obedience from those she befriended. This subordination of other cities to her converted the city by the Tiber into the Roman state, whose *imperium* was soon extended over the entire peninsula.

This position of protector, together with the wars it entailed, initiated a policy of exploitation. The annexed territory was heavily taxed; and the wealth of the land began to flow to the Imperial City and into the coffers of the few. The farmers were drafted into the army, and their lands, neglected through absences, rapidly deteriorated. Impoverished and exhausted lands failed to yield war taxes, and mort-

gages resulted. The wealthy senators and the dominant class from whom law had emanated and brought about this situation, together with the parvenu rich of Rome, now became the money-lenders. The usurious rate of fifty to seventy-five per cent which they exacted rapidly drove the farming class into bankruptcy. When failure came, the debtors were sentenced to serve indefinitely in the army. Thus the lands of Italy fell to the few. The situation in Africa, where, it is said by Pliny, six grandees owned nearly all the Roman domain, was typical of that in the Empire generally. Pliny observed that these large estates were ruining Rome and her provinces, and Nero, when he put some of these monopolists to death, said the same in exclaiming, *"Latifundia perdidere Italiam."* Thus Rome came to have a rich class, an army, and a wretched body of serfs.

The policy of exploitation as practiced in Rome has been justly called humanitarian in comparison with the usual methods of the ancient world. The Assyrian, Babylonian, Hittite, and Egyptian empires had either put the vanquished to the sword or carried them away as slaves into captivity. But Rome, instead of following world precedents in this respect, left the conquered on the soil in possession of their property and exploited them through taxation and compulsory service in the army. Impoverished, this peasantry sank into miserable serfdom under feudal lords of wealth instead of blood, who were wholly wanting in the *noblesse oblige* of chivalry. Therefore Rome had a tremendous social problem with which to cope. There was bitter discontent everywhere throughout the empire. Bread riots were common in the cities. The rich class, fearful of the rising tide of popular misery, resorted to many schemes to relieve the stress. Chief among these devices was one based upon the old traditional custom of *Vera Sacra,* or the springtime migration of the youth of a crowded place to some new seat. So Rome planted colonies to get rid

of her proletariat malcontents. Caesar, for instance, in the course of a few years, sent out 80,000. Long before Caesar's day, Sicily and Sardinia had been colonized and the war with Carthage had resulted. The colonial and imperialistic policy only meant more war, more armies, more taxes, more exploitation, more bankruptcy, more poverty, more peasants plunged into serfdom and slavery, and more social disturbance and unrest everywhere. And thus Rome was driven on and on in that vicious circle.

The course of war and exploitation once begun had its inevitable consequences, from which there was no deliverance. Those consequences, as has been made clear, were a wealthy class and a degraded populace; oppression on the one hand and social unrest to the verge of revolution on the other. Says Letourneau:

> Once started, the movement did not stop. Their conquests gave them slaves by the million; little by little the small free landowners, unable to withstand the competition of the owners of the *latifundia*, were ousted, forced into debt, and, in consequence, themselves compelled to furnish servile labor, since the creditor had the right of seizure upon his debtor. In time Roman society, in Italy and outside it, ended by being made up only of a minority of large landowners exploiting a multitude of slaves. The condition of these became, it is true, gradually less harsh than that of the slaves in early Rome; it was softened into colonage or serfdom.

Imperial democracy politically and legally but imperial oligarchy economically and socially was the state of Rome. Mommsen's summing up of the situation as it was in Rome reads:

> All the arrant sins that capital has been guilty of against nation and civilization in the modern world remain as far inferior to the abominations of the ancient capitalist state as the free man, be he ever so poor, remains superior to the slave.

For generations it seemed that revolution would break loose and overturn the economic order and force democracy into that realm; but it did not come. The crisis similar to that which precipitated the French Revolution appeared often at hand, but it never arrived. Incipient revolts like that headed by Marcus Brutus did occur, but they were quickly suppressed, and Rome went doggedly on her beaten way. There was no great upheaval. The abyss yawned, but not sufficiently to devour the lofty heights. But why? What prevented the overwhelming cohorts of Demos from sweeping the heights of plutocracy clear of their ruthless herd? Why did democracy cease to conquer?

3. *The End of Roman Democracy*

Many causes working together brought about the cessation of democratic efforts. Doubtless, one of the most fundamental was the diminution of surplus energy, physical, material, mental, and, moral, in the masses. Militarism had sapped the life of the Roman populace. This loss removed not only the incentive but also the power that enabled the plebeians to advance their interests. Cooperating with this waning of energy was the loss of leadership. Some have thought this latter the chief factor in halting the forces of Roman progress, for those who were capable of directing the social reform movements became interested in another cause—an anti-social cause, as it were—that was then sweeping over the Empire. That cause was none other than Christianity. It was therefore Christos who finally conquered Demos in Rome.

This conquest, suggests F. H. Giddings, came about in the following manner: Among the Jews in a remote province a hope had arisen, a hope born of despair as century after century they were crushed by successive conquerors. That hope is known to the student of Jewish tradition as the

Apocalyptic hope. It was the dream of a worsted and beaten people, whose other dreams had all proved false, and who, seeing no way of escape on this earth, cast their eyes heavenward and saw help coming from the skies. They saw God about to intervene in human affairs. They saw Him descending, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the sound of a trump, sweeping away the old order and causing a new heaven and a new earth to appear. Such was the teaching of the prophetic school to which the writers of "Daniel," "Ezekiel," "Zechariah," and other portions of the Jewish Scriptures belong. Passing over as a legacy from Judaism to Christianity, this teaching became the faith of the early church, and the Christians likewise hoped for a cataclysm in which the Roman Empire should suddenly be brought to an end and the Kingdom of God ushered in to take its place. By thus diverting attention from human efforts to divine intervention, Christianity thwarted the democratic movement. Or, to put it in the words of Rousseau, "Far from attaching the hearts of the citizens to the state, Christianity detached them from all things of this world." Thus captivated, the men of the age who were capable of inciting and leading a social revolt ceased their efforts to reform Roman society altogether. And why should they not, since God was coming to do it for them? Thus it was, in part at least, that Roman democracy was robbed of its motive — Samson shorn of his locks. As a consequence, the social struggle speedily vanished in passivity, fighting gave way to faith, and reform to visions of God's intervention.

It is difficult for us today really to measure the force of that other-worldly influence in Roman society, but it was tremendous. It took hold of the Roman mind with all the power of a new and entrancing hope, and, at the same time freeing from the necessity of arduous struggle against existing conditions, it literally enthralled all who fell under its

spell. In the light of current radical interpretation, Christianity ought to have been a boon to the cause of democracy; it ought to have been a great force for social equality; but in reality it had no such significance. To be sure, it taught equality — but not social equality. There was no Christian thought of equality in the Roman world; it was in the other world. And that other-world interest apparently played havoc with social endeavor, and has sometimes continued its stultifying work even unto our day.

It should be pointed out in this connection, however, that the Christianity which ended Roman democracy was far different from the social program of Jesus of Nazareth. The latter was truly democratic and worldly in its emphasis, and in no sense an antisocial force. Had the movement initiated by the Man of Nazareth spread abroad uncorrupted, *finis* would not have been written beneath the reform of antiquity. Nor is it probable that the world would still be needing a social Messiah.

So ended democracy in the Roman Empire; Christos had vanquished Demos. But down even beneath the subverting influence of Christianity and affording a preparation for its effective operation, it is obvious to one who studies the social situation in that age that plutocracy itself, with the policy it fastened upon the state, was the fundamental cause which prevented the complete triumph of the masses. For it had sucked away their energy like a vampire until they were powerless, and had turned their reason into mere emotion chasing phantom kingdoms and other-worldly mirages that led only to ruin.

CHAPTER III

Modern Democracy

Every one to count for one and no one for more than one. — BENTHAM.

Everybody knows more than anybody. — LINCOLN.

WITH the fall of Greco-Roman democracy, the second reign of Demos was at an end. That came nearly two thousand years ago. Then followed a long interregnum before the third democratic struggle, that of our day, began. For it was only a little more than a century ago that the conflict was renewed.

1. *The Rise of Modern Democracy*

To trace the rise of this movement in the modern world is not our main purpose, but a few of the great steps should be noted. From antiquity the medieval philosophers brought over the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and the Roman jurists. They pondered well the political ideas contained therein, and passed them on to succeeding generations of thinkers. Sometimes they boldly advocated them, as did Arnold of Brescia of the twelfth century, who was the first this side of antiquity, apparently to proclaim popular sovereignty to be right. But ideas of any sort were not easily popularized then, and democratic notions did not become common. In fact, the social capacity of the masses of Europe was not sufficiently developed to receive them. It took the Renaissance and the Reformation to awaken and individualize the many and make them socially self-conscious before ideas of social revolution could work with much headway. To be sure, in England Magna Charta had been wrested from King John, but that was

probably the work of the nobles in the interest of the few, and not a popular idea or movement. The first hint of democratic notions being common was in the Peasants' War of the sixteenth century, when equality of wealth and conditions was generally talked of.

The fascinating doctrines of natural law were really the first ideas making for democracy that became popularized to any great extent in the modern age. The Puritan Revolution was largely motivated by them; the right of rebellion, the contract theory, government by the governed, the natural liberty and equality of all men, were some of the conclusions this revolt drew from them and made practical. Though the victory of the ideas advocated by the Independents was not consummated, the ideas themselves marched on to the hearts of the commonalty. Passed along through the writings of John Locke, they soon reached France, where the logic of Rousseau drove them home. Here was exalted the notion that Demos is the sovereign will to which all wills must surrender. Here democracy first became the passion of the people.

However, the real birthplace of the institutions of modern democracy was America. From England the Whig principles had come with the colonists, but more potent than these ideas for the fostering of democracy were the conditions of life in the New World. A frontier land, where the soil was free, where society was free, where traditions did not bind, where there was great equality of fortune, chance, culture, and means, where men were laws unto themselves and themselves the source of laws — here grew naturally democratic institutions in politics, religion, business, and society. Here such institutions were brought to birth. They might have come long before in other parts of the world, for they had been conceived; but as a matter of fact there was no room for them to be born elsewhere. Had their nativity been announced, straightway an edict would have gone out that they

should be destroyed. Here, then, in America it was, as on the frontiers of the ancient Aegean, that little groups of pioneers had room and a chance to exercise sovereignty over themselves and institute in some cases pure democracies. From such institutions, small though they were, larger ones grew until, as G. L. Scherger has shown, the Bill of Rights — formulated in the several colonies and blossoming most perfectly in the Virginia Bill of Rights of June 12, 1776 — was but the flower of a plant purely indigenous to American soil. In the Virginia instrument democracy was made a political platform for the first time in the modern age. The Declaration of Independence came as the ripened fruit of that plant. That declaration, in the words of Bancroft, "was the voice of reason going forth to speak a new political world into being." Political democracy was indeed given being; the liberty of the state whose people were sovereign was achieved.

A fuller democracy was yet to be won in France, however, where Demos had long been growing, and was now ready to rise and claim his heritage. Inspired by America, he did arise to complete her work in a revolution that was not only political and administrative but social as well, and to announce "the arrival of a new era for the world." The Declaration of the Rights of Man was really the proclamation of the age of democracy. In the words of Scherger, it is truly said that:

> While the Rights of Man had been asserted by Americans against an external foe, these same doctrines proclaimed by the French people became a declaration of war against the privileged classes. The conditions which the *Declaration of the Rights of Man* presupposed did not exist in France, as they did, to a considerable extent at least, in America, and therefore liberty, equality, and popular sovereignty had first to be won. . . . . The Rights of Man became a mass of dynamite which shattered the entire social and political fabric.

Great was the day when the Third Estate seized the National Assembly and the Parisian populace stormed the Bas-

tile. With class government abolished and the citadel of despotism demolished at that one stroke, well might Charles James Fox, the British statesman, exclaim: "How much the greatest and how much the best event that ever happened in the world!"

Many factors contributed to the rise of Demos to power in our age; but perhaps the most important of them all was the invention of gunpowder. Without it ideas would have made slow headway. In fact, gunpowder has proved the most effective and the quickest of all social equalizers ever invented. It has made infantry equal or superior to the cavalry of the nobles; it has enabled the peasant to cope with the prince; it has raised the people to the level of the peer in war; and it has limited the lord by the liberty of the peasant in peace. The American and French revolutions were due to it. Gunpowder still has great democratic possibilities. Perhaps we do not care to know just how great, but let it not be forgotten that when ideas fail here is an instrument that fails not.

The world's first democracy, rising in savagery, fell before civilization. The second kingdom of Demos, appearing in Athens, flourished in Rome and went down before Christianity. The third movement, springing from the soil of America and growing to a great giant on the banks of the Seine, bids fair not to fall at all. Parliamentary government has arisen in a decade in Russia, Persia, Turkey, and China. Demos in France, Demos in America, Demos in England, in Europe, in Asia, is everywhere the rumor. A Frankenstein Monster he appears to some, an implacable Demon to others, but to a growing multitude the King of Kings.

2. *What Is Democracy?*

Surveying briefly the history of democracy, we have found the world of today ready for its conquests. We may now

pause and inquire into the character of this conquering power. And if we shall succeed in formulating a clear notion as to the nature of democracy, we shall do well; for what it is and is to be has been the eternal question of politics. What democracy is and what it has been are questions upon which much has been written. No attempt will be made to add anything new, save as a restatement of the old is new; but an effort to clarify our minds on the subject may be worth while.

Primitive democracy was assumed to be dead-level equality. Civil democracy is, in contrast, the equality of unequals. The former is natural; the latter, artificial. The equality of primitive men was natural because there were no individuals who were unsocialized; but that of civilized men must be artificial because they have come to be individuals in the strict sense of that word; and where such individuals are, there inequality is. They are unequal in muscle, unequal in mind, unequal in morals, unequal in money; and, if there be any equality at all, it must be created. What, then, is it when created? It inheres in a like sharing of the same rights, privileges, and opportunities. It is generally believed that if it be extended beyond this, it becomes illegitimate democracy, such as the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution or the Commune of Paris of 1871 sought to bring forth.

We see this imposed equality called democracy in three spheres — the state, the government, and society. Democracy in the state is general sovereignty. It is an equal exercise of the suffrage by all and a like participation in creating the actual power that rules at a given time. Democracy in the government is the actual rule by universal suffrage, which has meant the meeting of men in mass, as in the cantons of Switzerland or in the New England town for the administration of the affairs of the people, by the people, and for the people. Democracy in society means an equal sharing of all in the organization and control of non-political associations, in the

enjoyment of opportunity and the possession of goods, and a like voice in creating that basic authority which we call public opinion.

In only a limited degree is equality to be found anywhere. While at its best in the realm of the state, in no state is there really equal participation in the sovereignty. The franchise for all members of any society has not yet been won. Even where both sexes share it alike, there is yet an age limit excluding the immature in years. A family suffrage has been proposed which would change the unit from the individual to the household, and which, if adopted, might afford the most perfect equality possible in the state, but such equality is yet to be established.

In the field of government there is in general even less equality. This is a sphere fit only for the gods, said Rousseau, and too perfect for man. Where republicanism prevails there is a form of equality but one step removed from absolutism and far distant from real democracy. Government by assembly or mass meetings is quite impossible for great numbers, but representation is by no means a satisfactory substitute.

> Every law is void which the people do not ratify in person and no law. The English believe themselves to be free. They deceive themselves. They are free only during the time they elect members of Parliament. When these are elected they are slaves; they are nothing.

Thus commented Rousseau on representative government. He was persuaded that the general will was only the sum of the individual wills, and could not be delegated. The people, therefore, in order to have a real democracy must participate directly in making laws. The legislators and magistrates must be on the same level with them; and they must exercise themselves to see that their will is executed. Two movements are on foot and running well to bring this popular sovereignty

about. One looks to the control of the representative by nominating him through primary elections. It also provides for the recall of officials, when elected, at the will of the electors. The short-ballot scheme which proposes fewer elective offices with large appointive power has its merits, but it looks away from direct government in search of a remedy for corrupt government and is destined to futility. Not less democracy but more — more intelligent, efficient, vigilant democracy — is imperative.

The other movement is toward direct legislation. This is seen in the strong tendencies to make the legislator a mere agent instead of a principal. Public opinion is becoming the principal. It is determining the policy, instructing the representative as its agent, and standing guard while its mandates are being carried out. The legislator has little initiative and less independence left him in American political affairs. The American public is seizing its legislative agencies that government may be by the people. This is true in particular of our state affairs. The power of state legislators is waning and the tendency is to make them mere committees for drafting measures whose origin and final disposition pertain to the voters themselves. America has departed widely from the theory entertained by the founders of the Republic. Republicanism is giving place to democracy. But direct legislation is also evolving a new machinery. This is the initiative and referendum. As this invention is perfected, the function of the legislative institution will be entirely altered if not dispensed with altogether. Direct government is a desideratum that Demos will not long forego.

In the third realm, that of social life *per se,* the least equality is found. Here in truth inequality holds almost undisputed mastery.

It is evident, then, that the artificial equality, wherein consists democracy as it is, is only legal and political. While these

realms are of vast significance, and democracy's place in them large, its range is withal limited.

The idea of democracy held by Rousseau made men free and equal by nature. A return to that primitive state was his dream. He concluded the first book of his *Social Contract* by saying:

> The fundamental compact does not destroy natural equality, but substitutes a moral and legitimate equality for the physical inequalities nature may have put between men, so that, though they be unequal in strength or intellect, they all become equal by convention and right.

He here states, as we have pointed out, that democracy is an artificial equality. However, he does not confine it to matters political and legal but makes it general. Inspired by him, the French people tried to make it absolute, tried to restore the primitive social order. When our forefathers in the Declaration of Independence said it is "self-evident that all men are created equal," they, with the school of Rousseau, were evidently idealizing primitive society. But they were also seeking to create an equality that was not natural. Their idea of democracy was a social order without unequal privileges in affairs of state and government. They wanted to end by legal means certain artificial privileges in the social economy as well. However, they must have been fully aware of the fact that as men were there was natural inequality in abundance.

There is a notion of democracy somewhat widely prevalent and cordially entertained which would seem to imply that the rule of Demos means the proletariat come to power — the *bourgeoisie* supplanted by the laboring masses in the control of society. But if that were attained, would it be true democracy? Hardly, for it would give only an inverted order of society with the supposed superiors put under the inferiors — the small potatoes, so to speak, on top instead of at the bottom. To be sure there is no good reason why the small

ones should not be on top. Were they there, more would be on top, and who can say that the quality of society would be any the worse for the number and the size of those in ascendency? However, it would be only the domination of a single class, large though it be, and not the rule of all—not the reign of Demos, which means not that any part of the people but that all shall share alike in the life of society.

William Edward Hartpole Lecky, the English historian, considered democracy the rule of the ignorant. Seeing much unwise legislation by the democratic states of the nineteenth century, he concluded, since the many are incompetent, democracy is inevitably the rule of fools. Nor was he alone in his thought of it. Hear some of the early statesmen and intellects of America, Alexander Hamilton for instance, roaring, "The people, sir, the people is a great beast," and the president of Yale University a hundred years ago declaring, "We have a country governed by blockheads and knaves; can the imagination point anything more dreadful on this side of hell?" John Graham Brooks in his *Social Unrest* cites an interesting passage from Adams' *History of the United States,* which passage, Adams says, gives the estimate of democracy held by many Americans. He says:

> A democracy is scarcely tolerated at any period of national history. Its omens are always sinister, and its powers are unpropitious. It is on its trial here, and the issue will be civil war, desolation, and anarchy. No wise man but discerns its imperfections, no good man but shudders at its miseries, no honest man but proclaims its fraud, and no brave man but draws his sword against its force. The institution of a scheme or policy so radically contemptible and vicious is a memorable example of what the villainy of some men can devise, the folly of others receive, and both establish in spite of reason, reflection, and sensation.

Lecky's observation, if not his conclusion, was correct. The many are prone to be moved by emotion instead of reason; consequently their rule is often the coercion of mere numbers.

Still, mass action may be prompted by social feelings that represent the inherited wisdom of the race. Crude though it be and evil because mere brute force against mind, mass action has been more often good than bad. It has been many times the only available weapon for the multitudes in their struggles against privilege, wealth, injustice, and inhumanity. Intellect when arrayed against them is a thing to be hated and humbled by that might which is the wisdom of fools. Mass action is a fault of democracy but it is only a fault and one which is as necessary as flesh to spirit, so long as it is possible for spirit to oppress the flesh. But Lecky's conclusion that democracy is altogether and always the rule of fools hardly stands. If it does, what of Aristotle's observation that democracy is the rule of the best or the wise—the natural aristocracy? It seems that both cannot be right. But paradoxical as it may be, both are right. Democracy as it is may be said to be the rule both of fools and of wise men, for it takes the two classes to make a society. Lecky saw only the crowd while Aristotle saw their leaders, but the two occur in conjunction instead of apart. There are leaders to propose and crowds to dispose.

Resort to an unpublished analysis made by F. H. Giddings will make this clear. Let any group of men whatsoever come together and let any proposition be submitted to them and they will straightway split into two parties over it. There will be a majority who will feel, and a minority who will feel but also think about it. This minority will in turn split into a major party which will feel and plan, and a minor party which will act. This final fragment is the germ cell of all social force and initiative. Giddings has called it the social "protocracy." It furnishes leaders or "protocrats" for the rest. Now the "protocrat" may be an autocrat, a plutocrat, a bureaucrat, a democrat, or just a plain "crat" without other name, good, bad, or indifferent, a boss or a statesman, a demagogue or a patriot,

or any leader whatsoever. If the "protocrat" be a demagogue who proposes to society and is accepted as a leader, democracy is then, as Lecky saw it, inevitably the rule of fools. If, however, the "protocrat" be a statesman who proposes and is accepted as a guide, democracy is then, as Aristotle saw it, the rule of the wise. A "protocrat" is always a suitor whose personality is likely to fascinate more than his sayings. The maiden sees the man who is courting her, but may not hear him. The experienced woman hears, but may not see. Experience has taught her that sayings are more than suitors; proposals, more than proposers. The populace needs maturity's experience with "protocrats." For want of it, it is much like a bevy of giggling girls, much given to gabbling over suitors but little devoted to the serious discussion of propositions. It is wont to choose between personalities rather than between principles. This proclivity is one of the gravest dangers of democracy at its present stage of development.

Withal, a natural aristocracy, as Aristotle observed, really dominates in democracy as we know it. Employing the phrase coined by some American novelist, it may be said there is a reign of quality in place of equality. Many inequalities created by man have been swept from the political and legal realms, but natural inequality has not been removed. It is the *sine qua non* of society as it now is. In its name the social realm stands almost inviolable before Demos. Equality is good, but in the judgment of many, when it would go beyond certain limits, it becomes bad. To idealize the primitive world and set before us as a goal its dead-level life is a folly long since dismissed by the wise. Thus far hast thou come, Lord Demos, but farther thou canst not, is the decree. What has been and what is, is to be; but nothing more. Such is the prevalent attitude toward democracy in many quarters.

The dominance of natural inequality in the third sphere to which democracy aspires, the social sphere, brings us face to

face with the problem of modern democracy's limitations. That problem must now receive our attention.

3. Limitations of Modern Democracy

The persistent desire of humanity for inequality challenges the progress of democracy everywhere. C. A. Ellwood in his *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects* says in this relation:

> It is manifest that this peculiarly human tendency of self-assertion and self-display is at the basis of much in the life of civilized societies. While self-display may express itself in present society in more aesthetic forms than it did in the barbarian and savage stage, it is, nevertheless, quite as strong in civilized man as in primitive man. Again, self-assertion may be seemingly held in check by the modern gospel of equality and democracy; but we see on every hand sufficient evidence to show us that the love of power and the tendency to self-assertion are quite as strong now as ever they were. In fact, it may be doubted whether man has not a greater love for inequality than for equality. Much of the so-called passion for equality is simply due to the desire of those lower in the social scale to assert themselves as the equals of those who are socially more fortunate. It is only in the humanitarian few that the love of equality, based upon a strong development of altruistic instincts, may be said to truly exist at all. Hence, upon analysis we find that the love of equality in the strict sense must be considered a comparatively weak tendency in human nature.

The spirit of inequality is conspicuously evident in the persistent and almost universal desire of man for the acquisition of personal prestige of any kind whatsoever; for the possession of anything, however trivial and valueless in itself, that may exalt him above his fellows; in short, for whatever may create an inequality, real or seeming, between him and others. And the American, for all his supposedly democratic ideals and his vociferous eulogizing of equality, is quite susceptible to this prevalent ambition for vainglory. The natives of the South Sea Islands would trade whole archipelagoes for a handful of red feathers wherewith to decorate themselves.

The American Croesus does even better; he barters a daughter and a few million dollars thrown in for a single feather—an aristocratic family title—that, adorned with it, he may disclaim relationship with the common crowd. Truly, feathers are an ancient and an abiding fascination.

Men and birds are quite akin. Both are fascinated by feathers for the like reason that they give individuality and confer distinction. If it were not for them, similarity would be painful. There would be no way of telling your proper associates, and birds of a feather could not get together at all. Pluck your rooster, your turkey gobbler, your pheasant, your peacock, and all your lordly fowls, and who then could tell their species, so alike are they in reality? That ancient worthy who, accepting the definition that man is a biped without feathers, plucked a cock and exclaimed, "Behold your man!" may have been just as serious as clever. Anyhow, the fact is that without feathers the natural differences among us would be slight.

Feathers are of divers kinds and colors. The two chief kinds are natural and acquired. Natural ones are native superiorities, extraordinary powers, talents, or unusual endowments of character. To be adorned with such ornaments of quality confers just distinction, and so long as we accept nature's work with approval, merits respect. Natural aristocracy cannot and ought not be discounted. It should be prized as the ideal type to be striven for. Ultimate democracy looks with ill favor upon inferiority or even mediocrity. It demands the utmost individuation. It would raise the type to a common level, but in no case lower it to get equality. Acquired feathers are assumed superiorities and artificial privileges, prerogatives, and distinctions. Of these there are a number of well-known varieties.

Genealogies, for instance, are much in vogue just now in America. Those deep-dyed with royal purple are most

desired. They are of slow growth naturally, but artificial means of producing them are known. "Proud-plumage" makers have arisen, whose output is stamped and guaranteed genuine. The real quality, of course, depends upon the price you can pay. It is a pretty small purse that cannot command a genealogy that will at least admit the bearer to the D. A. R. or the Colonial Dames, but if it is a fat purse of Rockefeller length, there is nothing to hinder anyone posing as the scion of a king or two and reclining under a family tree whose growth, though apparently natural, has not been without the aid of magic. Of the making of this class of feathers there is no end. The flocking of full-fledged birds of this kind is a growing phenomenon in our midst. Societies supposed to be patriotic but in reality based on the principle of displaying one's ancestry flourish. The classification of citizens according to conditions of birth, and the chasing down of family names in order to find some means of getting into this or that class, or of making a new one, are shallow and contemptible manias now menacing American ideals. More and more the preferments of many of our leading institutions go to the sons and daughters of "first" or "leading" families. The "good names" are coming to be "great pulls." For a long time they have been such among the old Southern stock of our country, but the rôle is a relatively new and growing one in the North. Genealogies help get jobs, and the desire for place furnishes the incentive for such qualifications. Hugo Münsterberg tells us, for instance, that the seven men who govern Harvard University are chosen solely because of confidence in their ability, etc. "And yet," says he, "it is no accident that among those seven men there is not one whose family has not been of service to the state of Massachusetts for seven generations." Perhaps no castes have yet made their appearance on account of family preferments, but a caste-making process has its roots in the practice.

Then, too, there are titles, perhaps the most sought of all artificial feathers. They run up the scale through fraternal, official, scholastic, clerical, and military to those of hereditary nobilities. In every countryside, village, town, and city, the flutter of fraternal plumage is to be heard, accompanied by no little squabbling over it. Harmless pleasure, perhaps, but nevertheless, does it not serve to engender, feed, and keep alive the beast Inequality?

And what a strutful and haughty temper is the almost inseparable concomitant of titles of military rank, high and low—those gay peacock plumes so coveted by many! An English writer dwells as follows upon their baneful influence in his country, for which imperialism gives so much opportunity:

> As the despotic portion of our Empire has grown in area, a larger and larger number of men trained in the temper and methods of autocracy as soldiers and civil officials in our crown colonies, protectorates, and Indian Empire . . . . return to this country, bringing back the characters, sentiments, and ideas imposed by this foreign environment. Everywhere they stand for coercion.

This spirit of inequality begotten through military rank never dies out. A liking for it is growing in American life.

Titles of nobility, however decadent the feudalism that originated them, are yet supreme objects of desire. Those who, like Gladstone or Ernst Haeckel, in the name of equality spurn the empty honors when proffered are the rare democrats of the age. And nowhere really are they more rare than in this land of America, if our title-hunting penchant, which shows an unabating activity, means anything. Like buzzards about a carcass, many hover on the outskirts of dead and worthless nobilities, watching their chance to swoop down and pluck a feather. They are ready with prostrated honor and fabulous fortune to buy the privilege. It is estimated that in about half a century more than six hundred American families have bartered daughters for European titles. We may note

a few instances as we run down the list published not long ago in the editorial columns of a leading New York daily. Mrs. S., it is said, paid fifty millions for the privilege of being Duchess of Braganza; Miss M. G., ten millions to become the Duchess of Roxburghe; Miss C. V., a like sum to be Duchess of Marlborough; Mrs. H., three millions for the eighth Duchess-ship of Marlborough; and Miss L., five millions to be Duchess of Suffolk. Miss L. G. is reported to have given two millions to be the Marchioness de Breteriel; Miss N. I., two millions to be Countess Ferdinand Colloredos Mannsfeld; Miss A. G., many millions to be Countess de Castellane; and Miss V. G., a great sum to be Lady Decies; and lately a man, Mr. William Astor, has expatriated himself for a British lordship. What others have given in ducats for ducal or lesser honors no one knows. What tribute has been paid to inequality can be counted only as the influence of conspicuous example in our social life can be measured. Some have thought this mania for title buying sufficiently menacing to demand a law for its regulation. A bill was recently introduced in Congress with that in view. It proposed to lay a supertax of twenty-five per cent on the incomes of Americans marrying foreign titles. The author of this measure declared his object to be the protection of American democracy, which was being directly undermined by this practice and indirectly threatened by the begetting of a generation of aristocrats as the fruits of such marriages. Herbert Croly in *The Promise of American Life* declares that the energy of the average Englishman is—

> impaired by his complacent acceptance of positions of social inferiority and by the worship of degrading social distinction; and even the successful Englishmen suffer from a similar handicap. The latter rarely push their business successes home, because they themselves immediately begin to covet a place in the social hierarchy, and to that end are content with a certain established income.

If this be true of Englishmen, there are certainly good grounds for being fearful of the penchant for titles in America.

Other artificial distinctions and the desire for them are being cultivated on a rather wide scale. Once the servant of any sort whatsoever was respected in much of America. No uniforms or badges of servitude or marks of inferior place were tolerated. Now not only policemen, firemen, postmen, and public officials of certain classes are uniformed, but numerous kinds of personal attendants and employees are made to bear about habiliments of inequality. Those who in no other way are differentiated from the common herd take delight in liveried lackeys. They feel themselves distinguished thereby. It is astonishing how this custom spreads and creeps into places where it is least to be expected. It has recently insinuated itself into a well-known and famous theological seminary, whose corps of clerks, building superintendents, and office boys have been arrayed in brass-buttoned uniforms. The ostensible purpose, I suppose, is to fulfil the scriptural injunction to "do all things decently and in order"; but the real motive of it is to gratify the snobbishness of wealthy officials and faculty by preventing "inferiors" from being mistaken for equals or "superiors."

Conspicuous display grows apace with American prosperity. W. J. Ghent and others have called attention to it, but the most careless observer can see it for himself. For those who have neither genealogy nor title nor any of the more highly prized feathers, display through wasteful consumption of goods, employment of unnecessary labor, etc., on an unheard-of scale seems to give great satisfaction in gratifying the desire for inequality. To be sure, "display is an inveterate form of individuation older than humanity," as Walter Weyl says, but it has a new vogue just now among the American people.

We should not fail to note that feathers soften with age. They grow less proud and conspicuous from long wearing. In

the case of the human species, however, they are rarely ever molted. American plumage is newly acquired; it is for that reason very lofty, strutful, and fearful for itself. A new country, a new society, and new riches explain its highly artificial quality and the bad taste with which it is flaunted. In older lands, where it has long been familiar, it is much less obnoxious and perhaps less baleful in its influence. On large planes of such societies, there is apparently little desire for elevation and distinction. There is sometimes real contempt for it. Still it must not be forgotten that "all England loves a lord," and that in this is manifest a contentment of certain social planes with inferior rank quite as harmful as the aspiration for aristocratic standing. Withal it must be said that the wearing of feathers breeds a desire for more and more feathers, particularly in American society, until it has become an influence most seductive to the spirit of democracy.

The instinct of inequality never dies. Like hope, it seems to spring eternal in the human breast. Feathers of all kinds are its essence and the desire to possess them its spirit. Try to pluck them away, and ye gods! what a squealing and squalling and cackling there will be. So clever a democrat as Thomas Jefferson tried it to his dismay. When president of the United States he made an effort to practice *la vie égalitaire,* but the American eagle vied with all the cocks in Europe, the English Minister, the French Ambassador, and the democratic rooster in *squawking* it down. Robert Owen, the daring idealist, met with no better success. He tried it in his colony at New Harmony, Indiana, a half-century or more ago by prescribing equality of vestments. But over so simple a thing such a din went up from male and female alike as was never heard from common fowl before, and the colony was almost disrupted over the affair.

So we have in this sign of a trenchant hatred of equality a

most persistent enemy of democracy. Says Charles H. Cooley in *Social Organization*:

> Some tendency to isolation and spiritual impoverishment is likely to go with any sort of distinction or privilege. Wealth, culture, reputation bring special gratifications. These foster special tastes, and these in turn give rise to special ways of living and thinking which imperceptibly separate one from common sympathy and put him in a special class. If one has a good income, for instance, how natural it is to spend it; and how naturally, also, that expenditure withdraws one from familiar intercourse with people who have not a good income. Success means possessions, and possessions are apt to imprison the spirit.

Superficial though they be, feathers of any kind whatsoever, if long worn, engender a snobbishness which strikes deep root in human society. Deep clefts are forced in the planes, permanent inequalities established, and ultimate democracy prevented.

Much more significant for modern democracy than this spirit of inequality, however, is the monopolization of wealth and the feudalization of industry.

The concentration of wealth in the hands of a few is a widely published fact. It is one of common knowledge. The centralization of power through the control of wealth and its means of production, together with the increasing dependence of the many upon the will of the few, are facts somewhat less noted, but of far more alarming significance.

It has frequently been stated that one per cent of the American people owns ninety per cent of the national wealth. More conservative estimates of those who have tried to determine the facts from exceedingly meager and by no means typical data state that the poorest four-fifths of the American people own decidedly less than one-tenth of the total wealth, which, if we put the wealth at $100,000,000,000 and the population at 100,000,000 people, means $125 per capita or less. To

demonstrate or disprove these assertions conclusively would be impossible with the data now available. The notions are therefore only beliefs, not knowledge; and perhaps extravagant at that. But even so, there are facts strongly indicative of the development of such wealth-monopoly, if not conclusive proof that it already obtains. Land ownership in America tends to concentration in fewer hands, not alone as respects area, but perhaps more as regards value. The 1910 Census revealed the fact that about 200,000,000 of the total 878,798,325 acres of agricultural land in the United States were owned by less than 50,000 persons. This meant that about one-fourth of this land was in the possession of about six ten-thousandths of the population. There were many estates of millions of acres. Fifty-four owners had, it is said, nearly 27,000,000 acres. One man in the West, it is presumed, owned over 14,000,000 acres. The 1910 Census, as compared with that of 1900, indicated a perceptible trend toward an increased number of owners, but there is reason to believe that this tendency is only a fluctuation in a normal drift toward lessening ownership. A recent report of the Bureau of Corporations states that apart from the one-third owned by the national government, most of the valuable timber land of America is owned by 1,694 persons. To these few belong 105,000,000 acres. Only 16 men hold 47,000,000 of these acres. Three railroads are among the large holders. Eleven railroads own and control eighty-seven per cent of the anthracite coal of America. They produced eighty-nine per cent of all that was mined in 1914. Again, it is reported that, counting out banking and insurance, there are 6,700 companies in the United States with property — not capital — worth $27,000,000,000, or about one-third of our wealth. The railroads of the country are grouped into six financial systems with a capitalization given a decade ago by the government census at $11,000,000,000. The value of property owned by incorporated industries alone is put at

about the same amount. The total wealth of the country is estimated at from about $90,000,000,000 to $100,000,000,000. So it is safe to say that not far from one-half of the total wealth of this land is owned by corporations. W. I. King in his recent work, *Wealth and Income of the People of the United States,* verifies this when he states that in 1909 corporations produced forty-four per cent of the total product of American industry. That means that the wealth is in the possession of a relatively few thousand individuals at most.

Incomes as well as accumulated wealth are concentrating in the hands of a few. The work just cited gives some startling facts. It is there pointed out that in 1896, according to Charles B. Spahr's estimates, eighty-eight per cent of the people got sixty-five per cent of the income, while in 1910 they got only sixty-two per cent. Dr. King shows that one and six-tenths per cent of the richest families secure nineteen per cent of the income. He then concludes,

> If all the estimates cited are correct, it indicates that, since 1896, there has occurred a marked concentration of income in the hands of the very rich; that the poor have relatively lost but little; but that the middle class has been the principal sufferer.

It has been shown by certain economists that corporations, while multiplying in number, are diminishing in size or capitalization. From this it might be concluded that wealth is tending toward wider distribution instead of greater concentration. But such a conclusion should not be drawn from the premise, for multiplicity of organizations does not prove independence of ownership. The fact of "narrowing control of enlarging funds" under many forms is to be considered.

It is reported that a single group of financiers control railroads with a capitalization of $3,000,000,000. It has been discovered that one man is often a director of numerous railroads. It is very common to find the same person on a half-dozen boards. Someone has calculated that in New York City

48 men are directors of 7 or more railroads; 44 are on the directorships of from 10 to 15; 15 are on 16 or more; and one man is on the board of as many as 45. Others act as directors of from 20 to 40 railroads. It is authentically stated that some 1,600 directorships in 100 of the leading railroads and other industrial and money corporations are in the hands of 76 men. The capital of their concerns is equal to at least one-fifth of the wealth of the nation.

Senate Document number 278, issued in 1908 on "Interstate Commerce Corporations," makes it clear that 51 persons constitute a majority of the boards of directors which control over 53 per cent of the railroad mileage of the land and over 65 per cent of the gross earnings of the roads. It appears also that by concerted effort 93 persons are able to control 75 per cent of the total mileage and 81 per cent of the gross earnings.

The congressional investigation of the "Money Trust" in 1912 brought out the fact that the system of interlocking directorships, of which the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. is at the head, includes some 18 firms with 180 leading members who hold 746 directorships. These directorships are distributed among 134 industrial, financial, and transportation concerns, whose aggregate capitalization is more than $25,250,000,000. It will be illuminating to follow this report somewhat in detail, and to note the way this power is shared. J. P. Morgan & Co. hold 33 directorships in 39 corporations whose capital is in excess of $10,000,000,000. The First National Bank of New York has 103 in 49 corporations capitalized for more than $11,500,000,000. The Guarantee Trust Co., having 160 directorates, is in 76 companies with a capital above $17,250,000,000. The Bankers' Trust Co. holds 113 in 56 companies that control about $11,250,000,000. The National City Bank holds 86 in 47 corporations having $13,250,000,000 of capital. The National Bank of Commerce holds 149 in 82 companies with about $18,250,000,000. The Chase National

Bank with 69 directorates is in 48 concerns having more than $11,500,000,000. The Astor Trust Co. claims 74 in 47 companies with about $12,500,000,000. The completed list of the eighteen firms runs: Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the Hanover National Bank, Blair & Co. of New York, Speyer & Co. of New York, the Continental and Commercial National Bank of Chicago, the First National Bank of Chicago, Kidder, Peabody & Co. of Boston, and Lee, Higginson & Co. of Boston.

The chief corporations over which the men of the eighteen banking houses exercise large if not controlling influence through their directorates are as follows: The Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, the American Telephone & Telegraph Co., the electric street railway companies of Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Brooklyn, and St. Louis, the Interborough Metropolitan Co., the Interborough Rapid Transit Co., the Amalgamated Copper Co., the American Sugar Refining Co., the four leading express companies, thirteen leading insurance companies, the Beef, Biscuit, Electric, Harvester, Leather, Nickel, Oil, Paper, Powder, Rubber, Steel, Shoe-machinery, Tobacco, and Woolen trusts, the principal banks of Boston, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Providence, Washington, Chicago, St. Louis, and New York City. The total is 46 concerns. In addition to these there are 32 railway companies owning 167,200 miles of road, or nearly two-thirds the total railroad mileage of the country.

The public service corporations involved are capitalized at about $4,500,000,000, with annual gross earnings of some $477,000,000; the industrial companies have a capital of less than $4,000,000,000, with earnings of over $1,250,000,000 annually.

According to this report, therefore, 180 men have a controlling influence over capital far in excess of one-fourth of the wealth of America. They do not own it all, to be sure, but they do with it about as they please.

The United States Steel Corporation has a self-perpetuating board of 24 directors, who control a majority of the shares, and do as they desire, regardless of the 100,000 and more other small shareholders. According to the Stanley report to Congress on this trust, these 24 men are also large stockholders or directors in 159 other great concerns, such as banks, insurance companies, railroads, steamship lines, telegraph and telephone companies, express companies, and various manufacturing corporations. The total capitalization of all these companies together with that of the Steel Trust proper aggregates $15,000,000,000. This is a sum equal to one-sixth the estimated wealth of the United States. If the value of the property under the domination of these interests was added to the capital, the grand total would be much greater. For instance, the Steel Trust in 1915 had fifty per cent of the available iron ore of America, estimated at perhaps $2,000,000,000, under its control. While these 24 men do not absolutely own all this vast sum, they have a controlling interest in it and are able to dominate and manipulate it as they see fit.

The system of interlocking directorates makes of many interests a virtual whole, a unit of power under the control of a small head. The Stanley report then does well to summarize the situation thus:

> Where two or three corporations are owned and operated by the same set of individuals, their interests will be identical, and in a great measure the strength of one is the combined strength of all. This is true to a degree where directorates interlock.

Thus we see something of the extent to which wealth is monopolized, and its control confined to a few. But very likely there is not anything new or startling in this. The face of the monstrous situation is all too familiar to the reading public. Let us then draw away the veil from the body itself,

just a small portion of it—the labor section as represented by the Steel Trust. Behold the sight! One hundred and fifty-three thousand men in normal times at work for wages paid by this company. Hundreds of thousands, running into the millions, of others who are working for the 159 other concerns allied with this trust. What a multitude this, to be dependent upon the will of two dozen men! Nor is this sight a mere fancy of heated imaginings; for too many witnesses agree as to its reality. The Manly *Report of the Industrial Relations Commission* of 1915 says that a careful and conservative study reveals 2,651,684 wage-earners in the employ of corporations controlled by six financial groups which have a combined capitalization of nearly $20,000,000,000. It declares further that the Morgan First National Bank group alone controls corporations employing 785,499 persons.

As W. J. Ghent has so felicitously told us in *Our Benevolent Feudalism,* it is the appearance of a new feudalism. Here are feudal kings, masters of more than ever lordly princes ruled in ages past. Here are armies of human beings as much their subjects as were the masses over whom princes, by "divine right" instead of by "industrial right," exercised authority. More than three-fourths of all the wage-earners in manufacturing and industry in America are employed by corporations. This means some five million persons in this field alone who are more or less the dependent vassals of the few. The lords today have dominion over capital where once it was over land. The wage-earners are now bound to their jobs, whereas once serfs were bound to the soil. The laborers are dependent already and tending more and more to become a fixed class of servitors.

Sir Henry Maine, in speaking of America, said:

> There has hardly ever been a community in which the weak have been pushed so piteously to the wall; in which those who have succeeded have uniformly been the strong, and in which, in so short a

time, there has arisen so great an inequality of private fortune and domestic luxury.

One need not look far in any direction to see this new feudalism. Not alone in manufacturing regions, but also in mining sections is it of common appearance. West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Colorado have feudal estates in their mining regions where many thousands are bound in appalling serfdom. The land, the law officials, the teacher, the preacher, the houses, the institutions, the schools and churches, and the people themselves belong to the lords. A Colorado congressman had the following to say of conditions in his state before the federal grand jury sitting on the case of the civil war in the mining district:

> In these counties they have owned every public official for the last ten years as absolutely as the members of this house own their coats, and it has been impossible in these counties to obtain an enforcement of the law. As a result, while in those two counties there were killed twenty-six times as many men in our coal mines in proportion to the number employed as were killed in Austria in 1910, not a single coroner's jury during those ten years brought in a verdict holding a coal company responsible. In Las Animas County a judge of the court there has not permitted a single damage suit to go to a jury, and from evidence before the Secretary of State, 106 men were killed in the coal mines of that county and 366 were seriously injured.

These conditions are not exceptional; they are typical of such regions, whether located in Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Colorado, or elsewhere, for they are unavoidable in a feudalistic order.

The foregoing pictures have afforded us glimpses of the many heroic genres exhibited in the industrial gallery of the world. Who knows but some master will one day blend them all into one titanic creation? Perhaps some financier has already dreamed of doing it. Industrial oligarchy we already have, and industrial monarchy is not impossible. Though one may

point to ever so rich a background in the pictures—to a growing middle class and a public with pockets bulging with stocks and bonds, as is often done, yet what of it? What part does any background play? Very little. It is so overshadowed by the main object that it scarcely matters at all. The dominating and controlling feature is the feudal lord.

Still, let us pause and scrutinize this background. There is a somber mass in it that many fail to notice at all, and which our political and economic artists, who so proudly exhibit America's marvelous creations, do not often care to point out. This mass is the multitude of tenants and of the poverty stricken. We have been told of the penury that exists in Europe, and shown how one-third of London's population lives in poverty, so often that we have come to think America a paradise of plenty. But studies made of conditions in our own cities show that the contrasts between Europe and the United States in the matter of poverty are in reality not so great. As a matter of fact, there is almost as much misery in America as can be found anywhere else in the western world. It is estimated that in New York City 70,000 children go to school famished every day. It has been found that not far from that many families are evicted annually from homes for which they cannot pay the rent. One out of every ten who die is buried by the city in the potter's field. Robert Hunter thinks that in the industrial centers of America there are always in normal conditions 10,000,000 people in distress, and maybe at times as many as 20,000,000. In many of our cities four-fifths of the people live in rented homes. In New York City scarcely one-twentieth own homes. Not over one-third of the people of Massachusetts nor over one-fourth of those of Pennsylvania have unencumbered dwellings. Fully one-half of the inhabitants of America are tenants. Of course, tenantry does not always or necessarily imply poverty. But certainly very few tenants

on the whole are rich, and few are well-to-do. The vast majority are poor.

If the total wealth produced annually in the United States were divided by the number of families, and each one's share compared with its present income, it would be seen that the families of the six or seven million wage-earners now receive only about one-third of the amount that would then fall to each family; for it is calculated they receive only about $450 on the average. This amount is insufficient, as has often been demonstrated, for a decent standard of living under conditions of living as they are found, to say nothing of one productive of efficiency. It causes the family to hover close about the poverty line, and quickly to fall beneath it if undue expense comes through unemployment, sickness, or any misfortune. In the average case, the family may possibly be held together on $500, but without any margin for improvement. It must have from $800 to $1,200 before economic freedom and the beginning of independence is secured. But C. B. Spahr calculated that the annual family income of 88 per cent of the people is below $1,200. W. I. King thinks there are about 82 per cent of the families below this amount. He shows also that about 90 per cent of these receive less than $1,000, and more than two-thirds, less than $800.

F. C. Howe quotes in one of his books a paragraph from Frederic Harrison, as follows:

> To me at least, it would be enough to condemn modern society as hardly an advance on slavery or serfdom, if the present condition of industry were to be that which we behold; ninety per cent of the actual producers of wealth have no homes that they can call their own beyond the end of the week; have no bit of soil or so much as a room that belongs to them; have nothing of value of any kind except as much furniture as will go in a cart; have the precarious chance of weekly wages which barely suffice to keep them in health; are housed for the most part in places that no man thinks fit for his horse; are separated by so narrow a margin from destitution that a month of bad

one has said, "atheism at church, ignorance at school, anarchy in the editor's office, and treason in Congress." They make it appear that unrest arises from having too much rather than from having too little. Their attitude is fully expressed, as one has cleverly put it in the lines of the old poet, which run:

> To what would he on quail and pheasant swell
> That even on tripe and carrion could rebel?

Acquiescence, quietude, contentment are the great desiderata for vassals, according to the seigniorial view. Prudent lords thus to think, but perverse vassals not humbly to agree!

The paternal mind comes to its climax, not in advice, however, but in its own conceit. It assumes the divine right to rule in true kingly fashion. This "me and God" mind is always expressing itself directly or indirectly. Quite recently it came out when the late J. J. Hill of the American Northwest delivered himself on the "humanitarian and social justice" policy of the English government, which he feared would soon become the policy of the United States. Said he:

> Great Britain is now maintaining many of her industries in an artificial condition by appropriating for the support of one class of her people the property of another class. The British Empire is now sustaining itself by sequestering the stored accumulations of past generations.

The assumption underlying these words is that the rich should rule, that wealth is the divinely appointed guardian of the national welfare. More directly is this mind revealed in the now trite and famous utterance of George F. Baer during the anthracite coal strike some years ago. He is reported to have said,

> The rights and interests of workingmen will be protected and cared for, not by labor agitators, but by those to whom God in his excellent wisdom has given control of the property interests of the country.

Though the authenticity of this report is denied; for half a century the sentiment of it ruled the man. Moreover, it has ruled almost the entire class to which he belonged. It is the industrial lords' declaration of authority.

The seigniorial attitude again shows itself in the effort to control public opinion. Many great newspapers are doubtless effectively owned by money magnates. Through patronage their policy is controlled, their news censored, and their editorials written. When Lord Simon says to them, "Thumbs of depression down," down they go. The railroads, the trusts, and the other domains over which our lords reign, speak in the newspapers as from their own mouths. Thus public opinion is shaped, if not editorially, then by the news itself that is printed. "All the news that's fit to print" may indeed be printed, as one of the great and supposedly subsidized dailies declares, but who determines what's fit? When the lord determines it, the poor vassal may be wheedled into thinking how benevolent, how unselfish, how self-sacrificing the money magnates are to give him his daily bread. Thus will the vassal be led to render homage to those who provide against the day "when he confronts the world with a lost job and an empty cupboard." The lord's aim is ever to keep himself in favor. He accomplishes this by leading the public to think as he thinks by thinking for it in his paper.

Another means of influencing public opinion to which resort is made is the educational system. Control over this is sought, and is acquired not only by means of endowment to private institutions, but also by taking the government into service through "foundations" established by billionaires. One such sum of $43,000,000, incorporated as the "General Education Board," consists of securities in the form of stocks and bonds of over thirty-three railroads of the United States, stocks of the Steel and Sugar trusts, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the Central Leather Trust, the American

Tobacco Company, and of the Colorado Industrial Company's notes, so we are informed by Congress. The funds given to the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations amount to at least $250,000,000, yielding an annual revenue of at least $13,000,000. This, as the Manly *Report of the Industrial Relations Commission* puts it, "is at least twice as great as the appropriations of the federal government for similar purposes; namely, education and social service."

Could any but an industrial lord be so astute as to take the government into partnership? A wise prince always buys the king's favor as well as the people's. The king has been bought; so think many. One has said, "We have in the Rockefeller Foundation a supreme example of the philanthropy which deadens, by its large benefactions, a public criticism that would be as formidable as inevitable." A United States Senator has said:

> It is a well-known fact that he [the benefactor] thinks that in this way he will be able to control public sentiment through colleges to which he has made donations, and by reason of such donations he has the selection of certain teachers who will be subservient to the doctrines he wishes to advance.

Whether or not the one providing this "Foundation" succeeds in doing this to the extent this Senator believes he will, it is certain that to some degree the method is effective. Ex-President Eliot of Harvard has confessed that gifts from such sources have influenced the policies of educational institutions in many instances. He holds that it has been for good, however. Another college official, President Schurman of Cornell, has pointed out that the unlimited charter rights of one foundation enable it to engage in any activity or promote any idea it sees fit. It has limitless possibilities for good or ill. Though it passes as philanthropic, the power rests with its self-perpetuating board of trustees to decide what philanthropy is. Should they construe it to be political propaganda in the

interest of capital or for the suppression of labor unions, the power is theirs. And what power has government to revoke its charter when opposed by a $100,000,000 corporation? The feudal lord buys for himself esteem and tolerance by such means and makes secure his foothold in the social order.

In conclusion, one may say of this new feudalism what Sidney Lanier, in writing of the *Jacquerie,* the French revolt of the fourteenth century, has said: the peasants learned that a man who could not be a lord by birth might be one by wealth. Wealth, therefore, arose and overthrew the old chivalry. This wealth now has possession of much of the world.

> It controls all things; it interprets the Bible; it guides our national and almost our individual life; and its oppressions upon the moral existence of man have come to be ten thousand times more grievous than the worst tyrannies of the feudal system ever were.

What if, under such conditions, the political forms of democracy do exist? They are rendered of slight avail by the operations of this counter-force. Here then this new feudalism stands athwart the pathway of democracy. To strike it down and clear the way is the task of Demos; but how he will go about it remains for the future to reveal.

It took a cycle of Cathay to bring about the overthrow of the old feudalism in the modern world. For half a millennium the handicraft régime was undermining it, and finally with the industrial revolution it went down. It fell, however, to rise anew and mightier than ever in the form of industrial feudalism. Modern democracy, therefore, finds herself confronted again by her ancient enemy. She finds her victories have been in vain, and must be won again. However, she finds new courage also in the alacrity with which things are accomplished in the industrial age, and doubts not that whereas centuries were needed for her past conquests, decades will suffice to win victory over the new feudalism. Modern democracy is consequently hopeful and confident. Her confidence that

the future will witness the supremacy of a completer democracy rests in the hope that the subtle desire for marks of inequality will be chastened by a juster social conscience and lessened in power as the gross and tangible disparity of fortune with all its vicious influence over the ideals of men is eliminated, and in the further assurance that that equalization of wealth and opportunity is the inevitable end toward which the striving of an enlightened and aroused citizenship is directed.

4. A Menace to Modern Democracy

Our concern is particularly with modern democracy here in America; and here it is confronted with peculiar conditions and dangers. Ancient democracy faced no such conditions; nor does European democracy meet them as does American. The policy of the open door to the alien has never been pursued to such limits by any other nation; and it has never entailed such consequences as it does for the American commonwealth. Here gather the ends of the earth, and they mingle together till there exists a population of unparalleled heterogeneity. Under such conditions, the question very naturally arises, Can democracy flourish? Many students of society see in this policy a menace to the very existence of democracy. That they see aright, the facts of the situation ought to convince the unbiased.

The American policy of permitting liberal immigration harks back to the times of colonizing and pioneering this new world of opportunity, in which each man sought a chance for himself and let the other fellow do likewise. Upon the vast unclaimed domains, whosoever chose could enter; and enter they did with freedom and rejoicing. There was room for all, and fear of crowding or encroachment was absent. Under such conditions, the practice of non-concern and non-interference with other than one's own affairs took firm hold upon the American and

became a folkway which eventually drifted into a national policy respecting immigration. That policy, the outgrowth of our individualism, is still supported by it. For there is among us an ingrained prejudice against curtailing the chances of those who are in search of liberty and opportunity. Just these words suffice as talismen to call the whole array of our traditional habits of thought and conduct to the defense of the poor alien. They have caused three presidents with specious arguments from individualism, tradition, humanitarianism, and popular sovereignty to veto restrictive laws on immigration. Accustomed to put the individual or the class above the social well-being, the average American is not wont to ask whether what is good for the alien is good for the society of which the alien seeks to become a part. Individual success having been so common and unlimited, the American does not believe a social situation will develop in which it will be otherwise. The feeling of self-confidence arising from his own success gives him the same confidence in the capacity of American society to receive and assimilate unlimited numbers and still succeed in maintaining its democratic tendencies. The average American, therefore, in so far as he has no ulterior motives in the matter, is traditionally disposed to withhold his cooperation in support of any plan that looks to the conservation of our social and democratic resources in the face of their threatened destruction from unlimited immigration. It is appropriate, then, that we consider the question of the open-door policy to the alien in its bearing upon the subject of this chapter.

The social situation created by the mixing of diverse social elements is one operating against democracy, the security of whose essential elements — liberty, equality, and fraternity — is always threatened where great heterogeneity of population prevails. For in a measure liberty depends upon equality and equality in turn depends upon fraternity; and fraternity in

any real sense you do not have in such a situation. It is found only among those who are conscious of being alike. For fraternity is a mental attitude. It is based on similarity of sentiments, feelings, beliefs, ideas, and opinions, held by the individuals of a group, and on the consciousness of the existence of such a similarity. Without this there is no mutuality of understanding, trust, and confidence; no co-ordination and unity. The most essential tie — the psychic and spiritual bond — is weak, and society is easily disrupted. In a highly mixed population, the consciousness of being different is dominant. Segregation consequently is common, and racial stocks are set apart one from another in groups. Every effort is made by each one to erect a wall of seclusion and exclusion in order to maintain its unity in custom, tradition, and blood. By this process it is adapting itself to the environment in the struggle for self-preservation. As a result, while within the group in question fraternity is accentuated, without it is greatly weakened. Here in America we have gone on until our society is already deeply cleft. We have numerous little foreign worlds within the whole. There are communities of Bulgarians, Roumanians, Servians, Magyars, Armenians, Italians, Greeks, Slavs, Orientals, and others which are as completely separated from the currents of American social life and influence as they would be if shut in by some high-walled mountains.

Social isolation and insulation are in evidence everywhere. What are the consequences? One is the loss of the sense of equality; for there is seldom any such separation as precludes all contact and conflict between nationalities. They meet in various relationships, and through their contacts the natural inequalities of the diversified social groups come to the fore, stand out, are brought to people's consciousness, and are magnified until invidious comparisons become common. These are formulated in opprobrious epithets, such as Kike, Chink, Dago, Hunkie, Nigger, etc., which are freely applied until all

the vile offspring of hatred leap forth, causing racial prejudice to abound, and despicable propagandas to be nourished. There is then distrust and disregard.

Worse still, social stratification results. "A certain stigma or reproach attaches to working with recent arrivals or in the same occupation," declares a recent report of the Commissioner of Immigration. H. P. Fairchild also emphasizes this. He says:

> Already certain occupations are regarded as the special province of certain nationalities. . . . . [While this is only the beginning of the caste as yet, Fairchild thinks] even the beginnings must give us pause. . . . . There can be no more pernicious social classification in a nation than one based on race. Distinctions resting on wealth, religion, or education can be overcome, potentially at least. Distinctions of birth affect only a small proportion of a society, and exist only in nations long habituated to them. But distinctions of race affect the entire population, are fundamental, and can never be obliterated except as assimilation is so perfect that race is forgotten.

Simeon Strunsky of the *New York Evening Post* has recently pointed out how it is that in New York State with only thirty-seven per cent of its people of native parentage and in Massachusetts with only thirty per cent of its population native stock a social stratification has come about in the past few months. It is American versus the Hyphenate. In New York and Boston, where "the old native element is threatened with engulfment," this class consciousness is strongest. Says he: "The natural sense of social exclusiveness of the well-to-do is heightened by the consciousness that they are a saving remnant for true Americanism." Why should it be thought strange that America is likely to be as much stratified in time as India, when successive invasions of racial elements of lower and lower standards of living are allowed to sweep over the continent from either shore? The sociologist knows that the castes of India came from similar invasions,

though perhaps accompanied in that case by conquest. The peaceable invasion of America, however, is not fundamentally different, save that the process of stratification is much slower when subjugation and conquest are absent. Yet it is by no means less certain to come to pass, provided no barriers are interposed by a people aroused to the menace.

There is little doubt that immigration is one of the most important factors in creating the labor problem in America. Economists are pretty much agreed that the scale of wages has been and is still kept down and even lowered by it. Relatively the rich are made to grow richer and the poor to become poorer by its workings. Nor is this all; for of a culture, color, or speech unlike the American's, the alien in our midst is strange and foreign, and as ever in the world's history, he has been received and treated by the older stock pretty much as a barbarian and a heathen. The conditions, consequently, have been ripe for labor exploitation. It has been suggested by the obvious helplessness and deficiency of the alien. "Certain official brutalities peculiar to us," says Edward A. Ross, "white peonage, police clubbing, the 'sweat-box,' the 'third-degree,' the convict-lease systems — got their start in the abuse of the friendless alien." And every advantage has been taken of the foreign laborer by the oppressor and exploiter, with all the evil effects upon employee and employer alike entailed through the class hatreds and conflicts engendered. The gulf between capitalist and worker has been widened into a chasm; and labor itself, gathered from many nations with the most diverse ideas, cultural, political, social, and economic, has found a natural enmity in its midst, and a divisive spirit with respect to its interest, which has easily led it to become pitted against its own cause and kind. In his ignorance the immigrant accepts a wage lower than decent standards of living allow, sinks into a pit, and drags the American down with him. He is equally ready to fight on the side of Capital against Labor

or on the side of Labor against Capital, for he does not see on which side lies his welfare. It is no wonder that many labor organizations have taken a hostile attitude toward these unorganized and maybe unorganizable foreign competitors. It is not strange that in some states laws have been passed to exclude them from public works. The real tragedy is that this attitude toward the alien worker has retarded the growth of organization itself and thereby crippled the entire labor cause. The failure of many unions and their frequent inability to win strikes is attributed directly to the foreigner. It is said of the Russian, for instance, that he is a union-breaker, for he does not appreciate the necessity of teamwork, and knows not how to engage in it. The enemies of labor organization and democracy rejoice to see this situation, for none knows better than they that an army, however large, with broken ranks, within which and behind which sedition lurks, can fight and win no decisive battles. The paid apologist of the Rockefeller Foundation, who was supposed to conduct an impartial investigation into the causes of unrest in Colorado, wrote to his employer some time before his engagement on how the stimulating effects that war would exercise on immigration would make the unions "change their policies." He said:

> It will not be long, however, before the inevitable effects of the European War on labor conditions are certain to make themselves felt. . . . . And once this becomes apparent the unions will have to revise considerably some of their present policies. . . . . Looking at the ultimate rather than the immediate effect, there is, speaking generally, going to be a large amount of unemployment as a consequence of the war. . . . . In certain industries it is going to be easy for employers to find all the labor they desire and unions will be confronted with a new problem. . . . . Here, it seems to me, lies a possible avenue of approach toward restoring normal conditions in Colorado.

These enemies therefore exert their utmost influence to bring in the foreign worker to keep up the strife. They are

the greatest pleaders for liberal immigration that the "oppressed" and "downtrodden" may find an "asylum" and a "haven of peace" upon our shores.

But instead of peace, the alien finds a sword; for nowhere in the world is there so much real war in industry. Lawrence, Massachusetts; McKees Rocks, Pennsylvania; Calumet, Michigan; Ludlow, Colorado, and Youngstown, Ohio, have been only acute phases of a chronic condition in which Capital is at war with Labor and Labor at war with itself. There has been much real fighting because, many never having known the arbitrament of the ballot, and having it not even now, did they know, have had recourse to the only other means of settlement known to them — powder and shot. In some cases they have perished by the violence they took up; but that matters little; since more often the fraternity among laborers also has perished. The real loss is in the latter, for the growth of division and hatred among the allies of democracy is fatal.

Any destruction of equality in the rights which society has already secured involves the loss of liberty for large numbers. The superior by natural position or arrogation then violate the fundamental rights of men with impunity and proceed to render the inferior or less fortunate subservient to themselves. They succeed in doing this by playing one group off against another through such business as strike-breaking in industry, for instance. Thus some are kept in bondage by the use made of their fellows to prevent organization for collective bargaining. They are enslaved, also, by the use to which the superiors put them as voting powers by means of intimidation; for thereby some wax fat on robber tariffs and trust privileges in mill and mine regions, while multitudes grow lean in body and poor in liberty. Under such conditions, the superior classes always exalt themselves, add artificial inequalities to their arrogance, and assume prerogatives that seriously

encroach upon the freedom of others. It is thus, without conquest or royal favor, that aristocracy is made possible and begins to spring rapidly from the common soil.

A heterogeneous population, such as is found in America, not only makes a population where there is a positive loss of the essentials of democracy already achieved, but, worse still, it brings about conditions under which further advances are rendered slow and difficult, if not impossible. It prevents that homogeneity of feeling which is witnessed in a thoroughly amalgamated group. Sentiments are not readily communicated; suggestions are not quickly received; and society is dull and unresponsive to ideals and enthusiasm, which necessarily play an important part in social progress. There is a marked absence of social sympathy such as was common in America in the pioneer days everywhere; relationships have grown mechanical, impersonal, and indifferent. Something has been gained, no doubt, through the check immigration has interposed in the currents of sympathy; for certainly panics, crazes, widespread crowd-action, and kindred phenomena have been rapidly passing out of American conduct in the last half-century. It will be suggested in a subsequent chapter that this is due to a growing rationality, but that explanation is only half the truth. The whole truth demands that we recognize the foreign population factor as a hindrance to sympathetic action. Such phenomena as the sweeping religious revivals of the first half of the last century, Millerism, and the "Great Awakening" of colonial times are not possible over large areas any more. There are too many breaks in the social stratum to permit the free flowing of suggestion. This gain in the loss of the mob mind is counterbalanced, however, in that a sympathetic response to the social ideals exalted by democracy also is largely forestalled. The deepest of all social unities lies in feeling; and where a common sentiment does not have free course, the divisive ideas, creeds, and customs are difficult

to surmount. The loss of sympathetic unity means a serious handicap to the cause of democracy.

The loss of the higher social unity of common purpose results from a greatly diversified population. There is no getting together, no "meeting of minds," no common program consciously followed. F. H. Giddings has asked, "Upon what basis have free communities risen and flourished?" His answer to his own question is:

> Always this: the people that have made them and maintained them have been sufficiently like-minded, sufficiently alike in their purposes, in their morals, in their ambitions and ideals, in their views of policy and method, to work together spontaneously. Naturally there has been among them what the old Roman lawyers called "a meeting of minds," so that without a whip over them, or a strong hand to hold them together they have collectively carried on the struggle for existence and advantage, freely and effectively. They have all seen the same truth: they have all wanted the same success, they have striven by the same method for the realization of the same great purpose.

If this really be the basis, it must be said that America is being moved from it by the pressure of the alien throngs through her doors. It has already become a fact that no great self-governing society was ever so far from resting securely on this foundation. Hardly ever has a majority been more divided or more uncertain of itself and fearful of its own acts. Only in those states where a relatively homogeneous people is found, despite the fact that they are rural regions, has democracy made much progress in recent years. In nearly all the states of the Union west of the Mississippi River, the initiative and referendum have been adopted and are being used with telling effect, as the recent passage of a child labor law in Oklahoma bears witness. Nominations by direct primaries, popular election of United States Senators, recall of officials, the commission form of government for cities, and other *democratic* movements have all come out of the West, so

far as America is concerned. These advanced measures have won their way where people are of like stock, sympathy, and mind. Elsewhere they have made little headway. The progressive states of the West had in 1900 but 143 foreign-born people per thousand, and, if the American-born of foreign parentage be counted, but 394 per thousand. The conservative and reactionary states of New England and the Middle Region had 229 foreign-born and 546 native-born of foreign parentage per thousand, respectively. While the southern states are homogeneous in white stock, the Negro element is a big factor, and that, together with certain traditions, goes far to explain the lack of any considerable democratic movement in that section. Perhaps, though, it may seem too much to attribute the lack of democratic advance to a heterogeneous population, since even the most progressive sections are far from being altogether homogeneous. But for the most part, the progressive states have a stock only slightly divergent in its foreign element from the dominant American type. It is of northwestern Europe in origin, and is readily assimilated. In the eastern states, the foreign element comes in greater numbers from eastern and southeastern Europe, and deviates widely from the American type. Segregation and social cleavage result, and the response to ideals and the "meeting of minds" upon which progress depends is rendered difficult. As a consequence, some of the states have stood still, or maybe in some instances have even lost the hard-won ground of political liberty and equality. In the western states this difficulty is of far less moment, and much greater progress has come about.

When the American cities are considered, it is found that most of those which have preserved or advanced democratic government in their municipal affairs are of the states we have described as progressive. It is in them that we see going on a process of democratization by means of a commission form of

government, whereas this idea has hardly come east at all. In many instances our cities have reverted to types of military or feudal oligarchy; as, for example, Philadelphia and New York. The political boss has found in the population situation conditions suited to his despotism. The community, divided against itself by virtue of its demotic composition, is but a field and a force for the tyrant. Its inarticulate life, its ignorant mind, its bread-and-butter motives, its eyes blinded by selfish instincts, fears, and hatreds, and its entire being without harmony of feeling or purpose—all favor the enemy of self-government of any sort. The factor of a heterogeneous population in country and city alike cannot be excluded, and must not be minimized as a great drawback to the cause of democracy.

An effort is being made to turn the stream of immigration away from the cities and into the open country. It is thought by many that if accomplished this would prove a boon to American agriculture and go far toward solving the country-life problem. But those who so think evidently do not consider all the factors involved. The rural problem is a class problem. It has arisen through the formation of a landowning class and a tenant class. The latter is growing rapidly and bids fair to become far the more numerous of the two in a few years. Should immigration therefore be directed to the country, it would mean that this landless laboring class would increase by leaps and bounds, and conditions that are already serious would speedily become critical. It would mean an oversupply of workers on the farms and such low wages as have never been known in the United States. It would mean, moreover, that the ability of the toiler to buy or rent land would be rendered ten fold, fifty fold, and in time perhaps a hundred fold more difficult than at present. It would mean, above all, increased competition for land, with rising rents and reduced returns to the tillers of the soil, until in a compara-

tively short while America would have as wretched a peasant class as any European country ever produced.

Careful students of the rural problem are fearful lest this come to pass. President Kenyon L. Butterfield of the Massachusetts Agricultural College says:

> If it should come about that hordes of peasants from abroad should settle upon our lands more rapidly than the somewhat sluggish social machinery of rural life can grind the grist, American standards would be superseded by lower standards, and a system of peasantry would shortly be inaugurated.

T. N. Carver puts it thus:

> Of two farmers who are able to grow equally good crops, the one with the cheapest standard of living can accumulate capital most rapidly. He, therefore, can outbid the other in competition for land, whether they are in the market as buyers or as renters.

Butterfield also quotes Max Weber of Heidelberg on American rural life to the effect that—

> if . . . . the enormous immigration of uncivilized elements from eastern Europe grows, also here a rural population might soon arise which could not be assimilated by the historically transmitted culture of this country; this population would change forever the standard of the United States, and would gradually form a community of a quite different type from the great creation of the Anglo-Saxon spirit.

Certainly it is not too much to say that there is a real menace to modern democracy in unrestricted immigration.

It may be objected, however, that since hitherto our rural regions have to a considerable extent been settled by a foreign stock, and American democracy, so far as anyone can see, has been none the worse for it, why should it be assumed that ill effects will follow in the future from a larger influx of foreigners into the open country? But rural conditions of today are not those of yesterday; for free land is gone and an agrarian problem has arisen. Increase of rural population in the future, therefore, means competition for the use and

usufruct of a land area which is strictly limited and already occupied, whereas in the past it was competition for the ownership of free land. It is for this reason some are apprehensive for the future rural life of America if our open-door policy is to be continued.

Again, it may be objected that, after all, the supposed danger is only a remote possibility that need give us no concern. Such it is not, however. It is a very present danger. The old population is already giving way to a new and different one in many sections. The foreign immigrant is turning to the land in New England, New York, New Jersey, and in sections of the Middle West. He is driving out the older stock because his standard of living is lower. E. A. Ross thinks it is inevitable that, as a result of this tendency if our doors are not closed, successive waves of immigrants of lower and lower standards will come until eventually the United States is an Asiatic colony. And those who seek a more equitable dispersion of the incoming hordes are only hastening America to this fatal end.

Our open-door policy is shortsighted because it has been for many decades and is now determined by and for only one class of people: namely, the employing class in the city. This class looks only to its own needs and prosperity. It has no appreciation of the larger interests of American society. It lives in ignorance and disregard of this as of many other national policies. It fosters liberal immigration from selfish motives alone, and finds plenty of support in the sentimentalists and traditionalists. There is little promise for democracy in the outlook. E. A. Ross has dipped into the future with the sane vision of a prophet and has spoken in trumpet tones of the destiny toward which humanitarianism, inspired by plutocracy, is leading us. Hear him:

> Already America has ceased to allure, as of yore, the British, the Germans, and the Scandinavians; but it strongly attracts the Italians, Greeks, and Slavs. By 1930, perhaps, the opportunities left will have

ceased to interest them, but no doubt, the Khivans, the Bokhariots, the Persians, and the Afghans will regard this as the Promised Land. By 1950, even they will scorn the chances here, but then, perhaps, the coolies from overpopulated India will be glad to take an American wage. But by the last quarter of the century there will remain, possibly, no people in the world that will care for the chances left in America.

Then when immigration has ceased of itself, when the dogma of the sacred right of immigration has wrought its perfect work and when the blood of the old pioneering breed has faded out of the motley, polyglot, polychrome, caste-riven population that will crowd this continent to a Chinese density, let there be reared a commemorative monument bearing these words: "To the American Pioneering Breed, the Victim of Too Much Humanitarianism and Too Little Sense."

Here then, in the land that was given most at the outset and from which most was to be expected democratically, there has come the least in some respects. Other lands with great traditional handicaps when this nation was untrammeled and wholly free have left her forty leagues behind in the lapse of half a century. She has been compelled to mark time or retreat while they have forged ahead. Nor is the outlook from this angle promising for the future, since the mixing increases. The optimists dilate on the capacity of the American melting-pot, but what boots it of the capacity if the metal does not melt, and is poured in so fast that the fires of fusion heat it not at all? So long as this republic, founded by our forefathers and by them dedicated to liberty, continues to be the house of refuge — to change our imagery — for all the races of the earth, so long will the cause of democracy be in bondage to the situation created by a heterogeneous composition. Here the races of all the world may come to seek liberty and lose her in their very eagerness for her possession. They may clamor at our door; but coy fraternity will flee; frail equality, denying her identity, will hasten after, till bold liberty herself, forsaken by her sisters, takes fright and expires; and the house of de-

mocracy is entered desolate. This tragedy is being staged all about us, before our eyes. We are now witnesses of the first act. Shall we watch the whole wild drama to the last act, or shall we stop it midway of the first? The American citizen must make answer. Meanwhile the democracy of a hundred million people stands and waits.

For the sake of fairness, let us reverse the screen and look on the other side. There is something there to be recognized, though it be rather dim to us, accustomed to the high lights of our own immediate world. It is written here that no people lives to itself alone. America certainly does not. Her glory enlightens the other side of the sea and the world. Her spirit and institutions are reflected there. This is made possible and important too because the alien sojourns among us. Though demoralization and distraction be ours in consequence, it may be that the gain to other peoples and other nations equals our loss. If perchance, then, the price of Europe's freedom and the Orient's rejuvenation be our partial bondage, may it not be expedient that we suffer it to be so for a time? Such indeed would be the counsel of the humanitarians and the advocates of liberal immigration. And certainly democrats cannot deny being humanitarians of a sort, nor can they ignore the argument for wide open doors to the Land of Promise, especially when significant movements for democracy in other lands claim America as their godmother. Such claims have been made, for instance, in recent years by Michael Karlalyi, the leader of the Independent Party in the Hungarian Parliament. In his visit to his countrymen here in the interest of his national democratic progressive program, he has told them of the things American the returning immigrants bring back to the Fatherland. The Hungarian-Americans, says he,

> have absorbed the spirit of the United States. In time I and the members of my party hope to make Hungary a small-sized copy of the United States in the heart of Europe.

It is just such things as are illustrated by this case that have helped keep our doors open to the world. That power has gone out of our social being to the healing of the nations we cannot deny, and we cannot but rejoice that it has been so. But for all this, and for all that may yet come of good to the wider world, our traditional open-door policy ought not be continued if in the end democracy is to lose more than she can possibly gain. And, everything considered, that policy seems to involve and point to certain and irretrievable losses far beyond all possible gains. For let it not be forgotten that our national institutions, ideals, and spirit arose under unique conditions that can never again be duplicated on this planet. Therefore it is not possible for just such a democracy as we have achieved and are achieving, with all its peculiar virtues and obvious faults, to rise again anywhere. The uniqueness of its origin and the conditions of its origin must not be lost to view. Is it not, then, imperative that this democracy be preserved inviolate and be given a free chance to come to its ultimate development? Wisdom would seem to say, yes, and proceed to close the nation's doors, if not fast shut, at least so far that only a few may continue to enter. It would seem to say, Let the rest of the world work out its own democracy without the vicarious sacrifice of ours in its behalf.

CHAPTER IV

Ultimate Democracy

That which the best human nature is capable of is within the reach of human nature at large. — HERBERT SPENCER.

The unfinished window in Aladdin's tower unfinished must remain. — ANON.

WHEN the word ultimate is used, something final, finished, or perfected is usually implied. But to a generation that idealizes the changing, the idea of anything ultimate is not altogether pleasing because of its implications of the static. We shake our heads at the thought of ultimate truth; we are not comforted with the hope of ultimate heaven; and least of all are we satisfied with any notion of an ultimate social order. We are confident it would not be good if it should come; or, if good, not permanently good. The ideal Kingdom of Man or Kingdom of God is one that is always approaching but never fully come. In truth, it is no longer believed that there is anything ultimate. Consequently, the writing of social Utopias is at an end. Plato's *Republic,* More's *Utopia,* Campanella's *The City of the Sun,* Bacon's *New Atlantis,* Harrington's *Oceana,* Morelly's *The Basiliade,* Cabet's *Travels in Icaria,* Saint-Simon's, Fourier's, and Robert Owen's creations belong to a past day. A day of science has dawned, in whose light mere ideals, such as these were, seem wholly futile. They appear floating in the sky and without earthiness; but unless the mirage is also a lake we do not bother about it. If, however, the mirage rises out of reality like mist out of the lake, as substance of its substance, element of its element, being

earthly before heavenly, then does it command our attention. It is considered an attainable ideal and the ways and means of its realization become the object of scientific study. Restrained, therefore, from indulging in visionary proposals and ultimate orders, we must confine ourselves within those social goals that lie well this side of the horizon of the unattainable and final. We shall then use the term ultimate democracy only to indicate that there are social institutions and situations that must finally be changed if democracy is to widen its kingdom.

1. *The Institution of Property*

The first change that is being proposed is in the institution of property. Economic equality is the next goal Demos is setting himself to win. Political aristocracy has been broken down; the object of assault is now the aristocracy of wealth. Upon this latter the former has always rested; therefore its removal is of fundamental importance. Because basic, it will be overthrown with difficulty, but it is by no means impregnable. A new chivalry is rising to the task—

> that chivalry which every man has, in some degree, in his heart, which does not depend upon birth but which is a revelation from God of justice, of fair dealing, of scorn of mean advantage.

This it is which in our day has incited the insurrection against wealth; giving rise, as it has, to a new system of economic philosophy and conduct among the toiling classes — a system now fully organized and with growing means of promulgating itself. E. A. Ross says:

> Although possessed of the ballot, the working class has so far done little for itself because laborers have persisted in accepting and acting on the economic philosophy of their employers. But now there exists a full-fledged working-class philosophy — with press, literature, program, and propaganda — which is dignified by the support of scholars, scientists, artists, prelates, publicists, journalists, and statesmen. This

philosophy calls black that which the reigning business-class philosophy calls white, and calls white that which the other calls black. . . . . However biased and wrong-headed this economic philosophy may be, it does give the workingman courage to take a line of his own and develop his own attitude toward the social system the possessing class has framed. Through his own organs and orators he learns of damning facts once kept from him and becomes critical, self-assertive, and demanding. The spread of socialism, then, is but the latest phase of the tendency of the people to endeavor to control government for their own benefit.

In this description we have a fair report of the growing opposition to the institution of property as we now know it, against which wealth must make its stand. The movement for economic equality is well under way. Says William H. Mallock, in *Social Equality:*

Property is now the defendant, not the plaintiff as formerly, and the jury consists of the millions who have least obvious cause to be tender with it. This, no doubt, may seem a strange state of affairs, but the sooner we see it in its true light the better. We must realize once for all that the old conservative arguments are by this time wholly obsolete. The old traditions that were once thought sacred, the moral principles that were once thought absolute — we have to defend them, not to appeal to them; or rather we have to see how far they are defensible. Thus it would be idle to show, in the event of any great confiscation, how unjustly the few would suffer. The only reply would be: "So much the worse for the few!" If property is to be defended at all, it must be defended upon wider grounds, and in a much deeper way.

Mallock then proceeds to offer his defense of economic inequality. He sets forth two positions. The first is that however desirable it might be to equalize property it would be impossible to do so for more than a single moment; that the equality of such a moment would be one of want, horror and consternation, not prosperity; and that the old inequalities would again arise out of it, only changed in having their harsher features exaggerated.

The second declares that —

> even supposing that permanent equality were not thus unattainable; but that it could be really established as a stable social condition, its establishment would not be to the interest of even the poorest classes; in other words, that the inequality now surrounding us is not an accidental defect which we must minimize as far as possible; but that it is, on the contrary, an efficient cause of civilization — that it is the cause of plenty, but not the cause of want; and that want would be increased, not cured, by its abolition.

Mr. Mallock's arguments are the two strongest defenses of those who hold economic inequality to be sacred and inviolable. He has presented his brief ably, though not convincingly. In the first defense, that equality is unattainable as a permanent thing, the fallacy of the absolute is committed. It is assumed that an absolute equalization is sought; but democratic economists of the present day, let it again be emphasized, know no absolute, nor desire any. Only a class equality is wanted; that is, one which involves the fusion, as regards the economic basis, of the submerged class and the property class and the luxury and the leisure class into one class, in which there will be variation, but variation within strict limits. To impose such restrictions as will bring this about and maintain it in perpetuity is certainly not an impossibility.

Mallock's second proposition, that economic inequality is an efficient cause of civilization, takes the ground that the motor which energizes and vitalizes human activity originates from the compulsion of superiors or from the sight of those who have more than we. Remove from society compulsion and these inspiring visions, and there will remain no incentive to action. Now, if it be true that men are thus generally motivated, the necessity for economic inequality must be admitted. But is it true?

It would not so appear in the penetrating light which the author of *Property: Its Origin and Development* throws upon

the social conditions of the primitive tribes of Africa. Note what he says, especially the point I have italicized for emphasis:

> Among the superior races we are soon to study, private property is likewise almost universally instituted, but its abuses have often been in a measure curbed by loftier moral development, by a higher intellectual culture. Nothing of the sort exists in Africa; respect for man has not yet been invented there, and brutal selfishness has unbounded license. It is as if a huge sociological experiment had been made, demonstrating how far it is legitimate to connect the inclination for property with the instinct of self-preservation, with selfishness; and also proving that, amongst slightly developed races, little capable of being brought to perfection, *the institution of private property, so far from being a cause of progress and civilization, is, on the contrary, an obstacle to all further evolution. Black Africa has been for many ages under the private property system, and grovels none the less in the most hideous savagery.*

But reverting to Mallock's contention and granting for the sake of the argument that it is true, whence then arose the spirit of progress leading to civilization, since it is a well-established fact that primitive society had no economic inequality, and thus lacked the motivating influence at the outstart? Furthermore, if Mallock is right, the old world has not yet begun to "spin forever down the ringing grooves of change." But Mallock has anticipated and provided against such an absurd deduction as this. He has emphasized the well-authenticated fact that in primitive society there was the conquest and the subordination of one group by another, whereby economic inequality arose and progress got its start. But what about the motivation of conquest? What was the incentive before there was any subordination? There must have been one, else men would have remained unchanged and unchanging in savagery. Mallock imagines an enchanted isle where savage equality reigns supreme amid peace and plenty and where all incentive to action is wanting until a stranger appears and corners the food supply and thus starts the wheels of progress.

But what caused this stranger to come, and whence came he, if all primitive people were enchanted islanders?

Of course, it is conceivable that the enchanted islands of early man may have sometimes become desert islands. The elements may have laid waste, turning teeming hunting grounds to desolation. We know the physical environment is by no means stable. The hills and the streams and the fertile plains that look eternal are not. They have often been plowed by ages of ice, riven by earthquake shocks, submerged by floods, and parched to desert by wind and sun. And doubtless man sometimes found his habitat rendered uninhabitable, and himself compelled to flee afar in search of food, and more than likely driven to fight with other men for a new abode, and even to subdue them in order to share their hunting grounds and supplies. In the event of such forces being at work, the "stranger" would have sufficient motive for invading the enchanted island. And no doubt he was sometimes thus impelled to do so. But it is a bold and unwarranted assumption to declare that all "strangers" were thus set in action, and that all inequality got its start through their conduct. The environmental and economic theory of history is imperialistic and tends to preempt all the field of reason to the exclusion of all else. In yielding to its dominating influence, we are in danger of losing sight of much that is just as true. It is every bit as necessary for us to rise above this theory in our thinking as to submit to its logic. So with all respect to its merits, are we not justified in assuming that progress sometimes had its genesis apart from environmental compulsion or pressure, and that before ever primitive man was driven from pillar to post by nature's scourgings, he got a start — in some places, at least — on the long road that has led to the age of William Mallock? Nay more, are we not forced to the conclusion that back of the motive arising from inequality there are others? It is by no means true that man acts only as he is inspired by

those above him or compelled to exert himself by those over him. He is quite as much motivated by the pleasure of activity itself. There is no fun like work, said Walter Bagehot. Neither men nor beasts have been disposed to eschew activity, not even work, because irksome or pain-giving. For essentially activity is neither. Even savage man was not by any means the lazy creature Mallock and his school assumed him to be. Modern psychology and anthropology have spoken most convincingly on this point and greatly discredited the ideas once prevalent. Man is and was and ever will be a "self-starter," not wholly dependent upon the sight or the compulsion of superiors for his activity. The fears that if a dead-level economic equality were again achieved, "want, horror, and consternation" would reign, that society having reached the dead center would be powerless to make any further progress, are utterly groundless.

But whether they are groundless or not, whether Mallock is right or wrong, whether it is against all logic or not, is of little consequence; for the goal on which the eye of the age is fastened is economic equality. Democracy is not deterred by logic. It has always been against her, and now she is against it and ready to make some logic to her own liking. History and experience and tradition also have always been against her, as they have been against every innovating movement. But democracy boldly declares, as did Charles Sumner concerning the American people in a critical hour of our national life, "Thank God, we have no history!" and proceeds to make history for herself. However sacred and inviolable the rights of property in unlimited measure may be to some of us, they are not secure. Although, to follow G. L. Dickinson, "The only thing we, most of us, hold to be really unjust is to take away a man's property without full compensation"; and although "no political cry is so effective as that of confiscation" until even "the mildest project of rectifying, in the most

gradual way and with the minimum of disturbance and suffering, some of the inequalities of distribution at once arouses that cry," the shock to our personal and social nerves of witnessing the complete overthrow of this property idol is inevitable. Nor will the plea that the limits of private property should remain unchanged because the incentive to activity springs from the hope of gaining as much of it as possible suffice to do more than delay the ordeal. For while this plea is wisdom's last word for some, it comes to the masses as a counsel of folly, since with them there is no hope for any gain whatsoever, in the sense of accumulation, under economic conditions as they now are.

Assuredly the institution of property cannot be any more zealously or securely guarded than was the divine right of kings. It may have more guardians, but it has also more opponents. The idea of the priority of property in the economy of society and of the inviolability of its rights will change, as did the notion of the divine right of kings; and after that change will pass the institution itself. The suspicion that some change is pending has already begun to prey upon the minds of the property classes. Not from them, however, will the change come; it will come mainly from beneath them and be forced upon them, for it is the history of great social reforms that they work up from below and seldom if ever percolate down from above.

Labor, as already suggested, has become all agog with the notion that its lot is determined by the established institution of property; that the prize jobs and work of the world are, as a rule, the rewards of wealth, not merit. It has a feeling that opportunity is monopolized and by no means generally distributed; that the talented have little or no show beside the rich. Where natural economic advantages have been great, as in the United States, this is, of course, less in evidence; but even here the discontent grows apace with decreasing

opportunities. There is a vague surmise abroad that competition for place cannot be equitable so long as wealth is unequal. For such contests bring to the top those who have had the greatest economic advantages. Assuming for the sake of the argument that ability is generally distributed by nature among all classes, we must still recognize that it takes equality of means to give it equal development. In the absence of that equality, the state may compel education to a certain extent, but until it puts the same chances to the highest degree before all classes, there can be no fair competition for the places that are said to be the rewards of merit. To confer upon all really equal chances involves the rights of property primarily. But leaving the economic question out of account, even if the state did give a like education to all, so far as that is possible, private wealth would still confer upon her children certain advantages that would normally win them preference in any just contest. Nor is all that has just been said a mere matter of logic or vague sentiment; it rests upon demonstrated facts. Alfred Odin, by means of a careful study of some five thousand successful men in five hundred years of French history, found that in France, talent, success, and distinction were directly correlated with economic status. Moreover, Lester F. Ward, in *Applied Sociology,* his masterful treatise on education, has made it apparent that opportunity is dependent upon wealth in the world generally. We are, therefore, driven to face the conclusion that from the viewpoint of opportunity, the fundamental difficulty lies in the institution of property as it now exists.

The feeling of the truth of this is venting itself in much strange talk about "the right to work." It is common to hear the unemployed say that society owes them a living; that they have a right to work and to receive it as a reward of their labor; and that if this is denied them, they will take it by force. Of course, no such "right" is guaranteed them by the law of

any state. However, labor bases its claim not upon the rights of positive or statute law, but rather upon the rights of natural law. Since, moreover, this is done largely by implication, and without more than a sanction in feeling, shall we not say it is probably a case of social memory; that these demands take their rise in vague recollections of a primitive age when natural law reigned to give unto all free and equal opportunities and to exclude none from the privileges of securing a living? I think we would not be far wrong in doing so. I think, too, that something more than a survival is involved; that this feeling affords a proof of the inadequacy of "positive law" as it is, and comes as a demand for essential changes in the institution of property created by that law. For the chief difficulty lies in such a monopoly of economic opportunity by the few under the law of the state that many are denied the right to earn any decent sort of living at all. In confirmation of this, F. H. Giddings may be cited in the following excerpt from an article in the *Independent:*

> By creating private property and the rights of private ownership, they have made inevitable the control of the major and best opportunities to work and obtain a livelihood by a far-seeing, thrifty, competent, and enterprising minority of mankind. There is not much land left that is not owned by somebody. Hunting, fishing, and berry picking without permission are trespass and poaching. Wandering about without authority is vagabondage.

These conditions imposed by law compel many to depend upon the caprice of the property-owners for their living, yea, almost for their very right to live. So in the name of a more ancient, and perhaps a higher, or at least a juster law than that of the present-day state, the institution of property is being indicted before the judgment bar of humanity. Were it merely the hatred and resentment of incompetents and unfortunates that is involved, it might not be important, but as the reasoned judgment of a people growing in intelligence, as well as the

result of the ill feeling of those who may be abnormal, it is significant enough to be of general concern. This does not mean that positive law is bankrupt; neither does it forebode a return to the state of natural law. Even though the return to such a state might be thought justifiable in the making of a revolution, it would find few defenders as the basis of a permanent order. What it does mean is that the reign of a new and wider positive law is forthcoming.

Liberty is felt by increasing numbers to be the special prerogative of wealth. This feeling has for its complement not so much the desire for wealth as the determination to do away with its unjust distribution. It is true, as the author of *The New Democracy* declares, that the guaranties of the political liberty of the people are often used as a means to deprive them of economic liberty. He says:

> The constitutional provision that "no one shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" has seldom prevented an Alabama Negro from being illegally sent to the chain gang, but it has often prevented the people of a state from securing relief from great interstate corporations. The restraints upon the liberty of the poor are today economic.

F. C. Howe, in his *Privilege and Democracy in America,* says:

> Crimes against property are relatively more serious than crimes against the person, while crimes against the state, and especially crimes against society, are scarcely provided for at all. Thus the criminal code of New York provides a maximum sentence of ten years' imprisonment for criminal assault with intent to kill or commit a felony, and a minimum sentence of ten years' imprisonment for first degree burglary. The minimum punishment for rape and for manslaughter is twenty years' imprisonment, while for arson it is forty years' imprisonment. The abandonment of a child under six years of age is punishable by a maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment, while the sale of impure food, even though it may poison a whole community, is only a

misdemeanor, and the violation of laws for the protection of railway workers from death and accident is punishable only by a fine of $500.

Two items in the same newspaper pass before the writer as this is being written, both typical and ordinary in our daily life. One tells of a man in a southern state who has just been pardoned after serving thirty years of a fifty years' sentence for robbing a well-to-do citizen of fifty cents; the other concerns a New York merchant and financier who has just been fined $1,000 and given a few months' suspended jail sentence for stealing $2,400,000 of savings which he had induced his customers to intrust to a banking business connected with his stores. His plea has been: "We believed we had a right to do as we pleased with the money." The difference in the liberty allowed these two men is to be accounted for by the fact that one was poor and the other rich.

Out of such common experiences as these the conviction is forming in common minds that all the boasted liberty of democracy as it is, is after all subservient to plutocracy; that the liberty of the people is only secondary to the wish of property; in short, that political democracy is effectually checked by industrial oligarchy and that political enfranchisement does not necessarily involve social freedom at all. This conviction, nourished by other grievances, grows to revolutionary intensity. Strange to say, these grievances are not new but old ones — those supposed to have been settled in the eighteenth century when the rights of freedom of speech and assembly were secured and guaranteed to all. However, as the Supreme Court of Wisconsin declared, the eighteenth-century constitutions which form "the charter of liberty of a twentieth-century government" are being interpreted "by an eighteenth-century mind in the light of eighteenth-century conditions and ideas" instead of by a present-century mind in the light of existing conditions. Property panoplied with new power being on the throne of the twentieth century, old per-

sonal rights go to the cross without so much as the semblance of a hearing. To the moneyless and unfortunate are refused those freedoms which the well-to-do exercise as a matter of course. The poor may not freely assemble and freely speak. Their "talk-leaders," grievance-bearers, agitators, organizers, and walking delegates are suppressed by eleventh-hour ordinances made to corporation orders, by blanket statutes that would prohibit even neighbors meeting round a common board and toasting one another, provided some plutocrat thought it a dangerous practice, or by any other means that may work. Every labor strike causes liberty of speech and of assemblage to be restricted virtually to the capitalist and his sympathizers. The laborer who dares assert his rights is clubbed and jailed. During the Paterson, New Jersey, strike three hundred were arrested; some were convicted, only to be released in the end by the higher rather than the local court on the ground that they were guiltless of crime. Three thousand were arrested in the great Colorado strike, and many were indefinitely deprived of liberty without just grounds. That restraint of the guiltless which so well serves the few is wealth's tyranny. Police Commissioner Arthur Woods of New York has well said:

> People in this country have the constitutional right to freedom of assemblage and freedom of speech. The police have not only the responsibility to permit it, but to protect them in its exercise, and the police should be so instructed.

That the police and officials of the land with scarcely an exception anywhere are not so instructed is being charged to the account of the institution of private property against a day of reckoning for its unfair and unlimited power. A demand is therefore being uttered for a new sort of liberty which so far the poor have never had. It is the freedom of leisure and organization and movement and speech and assem-

blage and trade and person — the liberty that penury and disease and racking toil deny. It is the liberty which the institution of unlimited private property enjoys in a large measure but forbids to the non-possessor. Bent on having it, but knowing not just how to get it, labor nevertheless has a feeling of certainty that in order to secure it, decided alterations in the existing institution can and must be made.

Law and liberty are inseparable. Where the question of the latter is raised, the former also must be considered. Law is on trial in the court of Demos today. By law I mean the whole judicial system. The opposition to courts and their rulings which voices itself in the recall of judicial decisions and of the judges who have rendered them is at bottom an economic movement. It is a phase of the general attack upon wealth. For — all other questions that may be involved aside — those who have the money get law and get judgment in their favor. The reasons for this are obvious. First, the property-owning class can pay for legal talent — which profession is itself in truth a part of the institution of property, one of its guardians — and since when have not judges and juries decided by the preponderance of talent? Of course, such talent marshals the best evidence, and the poor man who has no guardians to defend him to the last ditch — or court — suffers defeat. Then, too, law itself has been made by and for property, if we are to believe Rousseau when he declares, "Laws are always useful to those who own, and injurious to those who do not." Therefore its spirit as well as its letter is prejudiced. Says Oppenheimer:

> The ruling class conducts its fight with all those means which its acquired dominance has handed down to it. In consequence of this, the ruling class sees to it that legislation is framed in its interest and its purpose — class legislation.

No country in the western world affords so clear an instance of property-class-made law as our own. A. T. Hadley em-

phatically declares that the standing of the property-holder is stronger in the United States than anywhere else. In an article contributed to the *Independent* in 1908 he asserts:

> The general status of the property-owner under the law cannot be changed by the action of the legislature, or the executive, or the people of a state voting at the polls, or all three put together. It cannot be changed without a consensus of opinion among the judges, which should lead them to retract their old views, or an amendment of the constitution of the United States by the slow and cumbersome machinery provided for that purpose, or, last—and I hope most improbable—a revolution. . . . . The forces of democracy on one side, divided between the executive and the legislature, are set over against the forces of property on the other side, with the judiciary as arbiter between them; the constitution itself not only forbidding the legislature to trench upon the rights of property, but compelling the judiciary to define and uphold those rights in a manner provided by the constitution itself.

There are historic reasons why our fundamental law is thus chiefly concerned with the rights of property. C. A. Beard has thrown much light on the subject in his studies on *The Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.* He has shown that the movement for a new government which led up to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was carried on by the large landowners, by the holders of the unfunded securities of the Confederation, and by the big manufacturing and shipping interests of the colonies. He has indicated, moreover, that the convention itself was composed of representatives of this property class. Five-eighths of the body were directly interested in the economic conditions the new government would bring, and were in the end greatly benefited economically by its establishment. There was a rise of not less than $40,000,000 in the value of the $60,000,000 of public paper in their possession. The small farmers and mechanics were not represented at all in the convention. They had no influence and no part in making the constitution. It was not because there

was no consciousness of class interests then in the land that they were left out; nor was it mere accident that one interest alone dominated. Men of that day were fully aware of class antagonism. James Madison wrote about it in the *Federalist*. Among other things, he said, "The chief business of government, from which perforce its essential nature must be derived, consists in the control and adjustment of conflicting economic interests."

Not only did the rich class make such a constitution as suited their needs, but they accomplished its ratification as well. Beard concludes from a study of the ratification conventions in the several states that only about one-sixth part of the male population voted upon the constitution. The number did not exceed 100,000 in all. The large property interests of the coastal towns supported it, while the rural and debtor class were either ruled out by the prevailing restrictions on the ballot or were indifferent. Though the men who established the new government were undoubtedly the brainiest men of the New World and the best qualified group of statesmen that ever met together for a like task, they were nevertheless unquestionably dominated to no small degree by selfish motives and prompted by the prejudices of their class to enthrone the interests of wealth in the fundamental law of the republic.

Since the eighteenth-century convention which ignored the laboring and property-less class, great changes have taken place. That submerged class has multiplied enormously and become a dynamic element in society. Its rights — the rights of men rather than the rights of money — have become paramount. The inadequacy of our whole constitutional law, which gives so little heed to those rights, has consequently grown more and more apparent as that class has increased. The relations between Capital and Labor have become strained, as they ought not to be in a country of such abundant resources, and as they probably would not be were our laws other than

mere class laws. Time has wrought but relatively little improvement in reference to human rights. On the contrary, property has made the most of its legal privilege until, as the author of *Privilege and Democracy in America* says,

> the American people are between the upper and nether millstones of law-made privileges. Above are the cruelly oppressive taxes of the Federal Government, which exact from one and a half to two billion dollars a year from those who labor. Below are the rent of the land, the monopoly charges of the mine-owners, the railroads, the transportation agencies, and the other public utility corporations, as well as the countless other monopolies which are identified with the land or are directly traceable to the tariff or the railways and which exact from three to four billion dollars a year more. Struggling between these law-made privileges are eighty million people whose political institutions have fallen under the control of a class.

The United States Supreme Court has recently rendered a decision in which it declares:

> Unless all things are held in common, some persons must have more property than others, and it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary results of the exercise of these rights.

It decided further that a state cannot declare "that the public good requires the removal of those inequalities that are but the normal and inevitable result of their exercise." Here we have the prohibition of such legislation as would mitigate the evils of economic inequality. This is nothing more than the effort of the wealthy class through its representatives on the bench to perpetuate itself.

Further, the judges of our courts are themselves creatures of wealth and the bulwark of its privileges. Says F. C. Howe in *Wisconsin: An Experiment in Democracy:*

> Judges are conservative by training. Employed for the most part as lawyers in the defense of property, when they become judges their

minds are colored by previous employment. They continually widen the rules of some earlier decision for the protection of property. Slender dicta or accidental analogies offer sanction for new decisions which may cost society unnumbered millions as well as unmeasured sacrifice before they are reversed or changed by legislative action,

No less an authority than Justice Seabury of the Supreme Court of New York freely acknowledges that the judges' "reactionary decisions are the natural results of their mental attitude and the class bias which unconsciously dominates them." Continuing, he says:

Just as in the old slavery days the slave owners relied upon the courts when they could no longer defeat the popular will through the executive and legislative departments, so today the forces of monopoly and privilege, battling to prevent the establishment of just social conditions, place their chief reliance upon high appellate courts.

And a word by Oppenheimer serves to sum up the situation:

Laws are then applied in such wise that the blunted back of the sword of justice is turned upward, while its sharpened edge is turned downward — class justice.

The prevalence of this "class justice" comes out in the case of almost every labor strike. It was brought into prominence in its typical aspects at the recent hearing before the federal Industrial Relations Commission in its Chicago sittings. A labor union on strike for a closed shop was shown to have been made the under dog wholly because of the court's attitude. A constant arrest of peaceable pickets and agitators and demands upon them for bail amounting to over $125,000 were the means used by the court to paralyze the union. Moreover, the union charged that in resorting to legal procedure to bankrupt its organization, the employers had at least the tacit support of the court. Whether these charges were or were not fully substantiated in this particular case is beside the point;

we know from the general situation that they were well founded in the light of common practices. The Associated Press dispatches for September, 1916, from Scranton, Pennsylvania, inform us that 187 Industrial Workers of the World were assessed $935,000 bail by the local court. They were charged with "unlawful assembly, forcible entry, meeting to riot, and disorderly conduct" at Old Forge. Unable to furnish bail, these men were remanded to jail; and, of course, quiet reigned, the strike was broken, and the coal company congratulated the court on upholding the law. In their zeal for "class justice" the courts leap over jurisdictional boundaries and usurp authority in the legislative field. We have, therefore, not only "judge-made law" but the constant claim made that it is "the best law we have." As a result of this the legislative victories of the masses are swept away by the disapproving judges who esteem their wills superior to the will of the many. When such acts as the nullification of the Workingmen's Compensation Law by the courts of New York and of the first federal Income Tax Law by the Supreme Court of the United States and of the recent Kansas law prohibiting employers from discriminating against union men by refusal of or dismissal from employment are of frequent occurrence, autocracy has surely arisen again — juridical autocracy instead of executive — though it was said to be forever dead in this land. Says Gilbert E. Roe in *Our Judicial Oligarchy* when commenting upon the case of *Priestly* v. *Fowler,* which was heard in Massachusetts in 1837, and which is still used as the great precedent for decision on industrial accidents:

> These principles of law devised by an English judge of nearly a hundred years ago in order to protect a master from liability for injury to his servant caused by the breaking of the horse-cart on which he was riding, as applied by our courts have saved countless millions of dollars to the employing classes in this country, while they have killed and made paupers of untold thousands of laborers and their wives and

children. These principles, as applied by our courts, have bred in some of the employing classes a reckless and wanton disregard of the safety and lives of the employed, and have aroused in the latter a class hatred which is a constant menace to our society and government. No one can estimate the suffering, or count the army of the dead and crippled, born of these dogmas of a primitive industrial time.

Apropos of recent decisions in West Virginia, New Jersey, and Colorado courts, a high legal authority has given utterance to what might well have come from an anarchist instead of a court official:

These decisions exalt the military power beyond any height hitherto known in this country. They assert the power of the military at the uncontrolled discretion of a single man to dispose of the life and liberty of any person within the state, not by way of detention till the termination of an insurrection nor where life is taken in the actual clash of arms, but purely as a punishment for acts which may not be offenses at all by law, or if offenses, subject to slight penalties.

The "just decisions" of the courts are thus seen to incline naturally to favor the well-to-do and the rich. Contempt for them is therefore growing. Trenchant opposition is making itself felt. The dire experience of Labor with American law and its courts is causing influential labor leaders to oppose such remedial measures even as minimum wages and compulsory arbitration. They apparently count the administration of the cure of certain ills worse than the ills themselves. Juridical infallibility is no longer popularly believed to exist. And well that it is not; for that sacred quality with which the courts have invested themselves is obnoxiously undemocratic. The temple of justice as it now stands was not erected by Demos and he will not respect it. He will eventually raze it to the ground, and rear in its stead a new one greater than the first; no sanctuary where one must tread unshod, but a court open to the free light of heaven, where sockless democracy will not fear to come and stand and speak aloud. Demos will make a

new law, and what he makes will be not his master but his servant. Juridical autocrats he will not create, and no more will nine of them lord it over ninety millions.

This attitude that is being assumed toward law some have called anarchy, but such it is not at heart. It is not even a self-motivated movement; it is only the symptom of a deeper one — namely, the revolt against wealth. The case of the courts cannot be settled by itself; it can be settled only by an economic revolution. And that revolution is in the making; it will inevitably come, if not processionally, then cataclysmically.

Life also is asserting its rights against the institution of property. It is using in its defense property's own methods of protection. They are not political and legal — for these have failed — but direct and physical. The institution of wealth has always employed force. It has ever been able to command the agencies of the state to enforce its claims. It has ever resorted to military power to uphold its interests, while law has generally given full sanction to its acts. The defeat of the new constitution submitted to the people of New York in 1915 was due in part to the organized opposition of Labor. The convention had rejected its appeal for a plank prohibiting the subordination of the civil to the military power. It had ignored the fact that in Ohio, West Virginia, Michigan, Idaho, Colorado, Montana, and elsewhere the writ of *habeas corpus* had been suspended by military authority, contrary to the laws of state and nation. It had forgotten what Judge Cullen had pointed out concerning the usurpation of authority over men's lives by state governors, who "may declare a state of war whether the facts justify such a declaration or not, and that declaration is conclusive upon the courts." For these reasons Labor's protest in behalf of life against property was directed against the New York constitution.

In mining and manufacturing regions military despotism is a common spectacle. The sheriff of Huerfano County, Colo-

rado, has testified that he appointed three hundred and twenty-six deputy sheriffs in the year 1913 before the strike began in the coal districts for the specific benefit of the coal companies, who armed, paid, and gave them orders. Another case may be cited in the shooting down of twenty men at Carteret, New Jersey, in 1915, by a squad of county sheriffs on guard over a manufacturing plant. The company had broken its contract, the employees had struck, and were peaceably picketing when officials of the law with bristling guns appeared and fired upon the men as though they were so many highwaymen. Little is the wonder that under such circumstances, laborers, believing that they have some right to their jobs which neither property nor law has any business to challenge with blasts of shot and tolls of death, begin to answer with sabotage and violence.

Even in quarters where there are great landed interests inherited from feudalism by an aristocratic class, direct action is the weapon of defense which wealth employs. The Tories, for example, it was commonly reported, spent $10,000,000 to stage the Ulster War in Ireland against English democracy in its efforts to establish Home Rule. How much absentee capitalism has spent in America for guards and to purchase military protection from the state in order to enforce justice of its own making no one can tell. So the property-less, whose only possession to be defended is life itself, having grown weary of a political and legal protection almost wholly prejudiced against them, or at least entirely inadequate, are frankly adopting military means. To this property itself has forced them, for it has debauched or repudiated all other means. It has bought officials, flaunted law, and caused labor leaders to turn traitors for honor and place in America as well as in England. It has acted upon the assumption that the end justifies the means, be they moral, legal, political, or military. The guiding cloud and pillar of fire which have been leading Labor to the land of political promise have therefore become for many a flaming

sword bearing the legend, "By This Sign Conquer." Syndicalism has arisen and violent Capital meets Labor made violent by Capital's own example. The new champions of direct action are frankly adopting more effective means. They are declaring that the use of force to preserve life and its standards against the encroachments of property is as much their right as the use of force as a protection against men is the right of property. This tactical move on the part of the property-less bodes ill for the institution of property; for it can never be withstood. This does not necessarily mean that a bloody revolution is imminent. It only forebodes a change in the institution attacked; for the plutocrat knows that in a show of force property cannot stand; he knows also that the people are becoming aware of this. Perhaps this preponderance of force that does not hesitate to strike on the side of the world's toilers will so overawe the institution of wealth that political measures of change will seem much preferable to a bloody revolution. There may be many feints at fighting, but very likely Capital will yield ultimately to Demos without the test of brute strength.

The attack on the institution of property which we have been analyzing has already advanced to the stage where means for bringing about economic equality are being seriously considered. If we inquire what they are, well-reasoned answers are forthcoming. And the very fact that there are answers ready is indicative of a determined effort to effect the change. The Single Taxer will speak in glowing terms of the advantages of a tax to appropriate the unearned increment and to nationalize the land. The Socialists, scientific and idealistic, will wax eloquent over the expropriation of the instruments of production and the socialization of industry. If Single Tax does not seem practicable, idealistic Socialism attainable, or scientific Socialism inevitable, it does not follow that wealth cannot and will not be equalized. That adequate means are not

now available is no proof that they may not be found. The explosion of theories of economic reform does not, as some fondly think and cleverly argue, prove the finality of the present order. Where there is a will the way follows. There is quite as much aiming at millions and missing of units in our thinking as in our practical affairs. If a scheme seems impossible in the large, it does not follow that it may not be easily realized in piecemeal fashion. A generation ago national prohibition was considered just as Utopian as Socialism or Single Tax. In fact, it was put in the same category with them. But today national prohibition is so near that it is an imminent probability of the next five years. It has attained to this state of practical reality by aiming at the units of organization in our civil government and winning them one by one until the million is about hit. So it may be that because in our thinking the proposal to change the institution of wealth appears impossible of realization in the large, we are deceiving ourselves by not admitting that it may be realized by degrees. As the author of *The New Democracy* points out:

> While we are being shown by diagrams that the people cannot even tell what democracy is, we need only to look out of our windows to see them actually achieving democracy.

So all the proofs of the futility of idealistic schemes of economic equality, if these schemes have any earthiness at all in them, as nearly all do, may be only so much dust kicked up by those already blind in order to blind others, while the actual equalization of wealth is being prepared and is finding its means as it proceeds. Certainly a beginning has already been made in government ownership of public utilities; in the regulation of big business as to its privileges, its field, its prices, its hours, its wages, etc.; in the taxation of inheritances and incomes; in the appropriation by the state of the increasing social surplus and of the growing unearned increments; and in the

social preemption of certain natural resources. The utilization of the surplus claimed by the state for pensions and social insurance together with its direct diversion to the worker through minimum wage legislation, marks the beginning of the end of maldistribution. England has gone far in this direction and contemplates much greater strides. L. T. Hobhouse has calculated that the annual deficiency in incomes among Englishmen — which is one hundred millions — might be made up three times from one-half of the incomes of those who receive above seven hundred pounds a year. Thus he shows how one-third of the surplus wealth of that country could be made to abolish its poverty. It is not unlikely that England will very soon come to some such far-reaching scheme of redistribution.

The appropriation of a share of inheritances by means of "death rates" and inheritance taxes shows the state at work evening up wealth. Alfred Russel Wallace coined the phrase "equality of opportunity" by which he meant equality of education and equality of inheritance of property. The latter he believed necessary in order to insure to all similar advantages, for so long as some inherit much there will be inequality, against which society must protect itself. Wallace argued that simple justice demanded this, since inherited wealth is mostly in the form of claims upon or tribute levied upon society. The continuation of such conditions then necessarily means the sacrifice of the good of all to the profit of the few. The state and community must therefore be the inheritors of wealth. Perhaps at first it may take only the surplus above a fixed amount, but eventually it must take all in order to introduce equity in the order. The principle upon which such a radical program may be carried out is already recognized and well established in the polity of the advanced states of the world.

The emergence of this principle is the result of a long social development. In his *Essays on Taxation,* E. R. A. Seligman has traced the steps leading to it. He shows that the original

idea of a tax was that of a gift or *donum* to the government. From this it came to be support begged by the state — a *precarium*. At the third stage it was conceived to be a favor granted by the subjects — that is, a subsidy or *adjutorium*. The idea of sacrifice for the public good which is described by the German word, *Abgabe*, arose as a fourth stage. The fifth development brings the recognition of the obligation to support the state, and tax is called a *duty*. When the sixth stage is reached, tax is compulsory and is known as an *impost*. In the seventh and final stage to tax is to fix an assessment regardless of the volition of the taxpayer at all.

It may be added that there is another line of development concealed in the preceding sketch. It runs somewhat as follows: First of all, tax was personal; then commercial, or indirect; and finally property, or direct. Moreover, along with the evolution in the method and incident of taxation has gone a change in the object for which the revenues were collected and upon which they were expended. At first taxes were for the king's personal use. In the next place, when the tribe had conquered other tribes and the state had its beginning, taxes were exacted for the benefit of the conquering or ruling class. In the third case, they were utilized by the state for carrying on wars, defensive and offensive. When, however, the militaristic activities of the state are lessened, revenues are applied to internal improvement. This fourth stage is the modern one. The modern states divide their revenues between war and domestic developments, the lion's share going to war. Finally, the state comes to that high social level where taxes are levied upon those who have much for the purpose of giving to those who have little or nothing. This is taxation on the principle of equalizing wealth. It is just coming into vogue, but already is recognized as a legitimate principle, and is destined to play a leading part in the tax policy of the democratic states of this century. The income tax offers great oppor-

tunities for the appropriation of immense fortunes in behalf of the public and for the benefit of the army of underpaid employees of the government and of such other classes as need pensions. To meet the social needs that are becoming evident the proposal is already before Congress that a tax of fifty per cent be laid on incomes of a million dollars or more. Thus the way is gradually being opened for the exploitation of the riches of the few by the many for the good of all.

Again, the principle of the limitation of ownership is in a measure accepted. In our country even a constitutional amendment having that in view has been proposed. It is somewhat as follows: first, the individual private ownership of property to be limited to a certain definite amount such as Congress may determine; second, the inheritance of property and its acquisition through gifts to be likewise limited. The advocates of this plan of equalization believe it would preclude confiscation such as taxation involves, that it would not take away the normal incentives to accumulate, and that it would in the space of a single generation bring about "a widely diffused and infinitely more equitable distribution of our national wealth."

So there are practical measures of far-reaching possibilities already in operation, by means of which wealth is being and will continue to be socialized. The genius of democracy is the good of all as against that of any individual or class. In the interest of all Demos will restrict wealth until it will become mainly common wealth. He will say emphatically, "Private wealth is wrong when there is poverty — wrong because it disregards the claims of brotherhood." He will say that since this disregard lies in the desire to have and to hold more than other members of society, a prohibition of the unlimited gratification of the desire must be declared. If the way be not altogether clear for the accomplishing of this economic task of ultimate democracy, the end is; and where the end is seen, the way will surely be discerned.

Though a general equality of goods be achieved by Demos, the conquest of the social realm will not be complete. Despite all the economic advantage this would give, inequality of talent would still remain. Few if any thinking men today share the delusion held by Helvetius that if all artificial privileges were removed, men would be found equal in the gifts of nature.

2. *The Quality of the Stock*

We know that there is an inequality produced by nature, in consequence of which some will be slaves and some aristocrats. The same great natural gradations of humanity that now exist, the domination of the superior over the inferior in all spheres of social life, would inevitably continue. So future democracy has a biological problem to reckon with — namely, variation. This is as persistent and sure as the law of gravitation. In his *Heredity and Social Progress,* S. N. Patten leads us to the crux of the question confronting democracy when he says:

> The biological process begins also with a surplus but ends in a complementary differentiation. By this process genius, greatness, and other sought qualities are made. Equality is a conscious tendency with no natural background. The unconscious tendency is toward differentiation and the inequality of strong, natural characters. The two processes are thus supplementary. If the economic process furnishes the material in the shape of a widely diffused surplus, the biological process when once started will work itself out unconsciously. Men need not think of it, but they must think and plan for equality.

To plan for genetic equality is incumbent upon society seeking ultimate democracy. If possible, limits must be set to the range of variation in the human breed. In this field lies the *opus magnum* of social undertakings. Frankly accepting the social process as being preponderatingly telic, nature must be superseded by art. However much a natural product society is genetically, the fact must not be ignored that in its developmental process it is largely artificial. It must be observed that

society occupies the anomalous position of being both builder and building.

Obviously society in its architectural capacity is becoming keenly conscious of its task and is approaching it with a growing sense of mastery. Practical plans for a harmonious, stable, adequate, and satisfying social structure that we call ultimate democracy are being perfected while at the same time the work of rearing it goes steadily on. The master builder long since summoned Politics to bring tribute of talent and workmanship. Calling History with ripe experience and sage counsel to its aid, Politics has labored long and unceasingly on the rising walls. Thus far it has been the chief and almost the only workman. It has done the major work, though often ill, necessitating repeated undoing and reconstruction. And its services are as yet by no means at an end. More recently Economics has been employed to contribute its skill as mechanic, and in a relatively short while has made a remarkable showing. Now going on apace, its work must continue to be paramount for an indefinite time. It promises indeed to make a well-proportioned and pleasing if not wholly perfect structure. Education also has been called to the assistance of Politics and Economics. With superior wisdom and infinite patience this artisan has buttressed the social structure on every side and has adorned it with much grace and beauty withal.

Still unsatisfied with the skill of these three, the master builder has finally called in that ultimate designer, Biology. To this sculptor is being committed the work of completion. And this is society's *opus magnum*. So it grows evident that society no longer thinks, as has been the thought custom since Plato and Aristotle, that it is futile to strive for any degree of completion in its works.

The great question, however, is, How establish the genetic equality? Clearly the fundamental requirement is the substitution of a thoroughgoing rational selection for natural selec-

tion. This eugenics has for its object. Sir Francis Galton states it thus:

> I conceive it to fall well within his [man's] province to replace natural selection by other processes that are more merciful and not less effective. This is precisely the aim of eugenics. Its first object is to check the birth-rate of the unfit instead of allowing them to come into being, though doomed in large numbers to perish prematurely. The second object is the improvement of the race by furthering the productivity of the fit, by early marriage and the healthful rearing of their children. Natural selection rests upon excessive productivity and wholesale destruction; eugenics on bringing no more individuals into the world than can be properly cared for, and those only of the best stock.

Galton's program as thus stated is the plan to which the ultimate designer of society must adhere.

But some question whether this ultimate designer is needed at all. They doubt that society is compelled to resort to artificial selection in lieu of natural selection and to breed men in order to achieve equality. They assert that proper environmental influences will suffice. Specifically, they hold that education can be made to effect the desired leveling up. Certainly education has already accomplished much, and its possibilities are by no means exhausted. Although it is doubtless true that the intellectual caliber of the most favored families of the race has not increased a millimeter in six or eight or ten thousand years or during the historic period, and has in no wise surpassed that of the Egyptians or the Greeks, it must be borne in mind that the capacity of the masses of the modern nations has undergone great development and far surpasses that of the masses of any past age of which we know. Of old there were a few of unexcelled ability; now there are literally multitudes. The talent of society taken as a whole is far greater than ever before. Once intelligence was great in the great; but society, men in their collective capacity, was neither

intelligent nor great. It was by no means so stable nor so rich, nor so full of resources everywhere as now. Never did Egypt or Greece or Rome see the time when they could command ten thousand men as capable as Caesar; but that number may be found in France, England, or America today, able to rule or instruct the millions of the nation.* Thanks for these incomparably better conditions are largely due to modern education. There is and can be no doubt that education is a process of removing gradations in ability. But what are its limits, if any? Can it bring to pass that intellectual egalitarianism that is needed?

Let us seek the answer by first taking account of the modern situation and the reaction of education to it. William E. Kellicott in *The Social Direction of Human Evolution* emphasizes in a striking way the fact that the load of social tradition is always increasing, while capacity for absorbing it remains the same. Says he:

> Our troubles begin when we realize that in the acquisition of this load each generation does not begin where the preceding left off, not at all — but we begin where our parents did.

Then, he goes on to say, we not only absorb what we can of the existing body of tradition, but we proceed to add to the load for the next generation. So the problem of education has continuously been growing more difficult for each succeeding race of men. From time immemorial tradition has been increasing in volume, but with the approach of the modern age it began to pile up with astonishing rapidity. Art, philosophy, science, mechanics, inventions, discoveries, processes of all kinds, all began laboring incessantly day by day to lift the mountain ever higher and higher. The child of primitive society was confronted with a simple task when he came to acquire the social heritage. Even the child of civilization before the present era was met by no really insurmountable mass

of knowledge. It was quite possible for him to compass almost the entire body of tradition, but in this age of science tradition reaches such towering heights that none may scale them, and few may ascend them far, while the many must stand appalled at the difficulty of mounting up far enough on any side or in any place to be assured of even a modicum of this world's light. The difficulty, of course, is that the growth of capacity has not kept pace with the growth of knowledge.

What has taken place in lieu of any expansion of capacity has been a growth in the differentiation of functions. The work of the world has become minutely divided and men's activities fragmentary in character. It is demanded that one be an expert in some narrow field. Specialization is the requisite for adjustment. Without it one is a misfit. Formerly the Jack-of-all-trades and master-of-none could get on fairly well, but now his lot is exceedingly hard and grows ever more difficult. To know how to do some one thing or else to do nothing is practically the present-day imperative. The lines of the untrained or the unskilled in some definite bit of tradition fall in very difficult places. Even those whose training and knowledge are only general find themselves little better off than those having none at all — so exacting are the exigencies of the situation becoming.

In order to meet the demands entailed by the differentiation of function, society strives to adapt its educational system to the making of specialists. But in so doing enormous difficulties straightway arise over the question of individual aptitude. Without first determining this, vocational training finds itself producing as many misfits as fits. So far the educational system has been able to do but little in ascertaining natural fitness, and from the present outlook it must continue to be baffled in its attempts. And this, too, in the face of ever-increasing differentiation of occupation and consequently ever more insistent demands for fit men.

Granting though that the differentiation of education will prove able to meet the situation on the whole without any bother about enhancing average capacity, what, nevertheless, of those who because of a sub-average capacity absolutely defy the efforts of education to adjust them? For entirely apart from the ability or the inability on the part of the educational system to discover aptitude and to develop it so as to adjust men to social conditions, it is becoming evident that the stock itself is woefully deficient. It is in multitudes of instances sadly lacking in self-adjusting ability or in adjustability of any sort. It falls short too often in both mental capacity and physical stamina sufficient to acquire the equipment necessary to fit it to fill a place in the world. It is all too frequently positively incapacitated by nature to rise above the state of dependency. The hordes of the maladjusted, defectives, and delinquents are increasing at an amazing rate in every land. The swelling currents of modern life sweep in this driftwood, and we see it as never before. And here philanthropy rushes up to save the precious flotsam and jetsam, lest perchance it perish naturally, until the stream of life becomes dangerously full of it. Here education is beyond its depth; the limits of its resources are clearly passed. It stands helpless and must give place to eugenics.

The eugenic proposal is no quixotic scheme that would attempt to fill the earth with a breed of giants having such prodigious capacity and strength that the individual could master the whole social heritage if he chose. It rather intends only to raise the average quality of the stock and to lessen the deviation therefrom. This it would do by eliminating the physically and mentally incompetent and defective by nature. It would prevent their breeding, and thus would put an end to the stock that cumbers the earth, imposes grievous burdens on the capable, operates to pull the race down rapidly to lower and lower levels of ability and efficiency through its great fecundity, and

makes possible the whole range of inequalities which society struggles to overcome.

The final process of equalization must, therefore, be fundamental; it must be biological. Genetic equality must be sought till there is brought to pass the saying that "all men are born free and equal." Human nature itself must be changed; capacity must be guaranteed in equal measure to all who are born; the law of heredity must be brought under social control. Natural aristocracy, which has been so much praised and prized and declared to be inevitable, is at bottom as bad as any other aristocracy and must be removed before ultimate democracy can come. In the effort to eliminate it, we lay the ax to the root of the tree of all evil, socially speaking — all aristocracy, autocracy, plutocracy, and every other thing that is undemocratic. Here is the real root of all the problems of society for this and for all ages. The economic question is only a branch, not the main issue. Inequality of conditions, contrary to the doctrines of some Socialists, comes not primarily and ultimately for many from the present distribution of wages and wealth, but from an inequitable distribution of talent. The pressing question is then, Can ability be equitably distributed? A negative answer has long been given, and the hope of idealists of the eighteenth century has been counted an idle dream.

Indeed, we may still think, while admitting that it is possible, that it is undesirable, since this would be a monotonous world if all were equally talented. But why monotonous? Equality does not imply sameness. Two of a kind may be of equal merit in their respective qualities and yet be quite different. A draft horse and a trotter may each be equally endowed after its kind, but by no means alike. Genetic equality among men does not assume such standardization as shall make us all either square pegs or round ones. It recognizes the fact that the law of variation precludes any such control. It assumes that individuality

must and ought to continue. With this understanding of what genetic equality signifies, Demos is dreaming of a new race, and eugenics is showing how it is to come. Plato's philosophy of the distribution of pegs, which may have been the sum of all wisdom for the race that then was and still is, will no longer suffice for the race that is to be; not because pegs should not and will not be different, but because that difference will no longer connote slavery for some and the philosopher's rôle for others.

This dissatisfaction with Plato's democratic principles extends to any scheme that would "create faculty to suit function," for "this means the deliberate mutilation of men." Differentiation and specialization must be; but degradation on the one hand and exaltation on the other — or inferiority over against superiority — are no longer accepted as social necessities. The new science of stock and race making insists that men shall be well born, that the deficient stock shall be eliminated, that the state breed out the weak and breed in the strong and capable. Its aim, according to its originator, Sir Francis Galton, "is to bring as much influence as can reasonably be employed to cause the useful classes in the community to contribute more than their proportion to the next generation." It would remove the possibility of classes and castes by taking away the ground from which they spring: namely, difference in degree of capacity, since this it is which permits the scale of position and power to be transmitted from generation to generation until it becomes stereotyped. It makes clear that society must seek the excellence of all, and that this excellence must be judged by the excellence of the individuals in themselves first of all, and not by "some supposed excellence in their relations, which leaves each of them maimed and halt and blind. What is, surely, is that all men shall be as complete as possible," says G. L. Dickinson.

The foregoing proposal for the advancement of democracy

is bold. Not even the most radical democrats have as yet generally seen and emphasized the necessity of it. Still, it is not altogether new in principle, for long ago Plato proposed that the state regulate sexual relations. Just how the breeding of men may be regulated so as to bring about genetic equality is not yet clear. We must learn a great deal more about heredity before we can make a race to order. Moreover, a popular desire for real and ultimate biological equality needs to be awakened in society itself before any eugenic program can be successfully carried out. Above all, equality for men as they are, good, bad, and indifferent, so far as it is possible, must be secured as a prerequisite for the discovery of areas of deficient stock.

Measures are already operative for docking the tail of the race, which has long hindered its progress. The irrationality of philanthropy, which has preserved the tail at the cost of the head, is made clear. Such counter-selection must cease. The extinction instead of the preservation of stock like that of the famous Jukes family of New York, which is reported by Dugdale to have cost the state $1,250,000 in seventy-five years, from 1800 to 1875, is coming to be public policy. Since 1875 A. H. Eastabrook calculates that the cost of this one family has grown to be $2,516,685. In 130 years they have increased from 5 sisters to 2,094 people. One-half of them have been feeble-minded, and of the 1,258 Jukeses living today 600 are feeble-minded. Very few of this stock have been desirable citizens, even under the best social conditions. Professor Charles J. Bushnell gives us some figures of expenditures for the delinquent and dependent class. In Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and California, he calculates that in a recent year $48,135,392.51 was thus spent. He estimates that there are probably 3,000,000 delinquents and dependents in the United States. Directly and indirectly they cost society not less than

$1,500,000,000 annually. This, from the economic viewpoint alone, is a dead weight and a menace to any people. To eliminate this element seems an urgent duty, if any practical and humanitarian way can be found to do so. Charles Booth says that about eight and one-half per cent of London's population is a dead load to the rest of the city. He thinks it would be a great gain if they were eliminated, for they mean a double cost, both because they cannot maintain themselves, and, as D. H. Macgregor says, "because of the influence of such a margin upon the employment of those immediately above them."

But negative eugenics will not of itself suffice, for there is difficulty in telling just where the tail ends. It is not unlikely that it is just behind the ears of the social animal. This probability makes positive eugenics imperative. There must be a forward extension as well as a rearward curtailment of the animal. In fact, the biological authorities of the day, like De Vries and Bateson, tell us that progress lies in the race putting forth a new head and a new body. Programs for the interbreeding of the most capable stock are therefore being proposed. The gathering of family records with this as an ultimate object is occupying the attention of the Carnegie Institute and the American Breeders' Association. The formulation of a public policy of a positive nature is a difficult task that yet awaits us.

The way is being prepared for it, however, through the advancement of equality of education for both sexes. A new and better voluntary selection of stock ought to follow this education and enfranchisement of women. From the exercise of her new freedom and prerogatives there should result fewer marriages of the deformed and the defective. Educated women will not need to marry for a home and a living; and so, if they marry at all, they will wait until they find a really congenial and capable man. There will again be female se-

lection, which, according to L. F. Ward, has been superseded by male selection in the human species; but it will be female selection on a new basis, and this change will give neither male beauty alone, as among birds and beasts, nor female beauty alone as among humans, but it will give a new beauty of both sexes — a completer and fuller and more excellent type. Under this new selection, as A. R. Wallace suggests, the vicious and the incompetent man will have little chance of finding a wife and of leaving offspring at all. On the other hand, the man, in so far as male selection will continue, will seek the most talented and beautiful woman; and she it will be who will replenish the race. This change education will accomplish by means of eugenics. Apart from this and encouraged by it, there will undoubtedly come compulsory regulation of marriage. The wise will thus eliminate the unwise; the capable, the incapable. Then will be brought to pass a condition in which it will no longer be said, as Scherger has put it, that —

> every person is entitled to the assistance of others: that every person in a state of infancy, helplessness, or infirmity has a right to the gratuitous help of others; that every person who has no income ought not to be obliged to contribute to the payment of public expenses, but has a right to gratuitous aid,

for these principles, though right, will have, in the main, no validity when economic and educational equality are brought into the race and incapacity and inefficiency bred out. Then can a Turgot no longer exclaim: "Liberty! I say with a sigh, men are perhaps not worthy of thee! Equality! they desire thee but they cannot attain thee."

But before this far haven of society is reached, there are stormy seas to be crossed. The opposing winds are already rising. In the name of liberty we shall likely have political parties made up of all classes howling: "Down with your eugenics!" In the name of her gods religion will probably

provoke a holy war against race-breeding, in which war ruling-class ethics will surely join. It would not be at all contrary to precedent if ultimate democracy were kept waiting longest on this account here in America. I say this because of our firm faith in the capacity of all men and in their right to breed their kind without let or hindrance. This faith has in it much that is truly democratic and praiseworthy, but it is nevertheless not the faith that will bring ultimate democracy. It must be swept away and place given to that larger faith in the capacity of society to breed a superior race and to shape its own destiny. But to sweep away a long-standing belief is often like trying to sweep the shadow from the floor. The English writers, particularly John Morley, think it is the fault of our democracy for us to have this faith; that we believe too much in the "inevitableness of progress" through natural selection. He says we suffer from too much Darwinism. I fear, however, this criticism is too complimentary to our intelligence. We, that is, the American public, do not know Darwinism and think little about natural selection. We think of no selection at all. Our real fault, as indicated above, is preservation of every kind of stock. The problem, then, is first of all to inculcate a belief in some kind of selection, either natural or social; and in the second place, to turn that belief, when once it is secured, into a belief in rational social selection exclusively. Long delayed by these sentiments and prejudices, and inertia and customs, democracy will not ultimately arrive tomorrow nor on the morrow's morrow, but on a distant day we cannot name but know is sure to come.

3. *The Nature of the Sovereignty*

In much that has already been said, particularly in this chapter, there has been a tacit implication that ultimate democracy necessitates a change in the nature of the sover-

eignty and in the manner of its exercise. But it remains for us to state it more fully. Before proceeding to that task, however, let us take account of the present social attitude which must be overcome in the rise of the sovereignty which democracy demands. This attitude has been well described by other writers as unsocialized individualism.

The popular use of the word "individualism" in this work may be objectionable for its looseness. To speak of unsocialized individualism may involve a contradiction in terms. Therefore it will be well to orient ourselves before proceeding with the main discussion.

All the members of a society arise together. Biologically, we are members one of another, and our coming to consciousness, like our coming to life itself, is a social process. Psychologically, we are members of the common mind. My consciousness is not mine, but society's. That being the case, I am you and you are I; or in other words, consciousness is one and the same in us all. Let us call it, by way of illustration, a stream in which there are innumerable eddies, each eddy being a "me," a "you," a "self," yet at the same time naught but the one element—common consciousness. The philosophical question may then arise, How can there be any antagonism between society and its members; how can there be any such thing as "unsocialized individualism"? If I am in body and mind, in thought and deed, what society makes me, how can there be any unsocialized attitude or act on my part? If we consider the content of consciousness alone, there can be none. Consciousness, however strong the eddy into which it breaks to make individuals, remains one unbroken social stream. But we are compelled to look for something behind the "content of consciousness." There must be something that contains. There is reality itself, and there, as experience demonstrates and facts prove, is found the "experiencer," the container of all consciousness content—the self-reality.

This container "I" is distinct and apart from the container "you"; and each is a spiritual reality—an individual. These realities are ultimate facts. We know not how; we care not why; beyond them we cannot go. With them as uncertain quantities society has to do. Here, then, we find rational ground for the seeming paradox, unsocialized individualism.

Viewed psychologically, it is, of course, not contended that unsocialized individualism is anything other than the prevalent traditional social consciousness. It must be that. But it is held that a given social consciousness may be antagonistic to the social welfare. Harking back to our figure, it may be described as a consciousness that, breaking up into eddies, is so persistent in turning and churning in and about those multitudinous centers that the stream is roiled and its progress retarded.

Individuation is not here spoken against, for it is good in itself. Its existence indicates progress in the evolution of society. Its unlimited growth is desirable, for the more completely differentiated the members of society are, the greater, perhaps, will be their interdependence and the greater, therefore, will be the social solidarity. Socialization by individuation is one of the ways to ultimate democracy. But that way is lost when the process of individuation is accompanied, as it may be, by a social psychosis unschooled in cooperation. Purposive mutual aid for the common welfare must be the program for the individual, if his conduct be truly social.

Unsocialized individualism is a foe democracy encounters everywhere. This is really the generic name for the great enemies of democracy in all history. Before history was, an age of sociality prevailed when man was one with his group in solidarity like that of a flock or herd. In fact, mankind's origin was in the herd, not in isolation. Adam and Eve there could not have been, for such individuation was not then possible. Eventually, however, the herd was scattered and the age of individuals came. We call this age, the age of

history, for it is the story of individual exploits — of Pharaohs and Cæsars, of kings and autocrats, of feudal lords and world conquerors, of princes, wars, chivalry, art, learning, wealth — all the achievements of man become individualized through release from the honeycomb of primitive sociality. In the midst of this age a third age has begun — the age of socialism, when men shall no longer be units of the herd nor yet mere individuals, but democrats. The second age is merely transitional between two forms of sociality; primitive, mechanical, unintelligent, bee-like herding and ultimate, voluntary, co-operative, self-limiting socialism or democracy. All the progress of the future involves the same procedure. There are traditions, institutions, philosophies, social habits, policies, "the conservative forces which represent historic differentiation," atomistic and antisocial, yet predominant. The whole age-old individualistic order must be combated by democracy; and nowhere is this foe more alert and stubborn than in America.

This unsocialized individualism is partly temperamental and partly traditional with the American people. By temperament the Anglo-Saxon is disposed to exalt individual character at the expense of institutions. This disposition may be due to inherent racial qualities, but be that as it may, the fact cannot be gainsaid that two thousand and more years of pioneering on his part have been of themselves a factor sufficient to give him this characteristic. At any rate, he naturally assumes that institutions were made for man, not man for institutions. Their function in his society is therefore secondary to the rôle of personal responsibility. This is especially true in American society for the reason that social conditions have operated to select the very extremes of the type described, and environmental surroundings have afforded them a free chance to develop. By contrast, the Latin, for example, puts his institutions above himself. He consequently falls short in private initiative, whereas the American fails in subordination. This

temperamental difference reaches into the affairs of state. Napoleon III said the French have always looked to the government for all instead of depending upon themselves. The genius of French democracy was embodied in Léon Gambetta with his policy of a strong centralized government. W. C. Brownell in *French Traits* points out our weakness when he says we underestimate official action as much as the French do private action.

The Anglo-Saxon temperament running wild on American soil soon apotheosized Liberty and deified Freedom. License began to fill the air. Restraint of any sort became galling. Independent, undisciplined, and unfettered will went driving through life. Private and personal initiative alone prevailed, and in vain did aught else seek sanction. The let-me-alone-and-I'll-let-you-alone attitude was rampant. Each sought his own game and insisted on being free to play it when and where and how he could, just as he pleased, and just as long as he liked. This was the liberty and this the freedom America exalted and cherished with all her peculiar pride. It was exercised first of all in exploiting the aborigines and the natural resources. In due time it was discovered exploiting the public also. The way was carefully prepared for this latter performance when the cornerstone of the republic was laid at Philadelphia in 1787. Care was then taken to set up a government which would secure the pursuit of this free life and happiness to all.

As usual in the world's history, there were two great parties concerned in the making of the new government. They were the rich and the poor. Their interests, though opposed, were yet one, in that both stood for the greatest possible personal liberty. The property class sought to effect and did effect a strong federal government which would render them secure in their possession and accumulation of property. They dominated the constitutional convention and wrote an instrument

giving them a free hand to have and to hold as much of this world's goods as possible without let or hindrance. The poor and ignorant class, on the other hand, sought protection against the encroachments of an unjust or tyrannous majority in the interest of personal liberty. By them too much government was feared; it implied oppression and dangerous coercion, together with a sinister distrust of the masses. They therefore adhered doggedly to the "let-us-alone" policy. While the latter class lost out or was ignored in the movement which led to the constitutional convention and the establishment of the new government, it nevertheless acquiesced in the situation, believing the constitution sufficient to protect them from interference and meddling on the part of the superior class, or else that they could get along without it and regardless of it. The newly wrought instrument was therefore expressive of the American spirit. It fairly represented the desires of both classes, for each had what all wanted — irresponsible liberty. Federalist and Republican, Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian, rich man and poor man, beggar man and thief, had joined hands practically, if not literally, to shape the ægis of freedom, beneath which the citizens were secure in being just about as antisocial or unsocial as they wished.

When presently the poor class under Thomas Jefferson's leadership got its innings, the idea of decentralized government and the *laissez-faire* policy became ascendent. This victorious party continued to triumph until eventually the American people as a whole were following its policies, in spite of the designs of the real makers of the constitution to centralize authority. It is interesting to note, however, that the two classes have entirely reversed their policies in the course of our history until today the property-owning class and big interests are in bitter opposition to federalism, while the masses are heartily in favor of it. Still, this is not strictly a fair statement, either, for, notwithstanding this facing about, neither

can really be called the advocate of centralized government in any true sense.

So the *laissez-faire* method was established and the individualistic policy thoroughly grounded in practice till almost the whole body of tradition, political, economic, educational, ethical, religious, and social, dominating the people of the United States became fundamentally unsocial. Under the ægis of liberty, temperament and tradition breed their wretched brood of political spoilsmen, exploiters, machine bosses, commercial imperators, freebooters, political grafters, corrupters of the people, combinations, trusts, special privileges, colossal fortunes, and judicial oligarchs, along with numerous good and praiseworthy creatures. But even the best of them have scarcely become aware of the bad ancestry whence they sprang, and still remain proud of their ultra-individualism.

In bondage to his liberty tradition and temperament heritage, the American blunders along in blind opposition to collective responsibility for the public welfare. Whenever any legislation, in the interest of all, is seriously proposed, that looks to the curbing of the free-for-all game, which has become the game of a few, from every quarter goes up the cry, "You are ruining business!" Such lamentation and calamity-howling has always been a sufficient deterrent to the extension of administrative and legislative power. The *argumentum ad populum* which "big business" makes always finds a responsive public mind. Our most unpopular laws and departments of government are, consequently, those whose function it is to regulate competition and exercise supervision over public corporations. There are few if any disturbances of trade and business slumps that are not laid to their "meddlesome interference." However useful such agencies may be for the public welfare, there is a trenchant opposition to them and to the principle of ample government upon which their authority rests.

As a business man, the American has insisted upon a free right of way; and, to put it in Walter Weyl's words, he became —

> bewildered when his familiar rebating became double cross-rebating, and the big shipper received both his own and the little shipper's rebate, and he became still more confused when the big shipper ended rebates by acquiring his own railways and his own pipe lines. The individual American was dumfounded when he saw that favorable terminal facilities, public service franchises, and other special privileges, given to a competitor, had ended competition; when he saw competition becoming parasitic; when he saw the trusts organizing a fictitious competition against themselves.

Notwithstanding his bewilderment, however, the American still adheres to the individualistic policy. Relatively speaking, he has had but little government and has felt he needed less. When he becomes a capitalist of influence, he grows vociferous in defense of his unsocial methods, and bitter in attacks upon cooperative endeavors of laboring classes to interfere with his game. He does not brook any interference with his "affairs." So two years ago a warm discussion was carried on in the papers over the ethics of a congressional investigation of the business affiliations of two prominent citizens who had been nominated by the President for the newly instituted Federal Reserve Board. The general opinion was just what it usually is: that the resentment of the appointees to any government censorship over their careers was justifiable. The recent report of the Interstate Commerce Commission on the management and financiering of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad shows the defensive attitude that efficient government has to take, as well as the typical opposition that it must meet in America. Says this report:

> The difficulties under which this railroad system has labored in the past are internal and wholly due to its own mismanagement. Its trou-

bles have not arisen because of regulation of governmental authority. Its greatest losses and most costly blunders were made in attempting to circumvent governmental regulation, and to extend its domination beyond the limits fixed by law.

Listen again to the plaint of a railway president whose company shows only twenty-eight per cent earnings on its stock for 1914:

It would certainly be most helpful could the country have for a time respite from the passage of laws having for their object more or less untried and unsound experiments in dealing with fundamental questions which the experience of all time has showed can only be solved by the working of natural laws.

"Natural laws" are of course preferable to "positive laws," since the former are and always have been what the capitalist has made them. The capitalist proclaims the championship of the tried and the sound against the "untried" and the "unsound," of "principle" against "unprincipled socialistic tendencies." He is too ignorant to see that what he calls principle is only habit — his habit of uncurbed selfishness. Or is he too wise to acknowledge his greed?

If a laboring man, the American is not much inclined to collective action. He is likely to think — and he thinks correctly — with ex-President Eliot of Harvard that the lineal descendant of the colonial patriot is not the trade unionist but the liberty-loving scab. Naturally enough he approves the latter for the same reason that he honors the former. He stands for independence while he and his fellows daily grow in dependence. The effort to form a coherent national organization of labor ended in failure nearly half a century ago. The amalgamation movement led by the Knights of Labor succeeded it in as futile an undertaking. The loose federation of autonomous trade or craft unions now prevailing marks the limit to which the American laborer has thus far been

willing to go in co-operative endeavors for the welfare of his class. Even at this but ten per cent of the toilers of the United States are organized in unions. The industrial union including all craftsmen of an industry in a single organization, which is so much in vogue in Europe, is without standing in the American Federation. The Industrial Workers of the World, adhering to that principle, meet with general approval only among the most radical foreign elements. This satisfaction with the local trade union in preference to a union more comprehensive and effective is a piece with our general unwillingness, if not inability, to get together on a large scale. The astonishing capacity of wealth and industry to get together in recent years has rendered trade unionism more inadequate than ever to cope with the situation. Consequently, it is, relatively speaking, losing out and must evolve into a higher centralized type if Labor is to be successful in the struggle.

When the American is found thinking at all, it is about "his rights" over against those of the group. "His rights" to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, etc., are held as though not created by society itself for its own welfare. They are esteemed things elemental, neither given nor to be taken by society. Withal the American puts himself first and society last; man-made society is the tacit notion. The alternative that society may also have made man does not arise. The sense of social obligation and collective responsibility is therefore poor. Such getting together as is demanded by democracy is not only rendered difficult but, worse still, is positively opposed in many ways.

Demos can conquer this foe only as the goddess of unsocialized liberty is thrown down and the traditional worship at her altars destroyed. That this may be accomplished we need a new American — one who, born of the brain of creative social purpose, and of the spirit of self-sacrifice and

equality, realizes and rejoices that ultimate democracy demands and will evolve a new sovereignty.

That sovereignty of persons, classes, or masses will be superseded by a general or collective sovereignty. Authority then, as F. H. Giddings points out, will consist in an "entire cooperating people, having the disposition and the power to exact and, in fact, exacting obedience from all individuals in the social population." This complete rule of Demos will give in some instances more government and in others less. It will give neither mere majority rule nor autocratic paternalism such as is seen in some European countries. Nor will it be absolutely perfect authority, for that is out of the question. However, the collective judgment regarding social justice and right is as nearly infallible as possible. It is certainly quite as much so as the individual judgment. Yea, we may assert with Aristotle that it is far ahead of the latter. Anyhow, this age has implicit confidence in the ultimate wisdom of the many. Speaking of the ages of equality, De Tocqueville remarks:

> The nearer the people are drawn to the common level of an equal and similar condition, the less prone does each man become to place implicit faith in a certain man or certain class of men. But his readiness to believe in the multitude increases, and opinion is more than ever mistress of the world. Not only is common opinion the only guide which private judgment retains amongst a democratic people, but amongst such a people it possesses a power infinitely beyond what it has elsewhere. At periods of equality, men have no faith in one another, by reason of their common resemblance; but this very resemblance gives them almost unbounded confidence in the judgment of the public; for it would not seem probable, as they are all endowed with equal means of judging, but that the greater truth should go with the greater number.

But fallible or infallible, the judgment of the many is the only ultimate authority that can be defended. To be sure, before it can prevail, there must come a large emancipation

of the individual along with much growth in ability to co-operate. The production of the new individual and of the new sovereignty are, however, mutually dependent processes. Through their reciprocal action both the citizen and the government are evolved, and upon this evolution hangs the progress of society toward a fuller democracy.

In America the prospects for more government which the new sovereignty involves and necessitates are generally viewed with alarm. The newspapers and the popular agitators keep the public on the *qui vive* concerning this alleged danger. In this vein run editorial comments: "Let us stand loyally to the principle of individual freedom and labor to correct its abuses without destroying it"; "Let us see to it that, while we amend and perfect the functions of government, we do not come to rely upon government to perfect us"; "Government agencies, however benevolent their purposes and benignant their appearance, may become the most crushing because the most insidious of tyrannies." Parallels to these utterances may be clipped daily from the current output of printed matter. Listen again, for instance, to the author of *The History of Freedom:*

> We are called upon to accept "the expert" as our controlling guide and "efficiency" as the final test of government. Many of the perils of monarchy or any other government from above may lurk in such advice.

Hear also the author of *The Evolution of Modern Liberty:*

> Demos may become a greater despot than an individual ruler. Demos seems to be rapidly becoming a Leviathan which is swallowing up all power. The liberty of the individual is being more and more restrained. Governmental interference is on the increase.

To this chorus the voice of the judiciary is not infrequently joined, as for instance, when the New York Court of Appeals declared:

The tendency of legislatures, in the form of regulatory measures, to interfere with the lawful pursuit of citizens is becoming a marked one in this country and it behooves the courts firmly and fearlessly to interpose the barriers of their judgment.

A misconception of the nature of a thoroughly democratic sovereignty is partly responsible for our traditional antifederal policy. While it is true that against personal sovereignty, class sovereignty, or even mass or majority sovereignty, liberty needs to be guarded, it is not true that it needs any defense against the sovereignty of Demos. And yet we go on guarding our liberty with nearly all the jealousy of our forefathers, who really had occasion for so doing. One would think we still stood in danger of personal sovereignty, even as in the days of King George. Because a strong government was dangerous in the eighteenth century, it does not follow that it will be a menace in the twentieth or the twenty-first century. Do the American people think that it is? Not at all. They do not think. They do what is easier — follow habit and tradition, and denounce the growth of the governmental function because it is customary to do so. If they did think, it would become apparent to them that the basis of governmental authority is entirely new. They would see a sovereignty unknown to the eighteenth century, and appreciate the fact that it, being of a different origin and nature, has a different purpose and program. David Watson in *Social Advance* has indicated this and made the democratic conception of the state so clear as to merit quoting. He says:

In the long march of progress from oligarchy, through despotism, to democracy, man has come to look with more friendly eyes on the state as the creation and expression of his will, and not as an alien force acting upon him from without. We have returned to the classical notion. The right of personality — a different thing from the right of individuality — having been sufficiently emphasized and guarded, we feel free to emphasize the rights of the state. The state,

says Professor Seth, restrains the expression of individuality, that it may vindicate the social rights of personality in each individual.

It is from this conception of the state as its foundation that the new sovereignty, which denies that "that government is best which governs least," arises.

The criterion of what government is best must be sought in how it works. It may be said to work when it promotes the well-being and progress of the governed. It may be called best when it works for the maximum well-being of the governed for the time being and for their ultimate perfecting as a social and self-governing group. If the minimum of government does this, it is the best. Theoretically, it has been assumed in America that it does, but in reality the want of sanity, wisdom, justice, and goodness on the part of the citizens of the state has prevented it from so working. It is therefore less than the best. The anarchists say the trouble lies in having any government at all. Abolish all organized government and let each be a law unto himself, and then will the best conditions for humanity be established. It is agreed that this would be the case only on the assumption that humanity is already perfect. But since it is far from perfect, it is reasonable to believe that anarchy would be as far as possible from the best, for it would give most chance to the play of the worst which government is designed to hold in check and correct. That government is best which governs most, if it be the right government. . Social progress under American and English democratic government has gone arm in arm with increasing governmental function and authority. Much government in place of *laissez faire* has justified itself. It is to the most ruled of all peoples today that the greatest efficiency must be accorded and the wisest provisions for the present and future welfare of the citizens be conceded. Though the régime under which the German people live is autocratic,

it has worked fairly well. It has demonstrated that intelligent autocracy can do better than any decentralized democracy. But centralized democracy can do even better than the wisest autocracy for the welfare and progress of the governed. Let the people then impose upon themselves the most thorough and paternalistic rule they can devise, for there is nothing to be feared but all to be expected from such a sovereignty.

With the assertion that man's imperfection rules anarchy as a desiratum out of consideration, renders that government which governs least less than the best, and makes imperative for democracy that government which governs most, the question naturally arises, Can an imperfect people be expected to choose the best? Is democracy able to exercise that sovereignty which will work the highest good? Many answer, No. The verdict of history, they say, is that democracy is incapable of the best. But our answer is: History is still in the writing and democracy still in the making, and the ultimate word on the ability of democracy may be yea instead of nay. The statement, made in the first paragraph of this chapter, that democracy is evolving, is quite sufficient; for in her evolution incapacity is becoming capable and imperfection is being eliminated, with the result that a greater sovereignty is coming and the best will ultimately prevail.

Even though we grant that the sovereignty of Demos will be despotic, it must be acknowledged to be despotism in the interests of all and eventually by the consent and cooperation of all. It will be a voluntary restraint of liberty in behalf of equality. For these are opposed. Says Faguet in *Politiques et Moralistes du Dix-neuvième Siècle: "La Liberté est aristocratique par essence. . . . . Liberté et Egalité sont donc contradictoires et exclusives l'une et l'autre."* It is argued that liberty is by itself aristocratic, but it is also true that it is of the essence of democracy, for it takes liberty checked by equality to give democracy.

Liberty is good. To win it was the first work of the democratic movement. Some always had it in civil society; not many, however. So for the many it had to be wrested from the few who monopolized it. But that done, it had to be curbed lest it become license to exploit others. The limiting of liberty is, therefore, the second work of democracy. The equalization of rights, privileges, powers, etc., is indeed the real task of democracy; it may be called democracy proper. Liberty may give only the "subordination of unequals," whereas complete democracy gives the "co-ordination of equals." Liberty fosters what we call individualism — which, left to itself unchecked, becomes in time a monster devouring all freedom. It brooks, naturally, no restraint; it cries, "Tyranny!" whenever the champion of equality draws near. Just as the few resisted the surrender of their liberties in behalf of the many, so now do the many resist the surrender of their liberties in behalf of all. At first at least equality must be imposed. If it come in the economic field, it must be maintained by compulsion. If it be attained in the biological realm, it must be upheld by the authority of the people — which may be benevolently despotic. Liberty must bow to equality. The cry of despotism will not halt Demos; for his watchword is not liberty for some, nor for the many, but equality for all.

The efforts to restore and preserve competition in business and personal liberty in general, and to keep away from strong central government are evidences of liberty fighting equality; democracy half-grown devouring democracy that would be full-grown. The policy is a mistaken and fatal one. The socialistic program is right in principle; and fight it, criticize it, spurn it, as we may, it is only along its way of collective purpose that democracy can advance. "Interference with the natural course of individual and popular action there must be in the public interest and such interference must at least

be sufficient to accomplish its purpose," says Herbert Croly, as he points out the fact that all amelioration in American society has come through federal intervention. Toward this new sovereignty we must face and march, or the goals of democracy will vanish from our horizon. And toward it the vanguard of the age is indeed now facing. Says D. H. Macgregor:

> Mill held that there was what he called "an inner circle" of the life of an individual within which the state ought not to intrude, but it is just this inner circle which the state is tending more and more to protect and to supervise. This is seen not only in the body of new legislation which regulates the development of such capacities in their most critical period in the case of children, but also in the tendency towards greater compulsion in the case of adults, as shown, for instance, in the insurance scheme and other aspects of the proposal to organize the labor market.

The advanced thought of the times insists that there is no inner circle whatever which may be locked against the state's benevolent interference.

The newer commonwealths of the Union have already begun to enthrone the new sovereignty in their constitutions. Organized government is being accorded powers undreamed of before in a democracy. Oklahoma's constitution of 1907, for instance, gives to the state the right to engage in any business or occupation whatsoever, except agriculture, for public purposes. Its power to regulate and control corporate wealth is practically unlimited. Wisconsin has likewise made a significant advance toward the desired sovereignty, and has for that reason become the nation's leader in good and efficient government. The agent of her sovereignty has engaged in numerous activities hitherto considered beyond the state's reach. The Wisconsin idea, as it has been designated, is really not original with the citizens of that state in substance, though it may be said to be so in form. The Teutonic ele-

ment, of which the population is largely composed, was already accustomed to the personal and class sovereignty of the Fatherland. Paternalism and bureaucracy were familiar to them in Europe, and the benefits resulting therefrom were known. They had, therefore, only to change the form, and to make the sovereignty public and general in order to get democracy and along with it some of the benefits without the evils of European autocracy.

This extension of the state's activities marks the entrance of democracy into a new sphere, in which the popular will, frankly supreme, causes the whole social organism to function for the good of all its parts. It marks the exodus from that sphere in which the social body delimited the social will in such a manner that the whole functioned for the good of one part alone. This means that an ethical age is superseding an economic age. The American West is thus proving to be the Moses of our democracy. However, this going out into the Land of Promise is becoming general. Great Britain is on the way, and the United States federal government is following hard after. Vast enterprises have already been successfully undertaken, and other experiments are soon to be tried. They will prove good; the state will grow by what it feeds upon; and the democrat's hope will surely be realized. Lecky correctly observes, "In our own day, no fact is more incontestable and conspicuous than the love of democracy for authoritative regulation."

4. The Process of Social Equilibration

The progress of democracy, finally, should be thought of as the process of equilibration in the civil order; and ultimate democracy as that equilibration approximately achieved. The civil process probably began, as Gumplowicz contends, in the conquest of one group by another, such conquest giving an aristocracy as the ruling class and such aristocracy ever being

or approaching a despotism. Against this ruling class the vanquished subjects composing the masses of the state have ever struggled, little by little winning liberties and privileges, while curbing the power of those above and leveling down social inequalities, as of old in Greece and Rome and today in the modern states. Throughout, the process has been one of equalization, first in government and law, then in wealth; and finally it will operate in the biological realm to equalize natural ability. Passing in triumph through the political and legal and economic spheres, the process must ultimately become operative in nature to even up the capacity of the human stock. Thus is society passing from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous, and so undergoing a progressive change — which is real social evolution.

This whole process of equilibration is one of increasing stability for society, for in society it is the homogeneous and not the heterogeneous that is stable. It is Gumplowicz rather than Spencer who has been the correct observer in this particular. Democracy means the equitable distribution of social energy. Just as a group of material bodies of different temperatures in juxtaposition eventually become of one temperature with themselves and their surrounding medium, so does the energy of society in all its forms tend to become generally distributed and possessed by all the units of the group in common till all share alike and a stable condition is reached. Immanuel Kant observed long ago that there would never be international peace until the various groups of peoples had attained to a republican form of government. He gave evidence in this statement that he had sighted a great principle, though he evidently did not see just how far it would apply. He had seen that social stability is correlated with equality. A republican state is more stable than a despotic state because it has liberty, which is the prerequisite of equality. A democratic state is in turn more stable than a republican state

because it has or seeks to have complete equality of energy. We may use the old and inadequate figure of the pyramid to illustrate, and say that the republican form of society is the pyramid turned from its apex to its side, but the democratic state is the pyramid turned on its base.

But though the social process be one of increasing equilibration and of greater stability as a consequence, is it desirable? No, not if it be a mere equilibrium that approaches, for that would mean a static condition without active energy at all. However, in reality society never is a mere equilibrium; it is always a moving equilibrium like the universe or like our bodies while they are living organisms. Ultimate democracy will therefore always be the most dynamic as well as the most stable society possible.

It has been assumed in the foregoing pages that ultimate democracy as we have conceived it is inevitable, that it is the goal of social evolution. Whether there is any such goal or even any natural succession of the forms of government and social organization has long been a mooted question. Plato and Aristotle contended that there were successive social forms of which democracy was the final one. Many writers since their day have argued for a succession of forms of one sort or another in the life of the state, and have generally concluded that democracy was the last. Notable among these philosophers were Polybius and Machiavelli. The history of the state itself really furnishes little evidence as to whether there is or is not any law of development. It does not justify any prediction as to the course a given nation will follow. One cannot say that monarchy will be succeeded by oligarchy and oligarchy in turn by democracy in the case of any particular state.

Yet notwithstanding this lack of historical confirmation there is nevertheless solid ground on which rests the theory that the goal toward which civil society moves is democratic

organization in the fact that there is a definite line of development traversed by the social mind. F. H. Giddings has pointed this out. He has shown that when a group is largely composed of an ideomotor mental type, especially if it is of a heterogeneous nature, and consequently lacking in sympathetic response, there is a ready submission to the yoke of monarchy. The necessity for unification and the difficulties attending it give opportunity for the strong personality to dominate. If the group holds together under the monarchical rule for a considerable time, a fusion gradually takes place and homogeneity increases. There is a drawing together of interests and feelings; and like-mindedness grows until an ideo-emotional social type prevails. This is a type not so easily coerced as the former, and, moreover, one whose social organization is based upon sympathetic response. Class rule of one kind or another, where authority is exercised more through appeal than by compulsion, succeeds monarchy. The state is then aristocratic or feudalistic. If its life still continues, the group normally evolves into one with a higher type of mind and organization. Intelligence develops and the emotions become attached to ideas; and interests tend to center in causes. A dogmatic-emotional element emerges and comes to dominate. This type is one which inclines to liberty of action, and is revolutionary in its disposition. It rebels against class authority, writes constitutions, and introduces liberalism into the social order. Thus a beginning in popular sovereignty is made. In case the continuity of the state or of the social order is not broken, a further development of the prevailing type takes place, giving a fourth stage of organization. Knowledge is disseminated, intelligence becomes general, and the people grow deliberative. The group is, generally speaking, rendered critically intellectual and organized public opinion becomes authoritative. The genius of the nation is then cooperation, and equality prevails instead of liberty. The age of democracy is then at

hand, and if it is not cut short social integration continues until in time ultimate democracy will result.

Provided the span of life for a given state is sufficiently long, ultimate democracy is pretty sure to come. The only question is, How long will it take a society which is already well advanced in the stage of liberalism to pass on to thoroughgoing democracy? Any attempt to determine this would, of course, be futile. Only those manifestations of the democratizing process in the shape of recognizable forces, which may be slow or fast, indicative of a rapid or of a retarded evolution, may be pointed out. In the succeeding chapters an effort will be made to indicate some of these forces at work in our twentieth-century society.

CHAPTER V

Democratic Forces—The Practice of Democracy

Ideals are born of situations. — JANE ADDAMS.

SOCIAL forces fall into two general classes, environ and volitional. Man and his group are acted upon by the physical world and mechanically moulded, or they selves act and shape their own destiny. In advanced stages the volitional factor is normally dominant. It both teleologically and accidentally. All action is in a purposive, but not so the results of all action. Unint and even unobserved effects are frequently produced. are the chance products or the by-products of actio seems proper, therefore, to speak of action when viewed the standpoint of results as both a purposive and an dental force.

In American society the accidental factor undoubtedly a very considerable increment to democracy, but it may als as much to aristocracy. At least it would be very diffi determine on which side the balance lies. The late Pro Munsterberg would probably have said on the side latter. However, since we do not know and may not find out, it is futile to speculate over it. And it is lik futile to attempt to maintain the distinction just drawn be accidental and purposive action in considering the prac democracy.

Activity of any sort, however, whether purposive o dental, is a socially determining force of primary impo More than any other it forms the habits and characte

group. We know that, genetically considered, action precedes emotion and thought. Says E. L. Thorndike:

> The laws of exercise and effect . . . . if they are the sole laws of modifiability, insist that the thought of an act will produce that act only if the act has been connected with that thought (and without resulting discomfort) in the animal's past.

It logically follows then that social aggregates, being composed of organisms, as well as single individuals conform to this procedure. They first act, then feel and deliberate. Social folkways and *mores,* beliefs and sentiments, ideals and attitudes, programs and policies thus got their start through group activities of one kind or another. They rise out of practical experience. The expansion and the advancement of the democratic idea, it is then fair to say, are due in a large measure to the practice of democracy. By this means the democratic theory has been broadened, the sentiments regarding it deepened, the ideals concerning it exalted, and the attitude toward it rendered more and more favorable. When persistently engaged in, democratic practices are perhaps the most trenchant force operative for the further democratization of society.

To illustrate, one practice of equality making for democracy is the consumption of common goods, as, for instance, clothing and food, and the indulgence in common pleasures and activities so prevalent today throughout the entire social sphere. This is peculiar to recent decades, for it is not long since large groups of people were brought into such close contact as to permit each to know what everyone was eating, wearing, drinking, seeing, hearing, saying, singing, reading, playing, using, and valuing. But now that this is possible, widespread and prompt imitation pervades our whole society, particularly in America. H. M. Kallen in a recent article in *The Nation,* says:

The outcome of free social contacts should, according to the laws of imitation, establish equality on the highest plane; for imitation is of the higher by the lower, so that the cut of a Paris gown at $1,000 becomes imitated in department stores at $17.50, and the play of the rich becomes the vice of the poor. This process of levelling up through imitation is facilitated by the so-called "standardization" of externals. In these days of ready-made clothes, factory-made goods, refrigerating plants, it is almost impossible that the mass of inhabitants of the country should wear other than uniform clothes, use other than uniform furniture or utensils, or eat anything but the same kind of food.

This practice of equality has not been of sufficient duration to show just how far it will further democracy, but it seems fair to conclude that it is exerting a subtle influence on the spirits of men, an influence that tends to exalt the lowly and bring down the haughty to a common plane.

The potency of the practice of democracy as a force in American society is all too little realized, or, if realized, is all too generally neglected in the discussion of our problems. It is the peculiar nature of democratic society to perfect itself by practice. The trial and error method is its very own. Crude and costly though it be, there is none other that works so well. Democracy has always "muddled through," and must continue to do so. It often acts before it thinks, but learns how to think straight in the end only by acting. In a recent article in *Harper's Magazine* Winston Churchill has aptly said, "Democracy must, from its very nature, evolve its own truths from experience and tradition, and can accept no external authority. It is an adventure." Precisely so. External authority has never yet evolved a democracy and never will, since it neglects that fundamental force we are discussing. Democratic institutions are developed on a people's initiative and by its activities if at all. This we forget too easily at home and altogether too much in our policy toward those abroad. For a free people or a people struggling to be free

there is and can be no guiding hand, if for no other reason, because so sure as a hand points to the end, the way thereto is overlooked; and the neglect of the way proves fatal. None can show whither a people shall go. Only their own impulses and promptings and past and present experiences can effectively direct. A democracy is indeed a venture of faith. The faith is self-confidence, and the venture is always upon some new experiment. Although it is customary apodeictically to pronounce this and that venture dangerous, a failure, or the substitution of "unpopular government" for popular rule, the venture, if persisted in, is usually more likely to turn out good than bad, and to evolve eventually into a substantial democratic acquisition. Thus the practice of democracy, at once educative and self-commending, is a force serving ever to perpetuate the venture.

1. *A Changed Attitude*

To what extent democratic action has wrought change in the United States may be observed by bringing into contrast the prevalent attitude of earlier generations toward democracy and that holding sway today. Truly democratic government and social organization were generally repudiated by our forefathers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The American statesmen and philosophers of that time thought of it much as did the Athenian idealists, who often conceived it to be a corrupt form of social organization by all means to be avoided. That they followed the views of Plato and Aristotle, and this too in a rather uncritical manner, is not strange nor discreditable, since there had not yet been in the modern world any considerable experience of democracy to serve as a corrective to these views. There had of course been a short period of New England community and American frontier life in which much social liberty and less equality had reigned, but there had been very little democratic organization on any

large scale. Still the feeling is unavoidable that the utterances of the fathers of the Republic on this question were sometimes inconsistent even with such experiences as they had had. Their voice was that of Jacob while their hands, it seems, must have been those of Esau. Such, for instance, was the case with the erudite James Madison when in his speech before the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia he said:

> Viewing the subject on its merits alone, the freeholders of the country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of property. These will either combine under the influence of their common situation in which case the rights of property and the public liberty will not be secure in their hands or, which is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence and combination, in which case there will be equal danger on another side.

This manifest distrust of the unprivileged masses of the body politic was again reflected in Alexander Hamilton's now famous sneer, "The people, Sir, the people is a great beast!" It was likewise evident in the words and acts of Roger Sherman, John Adams, and numerous other members of the Constitutional Convention. Thoroughly typical of the sentiment of the times among statesmen was the declaration of Stephen Higgenson, a Boston Federalist, who in 1787 wrote in reference to the New England states as follows:

> The people of the interior parts of these states have by far too much political knowledge and far too strong a relish for unrestrained freedom to be governed by our feeble system, and too little acquaintance with real sound policy or rational freedom and too little virtue to govern themselves.

Utterances such as these almost without number might be cited from the speeches and writings of the leading men of the formative period and the early decades of our history. It is very clear that the distinguished forefathers of the com-

monwealth had no confidence in the ability of the common people to conduct their own affairs. Nor, for that matter, did the people have any too much confidence in themselves. Democracy was discounted by the natural aristocracy and somewhat distrusted even by the commonalty. The result was that the federal constitution was drafted and the American government established by a group of men representing only the most wealthy, talented, and intelligent people of the day in accord with notions decidedly adverse to popular government. Their work was not for the people nor of the people nor by the people. Contrary to the opinion of the jurists who have praised it so fulsomely, our constitution was emphatically not the creation of "the whole people." It was rather the product of a class possessing the wealth, the culture, and the ability of the country and imbued with the notion which swayed the dominant element of the age, that, as Professor C. A. Beard has put it, "the fundamental private rights of property are anterior to government and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities." Every precaution was therefore taken to safeguard the institutions of society against the mob. A distinctly republican form of the state having in substance an oligarchical character was the result.

But now that old-time distrustful spirit in which our nation was conceived is practically gone. The conventional criticisms of that period towards democracy are not heard or if heard are received with that amused tolerance which greeted Rip Van Winkle. Political and social thinkers and statesmen of the present do not doubt the capacity of the masses for self-government, nor have the masses any doubt of themselves. There are no longer even many open defenders of inequality, like William Mallock, for example. There are none who today proclaim aloud the bestiality of the people. Instead, even privileged classes affect an approving and flattering mind and join in the acclamation, "Let the people rule!" They may

seldom intend that the people shall really rule, but they dare not voice their secret counsels against popular government, however much they may subvert it behind closed doors. This fact clearly reflects the spirit of the times. The safeguards that were formerly deemed necessary to keep the people from devouring themselves and turning order into chaos are now generally obliterated altogether. Whereas it was once sincerely believed that at its best democracy was adequate only for the organization and governance of the small community or, at most, the city-state, there is now not the slightest question of its fitness even for an empire greater than any the sun has yet shone upon.

2. *The Frontier's Influence*

Our thesis here is that the practice of democracy has brought about this changed attitude. Herbert Spencer maintained that the character of any aggregate was determined by the nature of the units composing it. Prejudiced against state action, he was able in this proposition to see only half a truth. Plato, on the contrary, held that "as the government is, such will be the man," or, in other words, that the nature of the aggregate determines the character of the units. These two principles must be taken together to get the whole truth; they are not contradictory, but complementary. They have so proved themselves in our history. In the outset the units, *i.e.*, a few conspicuous ones, shaped the form and the character of the commonwealth, but later on the mass has been forming the character of the units until the American is more of a democrat than it was dreamed he would be or intended that he should be. At first the units functioned undemocratically, but latterly the mass has functioned democratically with the result that those undemocratically inclined have felt the pressure and have been changed.

Let us see more specifically how this has been accomplished. To a degree it was caused by the frontier life, which gave free land and freedom almost without limit. The free land made possible a new economic order in which there was general equality of goods and in which every man was "a self-sustaining institution." Its further effect was to make every individual independent and to impose upon him the necessity of self-governance. Certain evils whose baneful influences have in some ways greatly interfered with democracy down to this very day inevitably followed from this ultra-individualism, but there were many beneficial consequences also. For the frontiersman learned that he could rule by ruling. The very necessity of ruling his own spirit fitted him to rule the city. His realm was often small and mean enough, but nevertheless sufficient to prepare him somewhat for the larger tasks of citizenship which eventually devolved upon him. A foretaste of these larger tasks soon came because frontier freedom gave opportunity for much lawlessness as well as self-control, and compelled men to get together for their mutual protection and the common good. Social well-being demanded group government in addition to self-government, and in instituting it men met and functioned as political equals. In no part of the European world had men been wont so to meet and act in the aggregate, and nowhere else on the globe could this class of men have met thus. So here arose a crude political and social fraternity, out of which grew forms of government and institutions wherein prevailed a fuller equality than had ever before been enjoyed by men in the civilized world. States were for the first time organized and admitted to the Union with full male suffrage for the mature, and citizens were made eligible to office who had in no wise any marks of superiority above their fellows, either in character, wealth, or achievement of any sort whatsoever. Here first vindicating itself in experience, democratic practice continued to grow by means of its own

exercise and has kept up its development throughout many decades. Each succeeding year has seen it thrive more than the last. The initiative and referendum were readily adopted and employed; the recall was devised; and with these three instruments of direct government in hand democracy's strength became unsurpassed. Primary elections and the direct choice of United States Senators developed so as still further to enhance the power of Demos. Woman's suffrage sprang up and was legally joined to manhood franchise, and their sturdy offsprings are now coming along to bless the union. Thus step by step the government has been passing more completely into the hands of the governed.

The results have been gratifying. Predicted disasters have not happened. The rabble has not run away with the recall. Those states making use of it are quite as stable in every respect as those adhering to the *blasé* principle that permits incompetency, malfeasance, insubordination to public wish, when once in office or on the bench, to remain till they have had their full fling. Our most thoroughly democratized states have not often acted foolishly — perhaps not even as often as have those more oligarchically inclined. California, for instance, in 1914 referred forty-eight measures of various kinds to the electorate. The results of the vote were not fatal — not even shocking. F. M. Davenport has analyzed the returns and in a recently published article on the subject comments as follows:

> California displayed the most exuberant and discriminating non-partisan judgment upon both men and measures. She re-elected the Progressive Johnson by a huge majority. She chose the Democratic U. S. Senator John D. Phelan over the Progressive Francis J. Heney. She stood the acid test of direct democracy by carefully picking twenty-seven out of forty-eight pieces of legislation and constitutional amendment which appeared on the ballot, displaying a liberal intelligence and ability that should excite at least admiration even from a Bourbon reactionary.

The people have not shown crass ignorance in their choices; they have not been eager to vote just for the fun of the thing; they have not been fickle to the extent that they have undone the work of one day on the next unless it really needed to be undone. In four hundred or more cities direct democracy has not caused any revolutions. On the contrary, Western America has by its practices disproved and given the lie to many of the arguments adverse to popular government.

The course of liberty, equality, and fraternity was once westward. When old England crowded out this troublesome trio refuge was found on the coast of New England. From thence westward still they went, trekking toward the setting sun and casting off as they journeyed such impedimenta as the older world had fastened upon them until, approaching the shores of a new ocean, democracy at last stood unfettered and free. Then the course of democracy turned eastward. It was bent on retracing its steps to reconquer the empire. The self-taught frontier, made proficient in the school of experience, soon became the schoolmaster of the East. The inflexible, class-cast, unratified by popular vote and in many cases unamendable state constitutions of the eighteenth century have under western tutelage been made to appear tyrannical anachronisms, and have as a consequence been much modified. New faith in the sovereignty of the people has been inspired and has given impetus to many forward movements in the direction of greater social and civic equality in the East. Thus for many decades the older parts of America have been going to school to the West. Full and equal manhood suffrage was one of the great lessons they learned, for the states carved out of the new territories had this as a birthright. Equal suffrage among men, to express it in J. M. Gillette's words,

> forced most of the Atlantic states to liberalize their constitutions in order to hold their people against migrating westward. While our national constitution has not changed except relative to the negroes,

our state and local government have grown constantly more democratic.

Brief fundamental principles no longer suffice for state constitutions. Experience has proved them inadequate, and they are being supplanted by extensive and explicit codes of laws that can be readily changed by amendment or revision. Law courts, lawyers, and privilege-seeking classes may find little delight in them, but they are the joy and pride of the justice-seeking public. Demos has learned that abbreviated written constitutions are public pitfalls, and he is insisting that if the respect of the masses for organic law is to be at all maintained, the American commonwealths must write not only the text but the commentary also of their basic laws.

Even more important is the new method of making the constitution. The indirect way, through the machinery of state legislatures and conventions, which has served so long, has had its day. The convention system of choosing candidates for office has failed and been cast aside, and it is but natural that that which is a piece with it, the convention system of making and revising constitutions, should also be thrown on the same rubbish heap. While it would be incorrect to say that it has already been discarded, it has nevertheless been so undermined that it must presently fall and be thrown aside. The initiative or direct method is in successful operation from Oregon to Oklahoma, and, as it is rapidly coming eastward, it is reasonable to expect that it will eventually become the only method. Under the direct method constitutions are being gradually and naturally evolved as need arises, and will always be found adapted to the social situation. No longer made things or special creations at the hand of special interests, and therefore found ill adapted as soon as finished, as they have hitherto been and in general now are, they will be organisms growing *pari passu* with the social body. The recent rejection of the convention-made constitution of New York was really

at bottom a repudiation of the old system. Had the direct method been in vogue, New York would have been building up her constitution in the unassembled convention of the people item by item during the past decades, and by now would have completed a body of laws equal to her needs. But having only the antiquated indirect method, she has been compelled to refuse a code, machine-made and completed in a few months, because it was ill adapted to modern conditions. In the light of recent experience in constitution making it seems reasonable to say that "in the many there is strength, sight, thought, wisdom, light," but that in their representatives there is no assurance that these virtues will dwell. Representatives do not represent. Nor is this necessarily any reflection on the intelligence and ability of the people who choose them; for even the best representatives when chosen become part of a legislative machine that draws in brains, personality, good intentions, loyalty to purpose, wisely laid plans, and every other thing of virtue and praise, and so mangles the whole that constituents are disgusted at the sight. Therefore the demonstrated superiority of democratic over republican government is sure to establish the latter at the expense of the former.

The constitution of the nation as well as of the states has felt the impress of the practice of democracy in the West. Though it is true that the organic law of the land has not altered greatly in form, it has nevertheless undergone profound change in spirit. Its aristocratic character, upon which, as James Bryce points out, an oligarchical system might easily have arisen, has been so modified in reality that the dangers with which popular government in America was once confronted have been largely forestalled. This is due to the fact that from our practices new habits and traditions have come; for, as Professor C. H. Cooley suggests, the real constitution, like all other institutions, "exists as a habit of mind and action." It is in our thinking and our doing. And let us here reaffirm

the fact, expressed in earlier paragraphs of this chapter, that the habits and traditions which were embodied in the instrument when it was framed in the eighteenth century are not now such as they then were in meaning and application. The written document may be likened to a monument such as that of the Egyptian Cheops, for instance, about which many generations have been busily engaged in the manifold activities of life. Each succeeding generation, more numerous than the last, has been wrought upon by its own practices so as to modify the old heritages and to give new ways and thoughts. But the change that has gone on all about has not affected Cheops. The monument has been but slightly marred; its walls still bear their ancient legends. The real Cheops, though, exists in the minds of the people, and so it is not after all the same today as it was to its builders, for the new generation has not the traditions and habits of the old.

The continual enlargement of state activity and undertaking now sanctioned is in direct contravention of our basic law as originally understood. For that law hardly presumed that government would encroach upon the private precincts of business. These were sacred; but Demos found the sacred to be synonymous with public exploitation, and ruthlessly invaded, until now the federal government does not hesitate even to engage in business of various kinds for the public good. Moreover, as it succeeds in one enterprise after another the sophistry of those selfishly interested classes which have long contended that state-conducted business is always inefficient becomes apparent. It is indeed futile for them to argue that democratic government can't run business when it does run it, and that too with success equal to that of the average private enterprise and with honesty even greater. Withal it is fair to assert that the spirit of the constitution has been made at least fifty fold more democratic by the practice of democracy.

It would be reasonable, indeed, to summarize thus: that on the frontier have been born the radical movements which have made both state and federal government more direct and popular; that here it was first demonstrated that the general sovereignty could be and should be more advantageously asserted, until that notion has penetrated into the heart of American politics; that out of the West, in brief, have come many of those policies — products of actual practice — insinuating themselves by precept and example into the attitude and acts of the whole American people to the end that they have been progressively democratized. Moreover, the influence of the West still continues, and for tomorrow's democracy in governmental affairs, we may say, the dawn is in the West.

3. *The Achievement of Orderly Change*

Besides the influence of the frontier, another factor in enhancing the prestige of democracy has been the effect of orderly change. Change has been found practicable by the practice of alteration itself, until it has been well demonstrated that democracy is at once the most versatile and the most stable organization of society.

Change was the bane of ancient democracy. Greece and Rome suffered from it. And France was affected with the same malady until Europe trembled at the very mention of the name democracy. The difficulty lay in the fact that the change was revolutionary, and organized, as social revolution is apt to be, about emotion. When ignorant, habit-bound, unreasoning, oppressed people act, it is from passion, and pretty sure to be in an extremely radical and indecorous manner. Says Gustave Le Bon in *The Psychology of Revolutions*:

> The peoples whose mind is most fixed and established often effect the most violent revolutions. Not having succeeded in evolving progressively, in adapting themselves to changes of environment, they are

forced to adapt themselves violently when such adaptations become indispensable.

They destroy institutions that must be restored again when the storm is past, if society is to continue. Good is nearly always accomplished — but so is destruction. At least, revolutions are costly means to the desired ends. Knowing or at least sensing the mental fixity, and remembering the inexperience of popular majorities, the people of the generation that founded the American Republic were fearful of change. They could think of it only as a destructive and disorderly phenomenon. They therefore took the precaution of fortifying the state against it, and made little allowance for any alteration in the institutions established. Many of the constitutions of that time, including that of the federal government, were made practically unamendable. At least eight of the state constitutions coming down from the eighteenth century to the present admit of no amendment. Shay's rebellion and other disturbances had given great alarm to the men of that day, and had served only to confirm the fears suggested to them from ancient history. There seems to have been only one prominent man who did not share the common fear; that was Thomas Jefferson, who not only approved change, but heartily sanctioned rebellion. Gilbert E. Roe has recently called attention to one of Jefferson's letters in which the Sage of Monticello alluded to Shay's uprising in the following vein:

Can history produce an instance of rebellion so honorably conducted? I say nothing of its motives; they were founded in ignorance, not wickedness. God forbid that we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion. . . . . What country ever before existed a century without a rebellion, and what countries can preserve their liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. The remedy is to set them right as to facts, pardon and pacify them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants.

But today the American people share neither the fear of their forefathers regarding change nor Jefferson's approval of revolution. Orderly or evolutionary change has become customary. In spite of early restrictions, it took place and has continued to gain momentum and favor and at the same time to relegate the possibility of revolution farther and farther to the background. Change of the orderly kind is organized about ideas and platforms instead of emotions and shibboleths. It is therefore rational, and has public opinion — not merely or chiefly public passion — for its motive. It does not depend upon some great personality from whom emanates suggestion with the intensity of radio-activity until a veritable mob bent upon doing the dictates of his capricious will becomes his following. There is no longer any danger from orators, whom Webster thought "the curse of the country." Ours is the age of publics, where real opinion reigns, and where it is organized by the press. There is discussion and the integration of thought. The fittest or the most widely published and best considered ideas generally prevail in place of the wildest passion or the will of the most heard and the most cunning person.

This age of discussion and choice of opinions giving change from principle and in orderly fashion is a real triumph of democracy. We have arrived in the neighborhood of Walter Bagehot's ideal of government by discussion. It is not as yet perfectly realized, to be sure, for the newspaper as the organizer and dispenser of public opinion has very grave faults, but it is here in form. President A. T. Hadley, of Yale, thinks the papers make emotion take the place of information. This is doubtless too often the case; still, in our great cities, where the influence of one paper is counterbalanced by that of others, truth gradually fights its way up from underneath all the perversion of facts, special pleadings, libelous attacks, prejudice, and vicious appeal that is heaped upon it. This new means

of effecting change, which in itself has been evolved by democratic practice, is orderly, rational, and moderate; and is and may be followed without fear. Having wrought out the method through a long process of trial and error, and having proved its ability to change by changing, democracy is better prepared than ever to sweep forward onto the broad highway of more far-reaching alterations in the social order than have ever yet been undertaken.

The decorous manner in which change has been accomplished in democratic society has put Demos in a new light before the world. He is shown to be a very well-behaved beast when let run; and we have come to believe he never was really dangerous except when he was kept chained and now and then slipped his chains and ran wild. Left unleashed, he has seldom demolished and laid waste the social structure, but has instead preserved the form while changing the content. He has acquired a sense of responsibility for his own conduct, knowing full well that he most of all must suffer the consequences of his own acts. He has learned self-reliance also, and inclines less and less to lean upon party machinery, but acts independently and with promptitude. He has above all grown optimistic, believing all things possible and within his power.

There are numerous ways in which the practice of democracy is promoting democracy, but enough has been said to call attention to this force; and we must now pass on to the consideration of another. It has been assumed in this chapter that practice precedes theory, but it is equally true that theory often precedes practice. Ideas rising out of action become themselves independent forces furthering new lines of action. In the next chapter, therefore, we shall take up the idea as a democratic force.

CHAPTER VI

Democratic Forces—The Idea

A state rests ultimately upon a way of thinking. — SEELEY.

TO CALL an idea a social force is not a novel conception. Alfred Fouillée, the French sociologist, has already put great stress upon the importance of idea-forces. He insists that the idea of what is, can be, or ought to be, makes possible and starts the process of change; that existing conditions are thereby altered to conditions as they may be or should be. Lester F. Ward and others have emphasized the fact also that ideas form "a subjective environment" which acts upon civilized man with the stimulating force of the physical environment. In fact, this "subjective environment" comes to supersede the latter in the power of its influence. For civilized people, says Professor Ross, "the mental content has acquired such mass, and experience has been wrought up into such forms — ideas, concepts, formula, ideals — that at each moment they control more than do the external conditions."

1. *How the Idea Works*

Idea-forces have their greatest influence in societies like those represented by the advanced nations of the western world. These societies have arrived at what has been termed the "thought and purpose stage," where change is wrought through public opinion. The majority of people in the nations of the West are open to the appeal of thought systems, and can quite readily readjust their notions. It is therefore by the imparting of ideas that public opinion is formed and social change commonly brought about. The priority of idea-forces

is effective, however, only when ideas are reasonable; that is, when they meet a felt need. Moreover, they must have prestige; which means that they are the common possession of the group, which in turn is conscious of its common possession. If in addition to fulfilling these conditions, they fairly hypnotize, as sometimes they do, their influence is most effective. For instance, in the French Revolution the doctrines of liberty, equality, and fraternity served to mesmerize the French people. Such social suggestion, however, is not desirable; nor does it normally belong to the "thought and purpose stage" of development. Crazes, fads, panics, booms, revivals, sweeping reforms, etc., mean the paralysis of rationality, and are generally possible only where it is at a low ebb. The rapid decline of these phenomena in the last century, and even in the last half-century, gives assurance that the age of mobs is practically superseded by the "era of publics." This development is fortunate for democracy, since, to be permanent, the democratic idea must establish itself in the thought of the people, and to be successful must proceed along rational and deliberate lines. And this it is doing, for by its sheer reasonableness the democratic idea is winning its way as never before. Its prestige was never so great. In all the Occident its onward sweep is like an incoming tide.

This is due, furthermore, to the fact that the idea has become an ideal. We have passed, or at least are passing into an era in which the control of society is largely by ideals. The labor cause, the temperance movement, the world peace program, are instances of social control by ideal forces. Professor Patten calls this "attractive social control," and distinguishes it from the customary control or what he terms "restrictive social control." He says:

> We may define the elevation of experience into ideals as attractive social control, for the reason that men's interests and their quest for happiness lead them into it. The other kind ought to be named

restrictive social control, for here habit and routine limit the activities, and the fear of pain is a constant depressing force, holding man within bounds.

The democratic idea as an ideal is a thoroughly dynamic force which is widely working and rapidly ushering in a great civilization.

In past generations of modern times, the democratic idea has been effective despite the fact that society was much less advanced and far less rational. Theory, contrary to popular belief, usually precedes practice in much of our experience, and philosophy begets deeds. This was never more the case than at the beginning of the modern social movement. The democratic idea was at first merely the philosopher's dream. In England it was the dream of Milton, Locke, Harrington, Blackstone, and others. Their ideas were transported to America and France. In France, Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Holback, and Turgot spread them abroad and instilled them into the popular mind. As a result political revolutions were kindled. The English, American, and French social revolutions clearly were the products of idea-forces.

But the democratic idea is today more than ever the father of deeds. This is particularly true in America. Here the idea is soon transformed into an ideal and the ideal in turn into conduct. Sir Horace Plunkett correctly observed our ways when he states, "In the life of the United States, the passage from thought to action is more rapid than in any country that I know."

2. The People Becoming Philosophers

The people as well as the philosophers are now dreaming; indeed, Demos has pretty nearly become the chief philosopher of the twentieth century. Popular education and widespread information have already given the masses minds for thinking, means for speaking, and mediums for spreading abroad their

conclusions. The growing interest of the public in education, and the avidity with which multitudes are availing themselves of its advantages are of tremendous import for the working out of any ideas, and particularly of the democratic idea. There is "an intimate connection between knowledge and liberty, between an increasing civilization and an advancing democracy," said Thomas Buckle. That he was right is becoming more and more obvious. Recent statistics on the reading of the world show where ideas are most common and most busy. It is among the common people. The working classes of all countries are devouring economics, sociology, and philosophy. Such works are popular even in the slums, so the publishers say, while light fiction sells better on the uptown avenues. One of the leading publishers of New York recently informed the writer that it was not difficult to dispose of books of solid reading to the East Side book-dealers, but that sales of this class of literature were slow and uncertain in more prosperous sections.

The poor are digesting and assimilating what they read, too. Taking knowledge of this fact, the ruling classes of some countries have made a studious effort to educate the people "aright," according to "acceptable notions" of the state and its institutions; and have attained more or less success. Despite these efforts, however, the subject of most vital interest among the masses is the question of social progress. The result is that if you want to find among the English, French, German, or American people real thought on economic, political, and social topics, you must go to a labor convention rather than to a meeting of business men, a society of the well-to-do, or a rich man's club. The laboring class is redeeming its leisure hours by learning how to think through the problems of today, by grappling earnestly with the real issues of the age, while the well-to-do and the rich are squandering theirs in pleasure or by tussling with the momentous questions of

personal comfort and indulgence. The latter are riding out in automobiles, gossiping at clubs, playing cards, crowding theaters and moving-picture shows, and doing numerous time-consuming things which, though not bad in themselves, are nevertheless sufficient to steal even that modicum of time which an intelligent people ought to devote to brain strengthening as well as to pleasure seeking. If they read at all, even that is prone to be for pleasure and to consist of the daily papers and cheaper magazines.

An irate reformer in one of our cities hit the sore spot by the following indictment of the average voter:

> You read the sporting pages in the papers and let the other pages go. How can city officials help such stupid people? They are tied with old laws made while you went to prize fights.

The Publishers' Cooperative Bureau has recently estimated that in the United States but one in 7,300 persons buys a book in a year. Compared with France and Great Britain, where it is one out of 3,800, with Germany, where it is even better, and with Switzerland, where it is one out of 872, America does not show up very well. Everything indicates that the difficulty is not with the so-called lower classes, but with those just above and with those higher still. The masses are fast becoming the thinkers, not the rich nor the comfortable, ease-seeking middle class. The latter classes like ease, art, and action, not thought. They are wholly unlike those very admirable Areopagites of ancient Greece, whose only care was to hear and discuss some new and vital thing. These classes do not want the new in any line unless it is in some sensation or amusement; it is too strenuous. They are against innovating ideas. They glory in often-told tales, "safe" notions, and what passes for history. Says Walter Weyl:

> Our conservative traditions are fulsomely praised while democratic experiments are derided and their inevitable failure prophesied. The

appeal is always to the old. New laws and constitutions are too likely to be democratic. For the mass of new ideas fermenting in popular movements, for all manifestations of democratic humanitarianism, the plutocracy has and has always had nothing but contempt and fear. The plutocracy exalts good old judicial precedents, and its patriotism takes on a mellow meerschaum retrospective tinge which is mere reactionism as opposed to a patriotism which looks forward to a better America.

Unfortunately, these classes control in a large measure the great agents of public expression, such as newspapers, periodicals, and pulpits. But, fortunately, the people are losing respect for "respectable ideas" voiced by such agencies and are beginning to speak for themselves and to their own through mediums of their own. The agencies that would hamper and hinder them, a subsidized press and a generally padlocked pulpit, no longer stand much in the way of the rise and spread of ideas and the formation of opinion among the masses. Walt Whitman could hardly say of the present situation as of a past one, "As I stand aloof and look, there is to me something profoundly affecting in large masses of men following the lead of those who do not believe in men." For nothing is clearer than the fact that these masses are capable of self-direction and are fast becoming the leaders of social progress. They are learning and understanding a new and better way than the prevailing one.

With this education and self-education growing apace, the masses bid fair to outclass the classes intellectually. They are thinking and growing dissatisfied. It can no longer be said of them as Lasalle said of the German Proletarians, that they do not know they are miserable; for never was the commonalty so keenly conscious of the fact and so prone to draw invidious comparisons between itself and other classes. The great unrest has its taproot here. Even "despite itself the plutocracy subsidizes discontent and revolt" in this age more often than it is aware when it endows education, libraries,

and particularly universities. It only lends assistance to the cause of democracy by feeding it when it thus tries to placate the monster; it only helps Demos to become full grown. A capitalist addressing a recent meeting of the National Civic Federation correctly attributed social unrest to the effects of educational forces at work for half a century which Capital has helped finance. He said:

> Have these men seriously thought of what their investment in the educational plant was to do? what kind of product it was to turn out? what kind of a dividend it was going to pay? . . . . I very much doubt it, for if they had thought of it seriously, intelligently, they would know that there was only one kind of dividend they could get from an educational plant, namely, minds that are trained to think better, more logically, more accurately, more independently. Every year we are turning out more of such minds and they are grappling with our problems; yet a large percentage of the men who made it possible for these educational plants to turn out such minds are today bitterly complaining because of the questions being raised and the problems being crowded for solution by these very minds.

Perhaps some among those who make no complaint whatever are half pleased with this kind of dividends and are chuckling to themselves as once did another class, who, wholly indifferent to the natural consequences of its conduct, said, "After us, the Deluge!"

There is some evidence that the capitalist and the well-to-do also are becoming somewhat more sensitive to the fact that education is so largely responsible for social discontent. It is seen in the very speech reported above, and it is seen also in a certain opposition to college and university training that is abroad, and in frequent efforts on the part of Special Privilege to curtail academic freedom of speech and instruction, and to cashier fearless investigators, dynamic teachers and bold proclaimers of human rights. In the South a rather widespread resistance to any sort of education for the Negro is summed up in the common saying that it makes him dissatisfied and

causes him to "forget his place." Viewed from the standpoint of aristocracy, such opposition is justified, for idea-forces do most certainly create and spread restlessness by making people think new and "dangerous" things.

Moreover, as John Graham Brooks in *The Social Unrest* has pointed out, the democratic sentiments and ideas have been commercialized and therefore made to run like fire over a prairie. This is peculiar to our industrial age. It is a paying business. Said an American journalist, "If I can find fault enough and state it in the right phrases no papers are left on my hands." An English editor said, "The young fellow's fortune is made who learns the trick of phrasing criticism against the present social order." As Brooks puts it, "This new faculty for the utterance of our complaint becomes also cause of the evil." Here the subsidized press in its avarice has worked at cross-purposes with the interests of the class that owns it, and has almost killed the goose that laid the golden egg. In its more immediate aspects there are certainly many evils attending this commercialization of unrest and social criticism. Judged in its remoter bearings and its far-reaching consequences, however, there is more good than evil. On the whole, it must be said that the commercialization of social discontent is an effective means for the making of democracy.

Lamentable though the neglect of knowledge and serious thought on the part of the more prosperous classes is, it is perhaps not really so deplorable as it at first appears. The fact that there is a dynamic center of democratic ideas and influences found located in even one social class sets the matter in a different light, for it is by no means necessary for every social class to be a thought-producing or even a thought-consuming one in order that idea-forces may operate successfully. There never has been, in fact, a time in any nation when all classes contributed to the prevalent stream of thought.

Yet, notwithstanding this, great conceptions have dominated societies in past ages and advancement has taken place. And today less than ever before do social movements demand the participation of the whole society in the formulating of their doctrines. For, be it remembered, ideas always pass from class to class by suggestion and imitation, and do so with surprising rapidity nowadays. The level at which they are generated is therefore of little importance so long as they spread and communicate themselves to the other levels. If the historic cycles of the past were surveyed, their dominating philosophies would more than likely be found generally to have originated with a single class, and then to have been communicated in some measure to the groups above and below the source group. In ancient times the conquerors were always the thinkers. To them alone pertained wealth, leisure, and opportunity for meditation, made possible by the toil of the enslaved and conquered. The systems of philosophy of whatsoever sort were entirely aristocratic products and largely if not altogether confined in their range to that circle. Only in Greece and Rome, so far as we know, did they spread to the plebeian classes to any great extent. The thought of the Middle Ages was pretty largely of middle-class or bourgeoisie origin. The commercial towns were the thinking areas, and therefrom the notions of the age permeated upward to the nobility. That great awakening, enfranchising, redirecting, and reorganizing movement known as the Renaissance came about as the first far-reaching influence of middle-class thought. The cause of liberalism which much later concerned the western world was a further manifestation of this same class philosophy. In its case, however, the idea-forces worked downward and to a considerable degree took possession of the masses. And they it was who made the idea of liberty prevail in France, and only in a lesser measure in England and America.

Gradually the doctrines and practices of liberalism wrought upon the proletariat till it began to develop thought and capacity within its own ranks, and during the course of the last century to draw to itself the generating center for the doctrines and policies of democracy. Consequently, from this class today are arising these ideas and ideals which permeate upward even to the topmost social planes. There may be little or nothing new in them, for it is difficult to add to the democratic notion, but they have at least given this new application and emphasis. According to the accepted statement of its law, social imitation always proceeds from above downward, but if the foregoing interpretation of thought movements be correct, a slight modification relative thereto would appear necessary. For the course of imitation has been from below upward as well as from above downward, where ideas are concerned.

The democratic idea is not then necessarily weakened because the source whence it emanates has been shifted from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat level. Nor is its influence necessarily jeopardized or even much curtailed because of middle-class mental indolence and indifference. The fate of any cause rests ultimately with those most directly concerned in its triumph. Liberalism was a middle-class notion, and middle-class interests and brains carried it to its achievements. Equality, on the contrary, is mainly a lower-class notion, pertaining chiefly to lower-class welfare and depending upon lower-class efforts and resources for success. The middle class's task in establishing liberalism was relatively easy, for it had only one class above it to leaven and socialize. And in doing this, too, the whole lower stratum was available for assistance. But, in contrast, the task of the proletariat is more difficult, for it has the weight of two classes above it to lift, and no class at all below it to draft into service. Still, there is some advantage in the fact that the democratic idea is now

being generated at the very bottom, for, if nothing more, it may communicate the sensation of instability to all that is above. And, particularly since ignorance, prejudice, and bigotry seem to be thriving rather widely on that middle-class plane where once liberty grew, it may be that democracy will work through fear if it cannot work through reason. For under such conditions fear is prone to rise easily, and unstable foundations communicate it more quickly than almost anything else. So then it is possible that fear will accomplish what reason ought to, if perchance brain-filling so far fails the middle class that it will be thrown back on instinct; since then it will yield from the instinct of self-preservation instead of from the sense of justice. Still, it is very improbable that things will come to such a pass in America. It is far more likely that the growing social intelligence of the working class with the democratic propaganda in its keeping will provoke the classes above it to new thoughtfulness until they accept the modern democratic idea in reason, not in fear.

3. The Character of the Idea

But what specifically is the idea at work to cause this discontent? As we have already stated, it is the doctrine of equality. This idea has become the ideal of our day. Once the democratic idea was religious freedom. It was called protestantism. It fought and won its battles long ago. Then the idea became political liberty. This was called liberalism, and became the creed of the latter eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. In this name political liberty triumphed, at least in theory, in the leading nations of the western world. Now, social equality in the broadest sense has become the ideal. It is called socialism, and is already making its first conquests.

In its current expression the doctrine of equality takes numerous forms and emphasizes several principles. Political

equality is one of its tenets. Direct government, where every vote counts as much as every other, and every voter has an equal voice, together with equal suffrage for both sexes, is being sought. Moral equality is another phase of the general doctrine. The equal worth of every individual from a moral viewpoint is being insisted upon. The question of diversity in "value of expression" is being swept aside. It is germane to ask only whether one is a human being, not whether a saint or a sinner, a Jew or a Gentile, a Greek or a barbarian, a plutocrat or a pauper, a free citizen or a prisoner, a sybarite or a toiler. It is being said now as it was never said before, "A man's a man for a' that."

The cardinal doctrine, however, is economic equality. Stress has already been laid upon this in previous chapters, and here only a brief analysis need be added. The first thing involved is the question of opportunity in respect to work and leisure. An equal chance for all to labor at something or other and to earn a living; the right of all to enjoy or at least to command leisure in equal measure; equal access to the means of education and culture that thus opportunity may be made general; and, since the inheritance of fortune is a big factor in making opportunity unequal, an equal chance at the outset are demanded. The second item in the program of economic equality is the securing of justice. The cry is that it, administered as it now is mainly by and in behalf of property rights, be made really even handed. A third plank in the platform is equality of reward for all workers. Denying that there is any real ground upon which one kind of work can claim more of the product than another, an equal sharing of the fruits of toil is demanded. Dr. Felix Adler in *The World Crisis and Its Meaning* has forcibly voiced the ideal in the following:

> The proportion between work done and income received will have to be based on a totally different principle, and the word "reward" must be entirely expunged from the vocabulary of economic justice.

The principle I mean is sustentation and not remuneration. The just principle is that which sustains the worker at the highest possible pitch of efficiency in doing his work, not that which rewards or remunerates him for doing it. The reward of the work, so far as it goes, is or must be in the work itself.

The fourth item in this program is equality within a narrow range relative to the possession of goods.

Lastly, along with political, moral, and economic equality the doctrine of genetic equality is involved. The right to be well-born is soon to be claimed. That all shall be born with endowments of equal merit is the final word of the democratic idea.

So this is the prevalent thought of the age, about which public opinion is revolving and concerning which it is taking shape. The ideals it upholds may be called fatuous and he who holds them fool, but, nevertheless, they are the dominant expressions of democracy.

Reinforced by protestantism and liberalism with their historical background, this broad socialism, as the democratic ideal, is at once a trinity of forces and a unity of power. It is a spirit having the validity of religion, becoming at once the inspiration of great leaders, the animation of great groups, the motive of great movements, and the life of great institutions. It is truly a leaven working in the mass, fermenting discontent, aspiration, ambition, reformation, revolution, and progress unto ultimate equality.

If you have ever stood on some beach or desert and seen the sand tossed into drifting dunes by the ceaseless wind, perhaps you have wondered if aught could give cohesion to those dunes, and if aught would ever establish them with the firmness of eternal hills. And wondering, perhaps you have gone away and returned again after long years to the self-same spot to find that the seed of the pine or the oak had fallen upon them and sprouted a tree, whose roots, penetrat-

ing the sands, had gathered them into their arms and hugged them together to form the heart of a hill, and had really given organization and unification to the shifting waste. And there, if this experience has been yours, you have seen a picture of the same power that an idea — the democratic idea, if you will — has in the social mass of our day, shooting its roots through it till the whole social aggregate begins to cohere about one purpose and to adhere to one all-inclusive program of democracy.

CHAPTER VII

Democratic Forces — The Urbanization of Society

The life that men live in the cities, gives the type and measure of their civilization. The word civilization means the manner of life of the civilized part of the community; that is, of the city men, not of the countrymen who are called rustics, and were once called pagans (*Pagani*), or the heathen of the villages. — FREDERIC HARRISON.

AROUND the globe everybody is moving to town. In all the nations of the western world especially, cities are growing with astonishing rapidity. Already nearly half of the people live in them, and the trend to them is unabating.

1. *The City Becoming Dominant*

England, Wales, and Scotland have about eighty per cent of their population in strictly urban territory. The first two countries have twenty-five per cent in cities of over 250,000 and thirteen per cent in centers of over 100,000. Places of 50,000 or more population include another ten per cent, while all under that size but above 10,000 claim another twenty-one per cent. This gives seventy per cent of strictly urban dwellers. In 1800, London claimed 864,000 inhabitants, while at the present time it has around 7,000,000. In two decades half the counties have declined in population, until there are now one million fewer people on the land in England than a half-century ago. The urban rate of increase still remains in excess of the rural. In Scotland there was a twenty per cent increase in city growth during the last census period.

Germany has forty-one cities of more than 100,000 population each, and two hundred and eight with less than that, but

over 20,000. One-third of the German people are l
cities of a population above 20,000. Nearly sixty per
the population is urban. Berlin has grown from l
200,000 a century ago to over 2,000,000 today. In thir
the urban centers have drawn more than twenty per
all the people of the German Empire.

In 1906 France had one hundred and twelve cities
20,000 population each, wherein dwelt more than on
of all the nation. A century ago Paris had somethi
500,000, while today it has 3,000,000 people. The urba
lation of France is a little less than forty-five per cen
total. The rate of urban growth is relatively rapid anc

Two-thirds of the population of Australia is urban.
there was in seven colonies forty-three per cent of th
concentrated in places of 10,000 population or over.

In 1800 the United States had only six places with
as 8,000 inhabitants each, whose combined populatio
gated only about four per cent of that of the entire
In 1900 there were five hundred and forty-five such ci
resenting thirty-three per cent of the total number o
counted in the United States. In 1910 thirty-one per
the nation's population dwelt in communities of tw
thousand or more inhabitants. There are now three
the first class, having one or more millions of peopl
fall in the next group of a half-million or more eac
next smaller size, with a quarter-million or over,
eleven. There are thirty-one of the fourth grade,
tenth of a million and over; fifty-nine that have 50,000
one hundred and twenty numbering 25,000 and ov
three hundred and seventy-two in the 10,000 class.

Almost forty-two per cent of the population of the
states of the Union, as reckoned by the census of 17
in 1900 living in cities. This original area, it may b
contains forty-four per cent of the total populatio

Republic today. Over four-fifths of the people of New England, according to the 1910 count, live in cities; over seven-tenths of those of the Middle Atlantic states, and over one-half of those of the East North Central and Pacific states. An average of 46.3 per cent for the whole population of the United States is now classified as urban. Fourteen states had in 1910 more than half their people in urban territory. New York and New Jersey had three-fourths; Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, ninety per cent or more.

During the last decade the increase of urban population was more than three times that of the rural population. If we compare the open country with incorporated places, the gain was nearly one to six in the latter's favor. Seven-tenths of the total increase during this period was urban. The rate of urban growth, moreover, is rapidly increasing.

This amazing transformation already wrought and still going on means rural depletion and the eventual subordination of the country to the town. Six states of the Union, including the great agricultural states of Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri, during the last decade experienced an absolute decline in rural population. The country districts of America are now as a rule almost static in numbers. In other respects they are in an arrested condition. Talent and leadership are being drawn townward until there is a dearth of capable citizens in the average rural community. There was a time when American politicians and statesmen were called from the countryside to legislative halls, but farmer statesmen are, generally speaking, not now to be found. Once trackless forests and boundless prairies called the pioneering and venturesome countryman to conquer them. Free lands challenged a hardy and ambitious breed to match brain and brawn with tough glebe and unhewn wood. "Westward, Ho!" was the watchword. Now the land frontier is gone, and the city has become the frontier of the new

world as well as of the old. It invites the superior stock to seek fortune and power within its gates. It challenges wit and skill of every sort to cope with its problems. Therefore "Townward, Ho!" rings the cry throughout the land, leading increasing multitudes to the busy marts of trade. Samuel Johnson could not see how anyone could dwell anywhere except in London. Judging from the universal drift toward the Londons of the globe, it looks as though all the world had come to agree with him.

The city seems destined to dominate the life of society. Even now it very nearly does so in many places. In certain states of the Union it is really the state, and would reign supreme were it not for the handicap of antiquated rural-made constitutions. As it is, urban political influence throughout America almost balances the rural. In 1850 it is estimated that urban wealth in the United States aggregated $3,170,000,000, while rural wealth amounted to $3,987,000,000. By 1900, out of the $88,527,000,000 of wealth, the city had $68,000,000,000 — three-fourths of the total, or more than twice its proportionate share. Moreover, the great economic organizations for buying, selling, banking, insurance, and credit are located in the city. The city dictates standards, prices, and business conditions. Thus its financial ascendancy over the country is well established.

The supremacy of the city in institutions, organizations, and constructive movements of every kind is almost as well grounded. The country goes to town for its plans, programs, fashions, doctrines, literature, political platforms, school curricula, and its cultural facilities. America is indeed very largely a city-centered nation.

Nor can the rising dominance of the city be checked so long as the forces of the industrial revolution which gave the impetus to its growth remain operative. All roads will continue to lead to Rome. The efforts to revive the country, to

tone up its life, redirect its institutions, and rebuild its communities until growing numbers will find rural society satisfying, praiseworthy and beneficial as such endeavors are, will not avail much to prevent the city overshadowing the country in every way so long as the distribution of economic advantages remains unchanged. Even though scientific methods be applied to agriculture generally, it is not likely that the situation will be altered. Unless the manufacturing industry can be removed from the city to the country, all the scientific farming, the country-life movements, and the "back to nature" propagandas that may be promoted will not change things fundamentally. And if this industry were taken from the city to the open fields, a new city would only rise wherever it were set down. At best such a move, were it practical, would operate only to make smaller cities but more of them. So it seems assured that for the future the city is destined to lead, rule over, and shape society, while the rural regions will play a diminishing part in the drama of the age.

2. *The Urban and the Rural Psychosis*

The most significant phase of the urbanization of society is the fact that it is giving a new social psychosis — one quite different from that which has hitherto prevailed under the lordship of the country. It is bringing society under the sway of the urban instead of the rural mind. Let us see what this means by contrasting the two mental types.

The rural mind is strongly fatalistic. The great areas of fatalism about the globe occur among country-dwelling populations. The countryman is dependent upon Nature's caprices. Sunshine and cloud, desiccation and dampness, heat and cold, fruitful fields and fertile flocks, fat years and lean ones, upon which turn feast and famine, good fortune and bad, are alike her gifts. She is no respecter of the will or the wish of those who live by her processes. The husbandman is for this reason

least of all men master of his fate. He proposes, but insensate Nature disposes. So he unavoidably grows accustomed to taking things as they come, and to thinking them humanly unalterable. This disposition he is prone to carry over with full force into the social realm and there as elsewhere to manifest a belief in the futility of effort. Halting between action and inaction, as in the old Scottish jingle which runs,

> You can and you can't,
> You shall and you shan't;
> You will and you won't;
> You'll be damned if you do;
> You'll be damned if you don't,"

he is in the end prone to leave it all to Providence.

Howbeit, this fatalism by no means extends so far that assertive effort is greatly neutralized. The *entrepreneur* function of the agriculturalist precludes that, and gives self-reliance and initiative a fair chance to develop. The farmer must depend upon his own resources, set himself to work, and make his own decisions — for his physical, economic, and social isolation necessitates it. This acquired initiative, however, is wholly personal, and scarcely comes over into social relations and group activities at all. The farmer is therefore neither equipped to lead nor disposed to be led by his fellows.

A third outstanding characteristic of the rural mind is its suspiciousness. This, too, is the logical outgrowth of the countryman's isolated, independent occupation and his close contact with fickle Nature. No trait so robs him of socially cohesive power and renders him relatively so unsocial. Because of his habitual suspiciousness, as much as anything, the farmer is seriously disqualified for concerted action, organized effort, and co-operative functioning.

A fourth quality of the mind of the country is conservatism. Having its basis largely in the mental complex of the other

traits mentioned — fatalism, personal assertiveness, and suspiciousness — it is strengthened by the uneventful character of a life subject only to the regular and cyclical changes of the weather and the seasons. Habits of readjustment are not much needed and are not strongly formed. It is therefore with the utmost caution and hesitation that old ways and notions are exchanged for new ones. To venture or experiment is not readily given sanction. As a result, neither progress nor the desire for it pertain to the open fields. Rural people have always been the most backward. The laggard and undemocratic states of the Occident even today are such forsooth in great measure because under the dominance of the rural mind. Witness Russia and Austria in the near East.

Paradoxical though it seem, the rural mind is also radical. It is an emotional rather than a rational or a thought radicalism, however — one that is due to sudden stimulation where stimulation of any sort is comparatively infrequent. This radicalism often manifests itself in moral, political, and religious fanaticism. Feuds, intolerant moral fads, partyisms, economic crazes, and religious revivals are the curse of country districts, villages, and towns. Radical thought is rarely associated with the rural mind.

On the whole, the mind of the countryman is relatively emotional. Its thought is deeply suffused with feeling, and its reactions to the environment always carry a strong emotional concomitant. Any classification is faulty because of the things it excludes, and we must in this case be granted the greatest latitude when we call the most common rural psychological type dogmatically emotional.

Whereas the rural mind is fatalistic, the urban mind is masterful and optimistic. The townsman has to do with art, not Nature. Far removed from the play of the seasons, the weather, and the forces of growth and decay, and the uncertainties of Nature's disposition, he is not accustomed to take

things as they come because he must. He is more used to making conditions and circumstances instead of being subject to them to the degree the farmer is. He depends upon himself, or, better said, upon human not extra-human ingenuities. Consequently he is inclined to think that all things are easily possible to human endeavor. He does not labor and wait and wonder if Providence will reward him; he labors and takes his reward, much or meager though it be, and is his own Providence. He may have far less initiative than his country cousin, since he is much less often able to be his own boss and business manager, and to set himself to work. Yet what he lacks in this regard, he gains otherwise, for his dependence upon others and his working with them and for them gives him something the country cousin has not at all, namely, social initiative. He is used to going with the group and pushing its program to success. While his self-reliance is not conspicuous his strength is great, for it is found in numbers and in reliance upon the group.

The townsman is not as a rule conservative. On the contrary, he is boldly speculative, daring, and always ready to hear and to undertake something new. He will venture all as in a game, hoping to win but not afraid to lose. His mind is prone to be fairly dynamic and relatively untrammeled. It is but slightly fettered by tradition, or if fettered it is to a vastly different one than the countryman's, and is bound even less by its own fears. It appreciates variety and longs for progress. About the city dweller, the city structure, entirely unlike the country, is never finished, but always in the process of making and remaking, and is apparently capable of indefinite and unlimited change and improvement. So the city man comes to conceive the social whole as a growing, changing entity. The organic view is his.

Again the urban mind is similar to the rural in being radical; only that the radicalism is different; it is rational, not fanatical.

There is fearless thinking of extreme ideas and a relatively better control of the emotions. There is so much stimulation that the emotions take a flat-gray hue and rarely become vivid save under persistent irritation. City frenzies are comparatively few.

Frankness rather than suspiciousness is another trait of the urban mind. Men are used to one another and to human contacts. They accept them as matters of course. There results common knowledge of human nature. Then, too, relationships are impersonal and center largely in causes, organizations, and principles, and this impersonal feature leaves little room for suspiciousness which relates chiefly to persons. The city mind if it can be classified at all in contrast to the rural is, roughly speaking, critically intellectual.

Franz Oppenheimer in *The State* has succinctly contrasted the two types in the following:

> The psychology of the townsman, and especially of the dweller in the maritime commercial city, is radically different from that of the countryman. His point of view is freer and more inclusive. Even though it be more superficial, he is livelier, because more impressions strike him in a day than a peasant in a year. He becomes used to constant changes and news, and thus is always *novarum rerum cupidus.* He is more remote from nature and less dependent upon it than is the peasant, and therefore he has less fear of "ghosts." One consequence of this is that an underling in the city state is less apt to regard the "taboo" regulations imposed upon him by the first and second estates of rulers. And he is compelled to live in compact masses with his fellow subjects; he easily finds his strength in numbers, so that he becomes more unruly and seditious than the serf who lives in such isolation that he never becomes conscious of the mass to which he belongs and never remains under the impression that his overlord with his followers will have the upper hand in every fight.

If the foregoing analysis is true to facts, the urban mind is apparently in most respects the superior mind. It is obviously the preeminently social type. Such indeed it has always been

in every part of the world, and it is vindicating itself anew as such today in American society.

3. *Urbanized Society*

Thoroughly urbanized society will be unique in the history of mankind. Although in times past there have been powerful cities, as in the days of Rome and in the Middle Ages, city populations have never been great and numerous enough completely subordinate the country, save, of course, in the small city-states. But we are now fast approaching a city-dominated society. Notwithstanding all the problems that are raised and necessarily involved, serious and perplexing as they are, there is, nevertheless, every reason for thinking that society is passing to a higher state in thus being urbanized. This is certainly true if it be granted that the urban man is superior socially. It is unquestionably true that the urban environment is fecund while the rural is sterile. Talent, invention, and thought come out of it; it is the home of origins and progress. From the static environment of the country almost nothing new comes; from the static mind of the fields few new social ideas are born. Nor do such ideas find a fruitful soil when scattered there; they but wither and die like the seed sown on rocky soil. In *American Men of Science* Professor Cattell has asserted that density of population is necessary for the growth of talent. He says:

> The main factors in producing scientific and other forms of intellectual performance seem to be density of population, institutions, and social traditions and ideals. All these may be ultimately due to race, but, given the existing race, the scientific productivity of the nation can be increased in quantity, though not in quality, almost to the extent that we wish to increase it.

That it will be increased in proportion to the urbanization of population it seems fair to assume in the light of facts

already discovered. M. Odin has done much to bring forth these facts, having shown that during the past five hundred years of French history most of the talented men who have furnished the thought and leadership and great achievements of France were either born or brought up in the city. Dr. Scott Nearing likewise has found the same thing to be generally true of America. He shows that of ten thousand eminent men in *Who's Who in America,* one-fifth were born in the twenty-seven cities of 200,000 or more population. Had he calculated the number who were born in smaller cities and those who had been brought up or educated in the city or come for some time under its spell, he probably would have been able to report that very little American genius or talent had arisen and developed outside the cities' influence. The mere place of birth is not the important factor; it is the place of rearing and of training. The city environment alone furnishes the means and the opportunity for the development and the expression of ability.

Military experts from the war zones of Europe tell us that the city recruits are far the best soldiers in the several armies. They are more alert, work together better, and adapt themselves more readily to situations than do the men from the fields and country villages. Physically no less sturdy, having even greater powers of endurance, and mentally more alert and generally superior, city men are much the more efficient on the battlefield. Henry Drummond was justified in saying, "He who makes the city makes the world. For though men may make cities, it is after all the cities which make men."

Urban society has often been thought vicious and destructive. In this light the countryman has viewed it. Some who have made studies of its life agree with this view. For instance, Josiah Strong in *The Twentieth Century City* attempts to show that urbanization is carrying society on to inevitable ruin; that it is engulfing free institutions and democracy in a materialism

which is fatal. Again, Dr. George Hansen in *Dei drei Bevölkerungs-Stufen* tried to prove the case against the city by a statistical study. Adna F. Weber in *The Growth of Cities* takes up the defense and states Hansen's proposition, which is to the effect that a stream of country-bred people enters the city's middle class and ascends while a downward current of city-bred degenerates sets in. The latter swells the proletariat which never rises. The city is thus an instrument of social degeneration, and if it keeps growing it will "dry up the reservoirs of strength in the population and leave in their place an immense proletariat, practically good for nothing." Such conclusions are unwarranted, however, as the facts from the wider induction do not support them. Dr. Weber boldly challenges them and demonstrates by the statistical method and from more complete data than Hansen utilized that the city man really holds his own. He shows that the proletariat is largely recruited from the country-born instead of from the city-born; that the countryman enters the city at the bottom and works up, and not at the middle or the top to crowd the city man down; that the pauper class has in it more of the country-born than of the city-born. Contrary to the views expressed by Strong and Hansen, then, it would appear to be a fact that urban society is not essentially an instrument of social destruction. The final grist of its mill is not inevitably pauperism and degeneracy; it is ability and social strength. Its selective process being quick and sure, the most capable are brought to the front, while deficiency is speedily marked either for improvement or elimination. Rural society, in contrast, has scarcely been selective at all, and as a consequence it is flat and stagnant, with perhaps a tendency to degeneration. Thus should the urbanization of society do nothing more than accelerate the process of sifting and sorting the stock, its coming would be a boon to the nation; for the sooner society becomes acquainted with its elements, the earlier it may adjust

itself to the problem of an adequate control of them. Ultimate democracy certainly calls for the performance of this selective work of urban society.

The important fact to which we come is that urbanized society is greatly conducive to democracy. An old German adage runs, *Stadt Luft macht frei* ("city air makes free"). "A nation may establish a system of free government, but without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty," declared De Tocqueville. These aphorisms are full of truth, for the cities of every age have fostered freedom. In them man's soul first gained emancipation, and from them have sprung all the liberalizing movements of the world. It was the ancient and medieval city that first broke away from feudalism. Civil democracy was born in Athens and flourished in Rome. Political liberty was born anew in the commercial cities of the Middle Ages. The form of city government of this period and of early modern times, in England at least, was democratic. Not until much later did the representative system arise. Says Oppenheimer:

> The city's influence brings about an ever progressive dissolution of the rigid systems of subordinated groups first created by the feudal state. In Greece, the territorial states alone were able to keep their subjects for a long time in a state of subjection — Sparta, its Helots, Thessaly, its Penestae. In all the city-states, on the other hand, we easily find an uprising of the proletariat against which the master class was unable to oppose an effective resistance.

Scanning the social progress of the past and seeing how much the city has contributed to it, he then observes that with the city were identified "economic means" in contrast to "political means," and points out how it gradually widened the horizon of peace, freedom, and equality among men. We quote a further word from him in which is summed up the thought:

> Merchant's law becomes the city law; the industrial city, the developed economic means, undermines the feudal state, the developed polit-

ical means; and, finally, the civic population, in open fight, annihilates the political remnants of the feudal state, and reconquers for the entire population of the state freedom and the right to equality; urban law becomes public law and finally international law.

Modern industrial urban society engenders liberalism in every vital way — legally, politically, morally, religiously, and economically as well. It breaks the cake of custom and liquefies life. Not until a considerable aggregation of population had taken place in America did liberalizing influences get the better of oligarchical republicanism, which had wrought out and established the constitution. The cities of the East joined hands with the frontier of the West in elevating Andrew Jackson and his party to power. Only by pressure from the urban centers were the ruling freehold voters compelled to extend the rights of suffrage to merchants, tradesmen, and other non-landed classes.

Those early restrictions on political freedom have all been swept away in the urban states. Only in rural territory do any important ones still persist, with perhaps the single exception of Pennsylvania, where religious qualifications for holding office are yet in favor. The rural states of Arkansas, Mississippi, North and South Carolina, Maryland, Texas, and Tennessee impose numerous restrictions for holding office. The persistent refusal of the most urbanized states of the Union today to support laws and movements to regulate personal morality by Puritanic standards affords an example of the love of freedom cherished by the city mind.

The spirit of revolution dwells among urban people. French history speaks eloquently on this point. When Paris in 1848 overthrew the king, the provinces two months later sent there a National Assembly which undermined the new Republic and organized the insurrection that swept away the achievements of democracy and deposed its defenders. The country districts finally put Louis Bonaparte at the head of the nation and

allowed him completely to demolish the Republic and republican institutions.

The city fosters fraternity quite as much as liberty. The commercial cities of the Middle Ages were schools of brotherhood. The guild system held sway, and every man belonged to one. Those of a common craft were united by the guilds into close fellowship. The rise of the guild really marked a great advance in the range of human contacts; it extended them from the narrow limits of the family to an entire occupation. Thus sympathy and mutual interests became widened. The guild determined one's social standing; it standardized until all butchers, all bakers, all candle-stick makers and all others of a common occupation were rendered greatly alike. Individualism was not given much leeway, but what was lacking in this respect was offset by the social solidarity that was gained. The city thus served to knit together inchoate classes, and definitely to prepare the way for the rise of modern democracy.

Somewhat like the guild that prevailed before the industrial revolution is the labor union of today. And the union like the guild is also of urban growth; and, too, its educative influences for brotherhood are quite as far-reaching. The author of *The Growth of Cities* well says of them:

> The trade union movement, which has been a conspicuous force in improving conditions of English workingmen in the nineteenth century (not so much, perhaps, from the economic or materialistic standpoint), would have been impossible without the association of large numbers in the cities. The trade union is in fact the only hope of those who have seen materialism prevail over spiritualism ever since the disruption of the familiar and friendly relations of master and employee by corporations and the system of centralized industry. And the trade union is peculiarly a city institution.

In numerous ways the union fits men for democratic citizenship. It affords, among other things, one of the greatest

forums, perhaps the very greatest, for training in self-government by discussion. Bourbon and Tory may denounce it as a school for scandal, plotting mischief, and engendering mob violence and class hatred, but notwithstanding its ill repute among its enemies, it is really about the only school for political and economic thinking which enrolls any considerable numbers of citizens today. Professor H. R. Seager accords to labor unions a very important place as democratic forces. He says:

> As miniature democracies they reproduce on a smaller scale the self-governing states on whose success the future so largely depends. Their members learn in them how to give way when they cannot persuade, how to sacrifice smaller for greater ends, and, in general, how to defer gracefully to the opinions and prejudices of others — qualities which are essential to the successful working of democratic institutions. The authors of the work referred to [*Industrial Democracy*], Mr. and Mrs. Webb, conclude that trade unions are preparing the way for a great cooperative commonwealth or socialistic state which they think is in process of development.

There is yet a larger aspect of urban fraternity to be noted — one which is widely manifest today. It is that cooperation and spirit of united effort which comes from the endeavors of the commercial city to further its business interests. Herein appears one of the potent forces for counteracting individualism. S. N. Patten lays great stress upon it in the following:

> The growth and influence of cities are renewing and intensifying in all classes the motives of cooperation. Compactness of organization and obvious similarity of the ambitions of crowded peoples enlarge the units which can profitably work together. Where the manufacturers of one commodity formerly united to market it, trade organizations now promote their city's businesses. The older exclusive trade morality did not condemn ruinous rivalry between a shop and its neighbor; the later inclusive code advocates cooperation against neighboring towns. It is not shop against shop, but city against city. The younger heads of firms talk enthusiastically in terms of municipal and fraternal enterprises.

This development of fraternity which we have been following grows out of organized interests. It is produced by means of "specialization in social relations," declares Dr. D. F. Wilcox in *The American City*. And this "specialization," he argues, is at variance with those common social interests represented by the neighborhood association or community because it brings together only the like while the latter unites the unlike. By substituting these interest contacts and an organic government for local government and neighborhood organization, the city robs the individual of that training which results from participation in the diversified interests and common affairs of local community association, whereby he is prepared to function in that universal way which popular government demands. He concludes that the city therefore menaces instead of fostering democracy. If locality and local unity in government are indeed so vital to democratic citizenship, emphasis on the democratizing effects of urban life is surely misplaced. Still, we may wonder if the civic-center or social-center movement which is in vogue is not destined to give back anything — indeed, more than what may have been taken away. Certainly, as over against the rural regions of America, the city is in a fair way to enjoy as much or more local and organized community life. However, it may be doubted whether the local neighborhood is after all in this day of easy and wide communication and of the ubiquitous newspaper, so important for arriving at a consensus of opinion such as democracy must have. At least, the evidence has yet to be brought forth which shows anything but gain from the organic tendencies of city life. The interest groups of city associations are far from narrowing, and are by no means lacking in diversity of contact. In fact, they are likely to be far wider and more inclusive than any local country neighborhood. The training in citizenship and the intelligent discussion which they afford is certainly unsurpassed in any other present-day

relationship. Our claim that urban life promotes that fraternity which is demanded by democracy appears sound.

There is a sense in which equality as well as liberty and fraternity is promoted by urban life. This is not at once apparent, perhaps, since the city of all places exhibits glaring contrasts and inequalities and the desire for them. Obviously favoring every sort of distinction in rank, it exalts the superior and subordinates the less fit. It affords the most differentiated life possible. Albeit, it is this very society that also most curbs the individual and sets strict metes and bounds to his liberty. It brings him under law and subdues him to the ends of community existence. In other words, it definitely socializes him. He still remains an individual, subject to all possible variations in type, but with the sphere of his actions thoughts, and feelings comprising more territory which is shared in common with his fellow-men than does the countryman's. Thus the equality of the city consists in the common life, while the equality of the country consists in sameness of status without the common ranges to any great extent.

In line with this pronounced tendency to limit individual liberty is the city's exercise of a larger sovereignty which conduces to ultimate democracy. Through this sovereignty the interests and welfare of the corporate people are, under normal conditions, raised above personal liberty and privileges. By it, governmental function is increased and private enterprise is curbed. Municipal ownership is one assertion of this sovereignty. Public utilities of every sort, such as gas, electric light, water, street railways, docks, ferries, dwellings, baths, outlying lands, etc., are passing under city ownership and operation. Municipal ownership already prevails in England, France, Belgium, and Germany. At least half the street railways of the United Kingdom are city owned. Interest in such ownership is growing apace in America also. Over four-fifths of the

cities with a population of over 25,000 own water plants, and not less than one-fifth of them own electric light and power plants. A growing number of smaller cities also are venturing in this direction. New York City has built docks costing $2,000,000. Cincinnati has built and still owns 200 miles of railway. It is the policy of German and other European cities to buy up and hold for home-builders the outlying lands, thus securing to the public the "unearned increment" which has all too long gone to swell the fortunes of speculators and to enrich the few at the expense of the many. The city of Liverpool receives a half-million dollars annually from the leasing of its land holdings. This method of making wealth common wealth has to a degree in recent months been sanctioned by the state of Massachusetts. By a referendum vote in the fall of 1915 the state gave an overwhelming majority for amending the constitution so that—

> the general court shall have power to authorize cities and towns to take land and to hold, improve, subdivide, build upon, and sell the same, for the purpose of relieving congestion of population and providing homes for citizens.

Many other functions which were once left exclusively to private enterprise are being assumed by the city, especially on the Continent. Among these functions are banking, the distribution of food and fuel, medical aid, supplying free amusement and recreation facilities. American cities lag behind those of Europe in this respect, and behind them generally in civic co-operation. This is due mainly to the restrictions which rural legislatures impose upon city government rather than to any incapacity or indisposition on the part of the cities themselves to enlarge their governmental service. A case is here clearly seen where the rural mind positively hinders the urban in its efforts to achieve democracy. But as the imperialism of the city grows, it will completely sweep

away even these handicaps and go on to the fulfillment of its ends.

Municipal ownership and the extensive corporate activities of the city in general already stand justified by the corruption they have eliminated and the special privilege they have destroyed. Above all, the beneficent results that are emanating from the exercise of a larger sovereignty on the part of the people have become so apparent that they are now serving as a banner to lead us rapidly along the great highway whose goal is the equality which such sovereignty alone can bestow and which ultimate democracy seeks. Little by little public activity widens its scope and gathers individual rights under its care and makes them social. The importance of this for society has been so well stated by the Lord Mayor of Manchester, whom F. C. Howe quotes in *The City: The Hope of Democracy,* that we can hardly do better than follow him:

> The expansion of cooperative activity is not likely to diminish in volume. The growth of municipal responsibilities illustrates the drift, and, as I believe, the irresistible drift, of public affairs. . . . . The democratic idea is being worked out through municipalities. Communism and socialism, words of terror a few short years ago, are finding a peaceful solution in various phases of municipal work. For what are free libraries, art galleries, baths, parks, technical schools, tramways, but communistic efforts? . . . . We need some stimulus to quicken our sense of mutual helpfulness. The real resources, material and mental, of a city like ours are probably greater than were ever known in the world's history. Is it not possible to so direct these resources that the lives of all of us may be sweetened and made more tolerable? Some day men will awake to the immense possibilities of corporate action, and the community will find salvation not in the patronage and gifts of the wealthy, but in the combined and social efforts of the people themselves.

The urbanization of society involves yet another factor of importance for democratic progress in the concentration of the property-less. They tend to congregate in urban centers.

In nearly all cities of considerable size the property-owners are outnumbered by them, in some cases three to one, in others ten to one, and even twenty to one. The larger the city, the greater the proportion of have-nots. If this economic class proportion is maintained in the composition of the urban population, it is obvious that the have-nots are going to dominate the urban world. That they do not in many cases already is due in part to the fact that many of them in the cities where they outnumber the owners are aliens and have no vote. But from the present outlook it is probable that the propertyless class of he cities will also be the largest voting class. Bearing in mind then, the radical tendencies of groups unfettered by property-holdings, and at the same time recollecting the fact of growing intelligence and social and political capacity in this group, we may expect much in every way from the future city dominated by it. Already radically democratic, the city will be many times more radical in its choices. The conservative property-class will be outvoted, outwitted, and outcast from the ruler's seat. It will be dispossessed also by Justice, Charity, and Brotherhood sitting as judges in the high court of human welfare. The procedure will thus be legal, judicial, and without violence and disorder. With these prospects for the city within its own gates, we must link the fact of its approaching imperialism in all society, in order to form an adequate notion of the meaning of social urbanization. This suggested connection being made, the meaning seems clearly to be what Dr. Howe has expressed in entitling his notable book *The City: The Hope of Democracy.*

So the urbanization of society, it would appear, clearly means the democratization of society. The city is discovering the way to equality and is calling the public to follow that way. Already the urban mind has begun to come into its own in certain states of the Union where urban population preponderates. In them public opinion is more quickly formed

and more readily altered, voting is more independent of dictation, and the character of legislation, public institutions, and social policies, in spite of numerous hindering traditions, legal restrictions, and ethnic problems, is somewhat different from that found in unurbanized states.

It is in England today, urbanized England, with seventy per cent or more of her people in town, that we find the vanguard of democracy. For a century or more her advancement in democracy has run *pari passu* with her urbanization. The growth of cities and democratization have been closely correlated, not alone in England, but pretty generally throughout the western world. To be sure, this fact may be only a coincidence, and indicative of no causal relation whatever, but in the light of our knowledge it seems absurd to assume that it is not more, that it is not a case of cause and effect. The facts appear to justify the expectation that America, France, and even Germany as well as England will progress toward fuller democracy just in proportion as their cities outgrow the provinces, and the urban mind becomes the mind of the many. The country will undoubtedly long remain the great hindrance to democratic advance, and in it plutocracy at least will make its last stand. The more remote from the city, the more secure and the more able to resist reform will be the institution of unlimited private property and other outworn social structures. To the fecund city, then, must we look for the birth and the rebirth of democracy and for the food that is her nourishment. Significant by way of summary are the words of Professor E. W. Burgess in his book, *The Function of Socialization in Social Evolution.* He says:

> The social tendencies are multiplying which denote that the impersonal way of looking at things will become permeated by the social outlook and spirit; that the perfected outward cooperation of our present industrial order will become motivated by a perfected inner cooperation; that out of the moral ferment and psychic seething of the throng-

ing thousands in our cities, united in spite of themselves by the closest and most complex external interdependencies, will be evolved a group-consciousness necessary for the solution of our problems and for the control of conditions in the common interest.

I conclude, therefore, that the social psychosis which is being formed through the urbanization of the world means the widening of the horizon of democracy and assures its ultimate triumph.

CHAPTER VIII

Democratic Forces—The Spirit of the Scienti Industrial Age

The world only grows better, because people wish th should, and take the right steps to make it better.—Mo

It is not for what is ancient, but for what is useful, that of sense ought to contend, and whatever is distinguishe the former quality cannot be expected to possess much o latter.— ARISTOTLE'S *Politics*.

AUGUSTE COMTE thought in terms of ages. I ceived that certain feelings, beliefs, emotions, ideals, and attitudes went together; that they formed complex and gave a well-defined character to great of history. He distinguished three of these large pe the primitive theological, the transitional metaphysic the positive scientific. We are living in the beginning last of the three, and are becoming partakers of those nating influences that make the age and are peculiar t is doubtless a far cry yet to the heyday of this ultimat tean age. Meanwhile, it may be well for us to design first part of it with which we are now familiar as the sc industrial age. For simplicity, the complex of influen termining any age may be spoken of as the spirit of th and so we shall speak of the spirit of the scientific-in age in relation to democracy. A period in the past h called a military-religious age. The spirit of it so bou in body and soul alike that democracy had no place. A

uneven evolution of peoples, some are still lingering in the military-religious spirit.

Another age, also past for us, has been named the liberal-legal age. Yesterday saw it end. It was full of liberty. The spirit of freedom swayed it—but not equality. The scientific-industrial age, however, has for its genius Democracy. Science and industry have struck the fetters from the soul of man and left him standing almost dazed with the sense of liberation. They have centered his vision on things material and mundane, and have enabled him to triumph over nature to such an amazing degree that he begins to feel omnipotent. His place, his feeling, his thought, his freedom, his power, thus magnified, make him a new man, and he beholds that a new world also has emerged along with himself out of the past. This latter is a world of cause and effect, of reasoned procedure; not of chance, nor of "deistic caprice." It has a new mind and a new flesh. The former, the new man, is flesh of the flesh and spirit of the spirit of the new world. He, moreover, is a creator; his works are a greater industry and a fuller science. He is an iconoclast; his hammer is falling upon the ancient blocks of tradition and breaking them. He is a dreamer also; he is about to rebuild society itself out of the materials he has about him, and to christen that master work Ultimate Democracy. This new world, and this new man, working together and upon one another, give that spirit whose manifold workings in relation to democracy are to be noted in this chapter.

Obviously, by virtue of its very nature, the spirit of the scientific-industrial age may not be directly pointed out and its workings indicated. Only indirectly may it be discerned, and only through various movements, doctrines, sentiments, attitudes, mutations, acts, etc., of society may the things accomplished by it be at all discovered. Therefore the method of this chapter will be to direct attention to some of the phe-

nomena mentioned, that the spirit of the age as a democratic force may be revealed and its significance understood.

1. *The Enhancement of the Economic Value of Men*

The status of large groups of men is gradually being altered through the enhancement of their economic value which is being brought about by the spirit of the scientific-industrial age. Whenever the value of anything is greatly changed, its status undergoes a parallel change. If that commodity is man himself as a labor force, and the value of that force increases, he is immediately raised to a more independent and commanding position and enabled to become master of much he did not before control. For instance, the great Black Death that swept over Europe in the fourteenth century greatly reduced the population everywhere. It is thought to have carried off more than a million Germans and nearly half the population of England. This thinning of the population ranks had far-reaching effects upon those who remained. Among other things it brought war to an end for a considerable time, probably for the reason that men had become too valuable to hurl across the borders in the royal game of slaughter. In England, one consequence was the abolition of serfdom. Men were relatively scarce and greater liberty was an economic necessity.

This rise of human values in the western world of today is coming not from a high death rate but from a rapidly declining birth rate. To be sure, the death rate also is declining and a larger proportion of those born live and live longer than ever before. Consequently during the last century the population of the civilized world increased by leaps and bounds. Howbeit, a sharp checking up of population growth seems imminent. With the increase of population ranging in some countries from a tenth to a third less than formerly, recent decades show that a marked lessening in the number of people must result if this continues. This diminishing output of the

human commodity has already become the reproach of France, the serious concern of the German government, and an occasion of great alarm and much agitation about "race suicide" in both England and the United States. The propaganda which has for its object the increase of the human breed is being vigorously pushed by religious, moral, economic, political, and legal agencies in every great nation of the West. The advocates of birth control are denounced as immoral and prosecuted in the courts if any law can be found to cover their alleged offense.

Those who preach up the birth rate most loudly do so chiefly from economic motives. They are the same people who in America plead for the immigrant and prate of this haven of liberty for the downtrodden folk of the earth, and who see to it that the gates of the nation are kept propped wide open both by day and by night that no refugee may fail to get in. They are the employing and ruling classes, who are solicitous about an ample labor supply, and who want if possible to keep the hovels of the poor veritable warrens of men in order that there may be no shortage of cheap labor. Be it noted, though, that these classes who are so eager that the masses have unlimited families do not themselves produce them. They know too well the consequences for their kind. But if the teeming population of the masses presses hard against the food supply, well and good; for the labor commodity will be all the cheaper, and the opportunity for the employer to amass a fortune will be all the greater. Notwithstanding the conspiracy to keep down human values, the bullish tendency of the market becomes more and more pronounced. Champions of birth control are rising everywhere, and the masses are learning how to limit the family and gradually discovering that it is to their interest to do so. From these facts taken in connection with the general desire for greater individuation among all classes and the already falling production of men, it looks as though a sharp rise in the price of men with all its far-reaching consequences

is in store. In the second place, the value of men is being enhanced through the organization of labor. Such organization has been achieved in all the industrial nations, and is being extended so as to embrace larger and larger numbers. By this means the labor market is becoming monopolized and prices are being fixed. The movement has advanced far toward this end by bringing competition under control and by regulating the conditions of employment. Labor has thus worked itself up, has been accepted at the higher value, and finds itself in a position still to raise the price.

There is yet a third factor operating to increase the value of men. It is the growing mobility of labor and its ready redistribution. The scope of this is not only national but international; and the general effect of toning up the commodity's value is world wide. The displacement of labor which accompanies the invention and the improvement of mechanical devices, so far as the slack is not taken up by new occupations created by the same process, is being met and more by the factor under consideration. The process of distribution with which we are so familiar today must continue until a population equilibrium is reached in the western world. The economists see this and do not miss the significance of it, as is evident in the following from Professor S. N. Patten:

> Large surplus populations come now only from Austria, Italy, Russia, countries which in a few generations will be drained as North Europe has been. Assuming that the white race will control and people the parts of the earth it now holds, populations will be distributed so evenly before the end of the century that all nations must supply their own labor markets. Then the swelling supplies of food and capital will effect themselves naturally, and the rate of wages will rise. The salient features of the new civilization is work calling urgently for workmen, that of the old was the worker seeking humbly any kind of toil.

Oppenheimer in *The State* has discussed the question of labor redistribution in relation to land. He contends that the al-

leged over-supply of free laborers is a legacy from the right to hold landed property in large estates. With the freeing of the serfs on these estates, labor escaped to the free-land countries and to the cities. The labor market, therefore, became glutted in industry until, as Karl Marx put it, "there are constantly two laborers running after one master for work, and lowering for one another the wages." The further consequence is, says this author, that "the surplus value remains with the capitalist class, while the laborer never gets the chance to form capital for himself and to become an employer." Emigration from the estates, however, has produced upon them certain important effects. It has caused wages on them to rise continuously and has brought about competition from foreign lands till falling prices for farm products and reduced rents are making the estates unprofitable. These rents, the author holds, must inevitably sink to the zero point, and the feudal estates of Europe fall apart as an accompaniment. When the land monopoly is thus ended and labor can return to the soil, the labor supply will not exceed or even equal the demand in the industrial world. Then "two masters will run after one laborer and must raise the price on themselves." Surplus value will no longer exist for the capitalist, since the laborer will be able to accumulate and become an employer in his own right. This economist's contention is, in brief, that the redistribution of labor resulting from the mobility conferred upon the serfs had for its consequence a further redistribution, of which the former was itself the primary cause, in the breaking up of land monopoly. The end of the process is such an enhancement of the value of men that the laborer will be made independent.

Confirmation of the position just set forth is by no means wanting in facts. It is asserted on good authority that the great English estates, for example, are being rendered unprof-

itable by foreign agricultural competition. H. R. Haggard in his work *Rural Denmark* says of England:

> The land is staggering beneath the cost of its upkeep and the burdens that accumulate on it year by year. It can scarcely support the owner, the tenant, and the laborer in the face of foreign competition and at the present prices of produce.

He furnishes evidence to show that rents have generally decreased in the last thirty-five years. For instance, a typical estate of 16,000 acres is shown to yield its owner on the average only about $1,200 to $1,500 annually. He says:

> Things have come to this over large stretches of England that few proprietors of land, except those who own great acreages, or rich soil that still lets at a high rent, really live out of their land. They live upon the produce of other investments, made perhaps in Johannesburg or the Argentine or elsewhere.

E. N. Bennet declares that since the Corn Laws were in force rents have fallen fifty per cent and more. Certain estates have already been put on the market as the result of this development, and more are likely to be offered for sale for the same cause in the future. Mr. Haggard goes so far as to say:

> Leaving out choice sporting and residential properties, my belief is that half the land of England is, and for years has been, for sale, if only purchasers can be found prepared to pay a price in any way proportionate to what has been spent upon that land. That estates should be put upon the market is no new thing, since doubtless hundreds of the owners of agricultural land are but waiting an opportunity to be rid of that which only brings them trouble and anxiety and comparative or perhaps actual loss.

Another English writer calculates that the actual losses of the landlords in rural Britain during the last twenty years exceed $3,500,000,000.

The ingenious argument outlined above relative to labor and land may not eventually prove to be as well founded as

it seems at present. But if the redistribution of labor has not affected the land question in just the way indicated, so that land monopoly is being destroyed and new opportunities given for labor again to redistribute itself to the great enhancement of its value, we are not to conclude that no relationship obtains between the two factors in question. The land monopoly is certainly being affected indirectly, at least, if not so directly, by labor redistribution, increasing mobility, declining production of the commodity, and widening organization—all of which tend to enhance the value of men and continually to raise the price of labor. For this means that the surplus value that goes to capital tends to grow smaller. From all capitalistic quarters evidence of this is coming in the complaint about high wages. Labor, it is said, is never satisfied. The more it gets, the more it wants, demands, and is able to command. From the present outlook the earnings of capital of all kinds are falling and must continue to fall. The average return on capital invested in American agricultural land seems to be less than three per cent. It is reasonable to believe that these conditions will affect and are already affecting the agrarian situation; first through the reduction of rents, and secondly through the breaking up of estates. The latter tends to follow as a result of the first, and it in turn to bring about that opportunity for a further redistribution of labor which serves to render its economic welfare more secure.

Monopoly in land is assuredly an effective barrier to the complete emancipation of labor. Were it entirely destroyed and opportunity given the laborers of the world to possess the earth, significant changes would no doubt be brought about in the capitalistic economy. How extensive this monopoly really is few appreciate. If the United Kingdom be considered, over fifty per cent of the ground of England is owned by 2,250 persons. Nine families own a large part of the ground on which London stands. Many whole counties are in the hands

of five or six persons. Nine-tenths of Scotland is owned by 1,700 persons. Two-thirds of Ireland is owned by 1,942 individuals. These few landlords almost run the British Empire; for the House of Commons as well as the House of Lords has been really dominated by them. They form the capitalist class, and a large part of the world pays tribute to them through their globe-encircling interests and investments. In 1851 there were 1,904,687 persons living and employed on the land in England. In 1901 there were only 988,340 persons. Is not the acuteness of the conflict between Labor and Capital in the British Isles in a large measure directly due to this land monopoly? The situation in the greater part of the continent of Europe is similar. The land of Germany, except in the south, is held by a few, even as in feudal times. These great lords, the Junker class, needless to say, manage the Empire, make its laws, and determine its policies, both domestic and foreign, just as do the landlords in England. The feudal estates are still held intact by the nobility of Austria, even as in part of Germany and the British Isles. The Austrian aristocracy and capitalists are one; they run the government and determine the economic status of the many. It is the same in Russia as in the other countries mentioned.

Turning to the American continent, we find the same monopoly of land in Mexico. There are 13,000,000 Mexicans, but 7,000 of them own almost all the land. Feudalism prevails in the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Morales. Chihuahua belongs to three families. Four men are reported to own the state of Morales, which once had 200,000 independent farmers — now dispossessed. One family owns the valley of Paputala, which formerly supported 20,000 people. One man alone owns over 30,000,000 acres of the land of the Republic. The Mexican revolution led by Pancho Villa, the peon, General Carranza, and others, is a labor revolt. The *agrarian* question, we are told by John Lind and others who

have first-hand knowledge, lies at the bottom of the trouble. The peon class are fighting for a right to their native soil of which the Diaz régime very largely robbed them.

Such conditions as prevail in Europe and Mexico in the matter of land-holdings are most deplorable. It was just such conditions that caused the French Revolution and led to the confiscation of the feudal estates in behalf of the people. The contrast France makes today as a result of this to the countries of land monopoly is most pleasing. She has 8,500,000 landowners, which, multiplied by four for the family, gives thirty-four out of thirty-nine million of the people of the Republic in the landowning class. It is a nation of peasant proprietors. France is rich. Moreover, she has a larger percentage of rural population than has any other of the great western nations. Comparatively speaking, the labor situation in industry there is much better than elsewhere; certainly far better than in the British Isles. It is generally true that where people have free access to the land, the status of the whole population is better. Says F. C. Howe:

> Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, and France are countries of the small proprietor. These countries have added little to our population. It is England, Ireland, Scotland, Germany, and Austria, and now Russia and Italy and the Baltic provinces where the land is held in great estates, that have sent their landless peasants over the face of the earth in search of a new chance, free from the servitude which land monopoly everywhere involves.

Witness Denmark. No problems of rural decay and city congestion and wretchedness on the part of a growing multitude confront that land. For nearly thirty-five years her rural population has been increasing and her emigration decreasing. This is a situation in striking contrast to that prevalent in both Europe and America. Yet Denmark was once a land of great feudal estates, like Europe in general. But over a half-century ago the government prohibited the practice of entail-

ment, and later provided for the breaking up of the estates into small farms. As a result, the Danes have become a land-owning people. There are nearly 250,000 farms ranging from seven and a half to 270 acres, and less than 2,000 of a larger acreage. There is no farm tenantry, but instead we find the world's best rural life from both the financial and social standpoint. The multiplication of landowners has been the salvation of Denmark as well as of France. In the former case, the land was made available to the people through the pressure of economic conditions. It came by evolution. In the latter case, a revolution brought it about. Mexico is now trying the French method, but the rest of the world will probably await the pleasure of the slow-moving evolutionary process.

The United States has always been a free-land country. And notwithstanding the fact that the status of labor here has for a long time been largely determined by European conditions, the pressure has not been so severe as in Europe. The value of man has kept up. However, the situation is rapidly changing as population increases and free land disappears. Rural tenantry is growing at an astonishing rate. Already nearly forty per cent of the farms of America are occupied by renters. It is not commonly known that we have a growing agrarian problem right in our midst, of which we are some day to become sadly aware. Almost one-fourth of the 878,000,000 acres of the agricultural lands of the United States are in large estates that average about 4,300 acres in size. It may be, though, that the great landed estates of America will presently yield to the disintegrating forces of world competition and markets. In fact, there are signs of their so doing where they are not artificially protected by high tariff walls. If they do break up, the labor readjustment involved will operate to the enhancement of the worker's value. There is no doubt that if the vast estates of all the western world were shattered into millions of pieces by any means whatsoever, such a re-

distribution of labor would follow as would sweep us forward to a plane of well-being and economic equality hitherto unknown.

The enhancement of the economic value of man by the several factors indicated seems to be moving toward such a shattering by economic means. If this seeming shall prove real, there is then at work here a force for the equalization of wealth of vast significance. The forces making for democracy are apparently not all idea forces, as is sometimes assumed. There are economic and environmental causes at work producing important social results. We are often wholly unconscious of their operations, or even if conscious of their effects are unaware of the real causes behind the effects until their work is done and their energy spent. Of course, not all impersonal forces can be counted on the side of democracy, for there is truly no predetermined social destiny which is being wrought out, nor any unseen power which is disposing either to democracy or aristocracy. Still, if we "doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs," so far as society is concerned, and if we doubt not that the purpose has been the democratization of the order, it is not difficult to believe that the cosmic forces must have been and must still be more often with than against the social purpose, else would that social purpose be something other than it is. Then may we say that the very stars fight together with us to accomplish our cause.

2. The Idealization of Common Labor

The idealization of common labor is a significant characteristic of this age. From time immemorial there have been two ways of getting a living—to work for it, or to work somebody else for it. The first way is the more ancient; but the latter, the more honorable. Indeed, the second so discredited the first, that ever since its discovery, to labor for

a living has been deemed unworthy, but to exploit others wholly praiseworthy. Probably the first exploiter was some barbarian who found out he could work his wives. Our American Indians were experts at exploiting their squaws, and considered common work beneath a man's dignity. And the modern African, whether in America or in his native heath, is quite as well versed in this clever art, and as fully sensible of the unworthiness of work. Next after squaw-baiting, the barbarian discovered war, or the exploitation of his enemies, as a means of livelihood. And this soon became and has long remained the most important employment of man. If, however, he was not successful with the squaws nor fit for war, he probably took to religion and posed as a medicine-man or a priest and thus sought his living by the exploitation of his neighbors; and the priestly profession, next to war, has long been most honorable. But if neither squaw-baiting, war-making, nor priestly profession gave opportunity, then perchance man became a trader and exploited the producer; and even to this day trade is deemed worthier than work. But if neither squaws, nor war, nor religion, nor trade enticed, there was yet one other field for ingenious man—the profession of hobo or social parasite, which is the exploitation of the tender-hearted. And this too is esteemed more laudable than labor.

The foregoing analysis of the differentiation of professions may or may not be historically correct, but certain it is that common labor has long been looked upon as the primeval curse —as degrading. In fact, the more common it is, the lower in the eyes of the world is he who does it. So we have a society ranking itself with respect to work; we have exploitation stratifying humanity. To some it accords honor and lordship; and to others, dishonor and villainage on the basis of the work they do. There are the unworthy, the worthy and most worthy of long-standing rank and of daily making in the matter of work. The heyday of exploitation, however, is past.

That was the age of barbarism and feudalism. With the passing of these golden times and the rise of industrialism there came a new spirit of self-respect into the worker, and there was spread abroad a new respect for him because of his importance. We see the beginning of this in the industrial towns of the Middle Ages in contrast to the feudal manors. E. A. Ross has set forth this contrast in the following:

> Outside the towns the industrial classes were servile, and a stigma attached to labor; inside, labor was honored and the workingman felt joy and pride in his work. Outside, fighting and working were distinct professions; inside, the burgher labored or fought as occasion required. Outside was rigid hereditary caste; inside, men came into numerous and fluid relationships.

Here in the towns, then, the recognition of the dignity of work made its effectual entrance into the social economy. Its significance as a social factor in the leveling up of society has steadily increased with the growth of industrialism. The discovery or rather the rediscovery of the "honor of free labor" came with the industrial city. Says Franz Oppenheimer:

> It had been lost sight of since those far-off times in which the free huntsman and the subjugated primitive tiller enjoyed the fruits of their labor. As yet the peasant bears the mark of the pariah and his rights are little respected. But in the wall-girt, well-defended city, the citizen holds his head high. He is a freeman in every sense of the word; free even at law, since we find in the grants of rights to many early enfranchised cities (*Villa-franche*) the provision that a serf residing therein "a year and a day" undisturbed by his master's claim is to be deemed free.

That honorable position which industry gave labor in the free cities of Europe has been exalted continually in our day by science and modern industry. In a recently published article, "Science and Democracy," by M. E. Hagerty, the

impetus science has given to labor is so finely set forth as to merit repetition. He speaks as follows:

> In the long process of civic emancipation it has finally opened the way for the rise of the man who works with his hands. Nor will the former master of society be willing to cut short the beneficent results of science, for it adds to the pleasure and efficiency of the rich and high-born as well as of the poor. But it is to the common man that it means most, for it lifts him for the first time in history above the level of economic slavery. Regardless of all the theories of political science and philosophy, this economic liberation of the fourth estate is working toward the ultimate democratization of society with a force as irresistible as gravitation. It matters little what Bourbon statesmen or scholastics may think about ultimate democracy; it matters tremendously that science has made it possible.
>
> In this altered view of the world and man's relation to it, the man who works with his hands has assumed a new status. Both he and his work are objects of general concern, and manual labor that is skilled takes on dignity and honor with the work of the laboratory. No man who has worked with his hands in any of our modern laboratories will long despise his neighbor whose handiwork is in a shop or in the cab of a locomotive, grimy as that work may be. This world of ours is fast ceasing to be a world of privilege and war, as it has long been, and is becoming through and through a world of work. Faster than he likes the king is being replaced by the scholar, and the soldier is giving way to the engineer. The province of the priest is suffering encroachment by the physician, and the lawyer is having to recognize the contentions of the social worker. In a score of fields the privilege of dogmatism is being crushed by established facts, and the privilege of contempt must more and more disappear as we see how near akin are all the men who work. In the process of our civilization's making we see that all who labor must share in the glory of the final achievement. In this new view both the worker and his work are lifted to a more elevated place in our view of things. We realize the human value of the work and we see that through his work the worker himself is made.

This idealization of labor issues in a new appreciation of the laborer for his own sake. It reverts in the last analysis to the ultimate factor, the human factor; and a revaluation of men results. The drawing of a sharp distinction between the

laborer and the labor he sells is necessitated. The notion that labor is a mere commodity is therefore being relegated to the limbo of vicious doctrines and exploded fallacies. Our age is thus carrying to completion human emancipation. The slave was labor considered a commodity and nothing more. As such he was bought and sold like hay or cotton at the option of the master class without regard to the human factor involved. When slavery took the form of serfdom and labor went with the land, the commodity was no less a vendible thing, but merely one with the rights of sale and use restricted. When labor became free, so called, the commodity was by no means taken out of the category of things. Freedom meant little more than the privilege of working or not and the right to sell one's work rather than to have it sold by another. Until about a century ago, it involved neither the right to set one's price on his toil nor the choice of the market in which he would sell. The English workingman was not allowed to go outside his parish to work, and his wages were fixed by the local justice of the peace.

A further change in the status of this commodity came when all restrictions were finally swept away and the laborer was permitted to dispose of his work wherever he found demand and at whatever price he could command. Still labor continued to be classed with lumber and to be discussed by capitalists and economists alike as a mere object of merchandise.

The status of labor was again altered when it came to be frankly regarded as a living commodity. This may be termed the stage of zoogenic evaluation, since those who handled it began to think of the animal needs and to provide for the creature comforts of those who toiled in order that, like their ox or their ass, the worker when well fed and cared for might be efficient. Nevertheless, in passing from "the thing view" of the labor commodity to "the animal view," though ever so much stress be laid on sanitary conditions, good housing,

reasonable hours, and adequate wages, laboring men are still dealt in as commodities. Felix Adler, who has developed this thought, says that under this view—

> the idea of justice will have no place in our treatment of them. Compassion may enter in, or self-interest, but not justice. Animals are not our moral equals, and justice is founded on moral equality.

The final step in the emancipation of labor is reached only when it is looked upon not merely nor chiefly as a commodity, but as human. This anthropogenic or sociogenic attitude is beginning to appear today. It esteems the common laborer first as a man — an end in himself, a socius — one of the multitude of social units that compose the social whole; then, as a secondary matter, it considers him the dispenser of a commodity called work. The human factor is paramount; the work function subordinate. It is only as this way of looking upon labor prevails that there is equality. While this is not yet fully come, its light streaks the industrial heavens with rays of promise, for by federal statute labor is declared in the United States not to be a commodity.

So it has been brought about that the long-forgotten apotheosis of work by the Carpenter of Nazareth has been renewed and the curse wiped forever from the brow of toil. It is coming about also that the worker himself is being exalted to the position of a recognized social unit, where as such he is the peer of any man. The industrial age has honored labor until labor has idealized itself and compelled others to respect it and to change their attitude towards it. It has been forced to make a cause of its interests, loyalty to which has become the great attachment overshadowing all others. And despite the fact that there is a tendency for the laborer to be infected with the shame of stigma that idle aristocracy puts upon him, the dignity of labor continually rises to greater heights. That all work is honorable is a prevailing sentiment; that exploita-

tion is dishonorable is being loudly spoken. The elimination of the latter and the exaltation of the former till the onerous work of the world shall be equally shared is the goal toward which we are surely trending. This idealization of labor makes for social equality, if only in respect to the spirit and dignity that are necessary thereto. It is no mean force for the extension of the bounds of equality and for the strengthening of the bulwarks of democracy.

3. *The Depreciation of Futile Leisure*

Another manifestation of the spirit of the scientific-industrial age which is making for democracy is the depreciation of futile leisure. This, of course, goes hand in hand with the idealization of common labor; and has a twofold bearing. It is ethical and economic. In so far as leisure is condemned because futile, its repudiation is an attack upon the social ethics of aristocracy. But otherwise it is an attack upon the monopolization of wealth; a movement for economic equality. For, according to the English economist, leisure is one form of wealth. A common distribution of it is therefore desired. That a considerable element of society should have it without toil or obligation is judged wrong. The process of economic differentiation that goes on unceasingly makes possible this established division of leisure, but does not justify it. In no other way perhaps does wealth's estate become so galling to the poor; and certainly in no other way does real parasitism become so apparent as in the institution of futile leisure.

Ethically considered, leisure is the badge of superiority. It is the banner of triumphant and conquering classes. The first man to acquire the emblem became thereby the first aristocrat. Ever since his day leisure has stood for distinction and has been esteemed the most conspicuous sign of position. And, we do not fail to note, everybody has sought after that sign — not always because labor is irksome, however. For irksome

it is not when free. It is most wholesome and full of joys unknown to those who are wont to spurn it. Manual labor is all in all the best gift instead of the greatest curse of the gods to the race. Those who prefer empty leisure desire it not, I suspect, alone because it has unmitigated joys, but because it is elevating.

Among the middle classes, there have always been those who, unable to afford the luxury of leisure for themselves, have sought it by proxy. And the chief leisure proxies of the world are women. To be sure, man first worked them for his own living while he "took it easy." But as soon as he got rich, he required them to be idle for his glory. And if he never got rich, he took to aping those who were, and began to work himself while he caused his wife and daughters to turn to leisure that he might be thought rich and eligible for the élite anyhow. Thus since knighthood was in flower and even before, leisure has been the lot of women among the rich, the near-rich, and the would-be-rich, even to this hour. So leisure has become a well-established economic and ethical institution.

But behold, a change is taking place. Now women are up in arms. They have gone on a strike—not a labor strike, but a leisure strike. They have grown tired of their vicarious jobs, and are demanding release from leisure. They want work. Think of it! A leisure class striking for work, up in arms against the lords of creation, their husbands, brothers, sons, and fathers, calling them tyrants merely because they have been doing the work of the world and keeping women from it. What possesses the frail and fickle creature that she so ruthlessly tosses aside her dogs and her novels, her dress and her parties? Has leisure driven her mad? Has she a demon that is making her say, "Away with conspicuous display for the pleasure of man's vanity; give us useful labor for our own good"? Perhaps; but maybe it is only intelli-

gence and discernment that she has. Perchance she has made the interesting discovery that "heredity has not been making idleness good for women while it has been making work good for man"; that "valuable qualities are developed by toil, and women improve as men do under its discipline," as S. N. Patten states it.

Perhaps, though, this rebellion of the great leisure class is only a desire for self-expression too long suppressed. For woman wants to vote — for liberty, she says; but, nay, it is not liberty she wants; she already has too much of it. She wants obligations and duties. Let us understand her; for she does not always quite understand herself. She means well, but speaks poorly. Her cry for votes is after all only the inarticulate demand for work, for the privilege of doing something instead of the pleasure of being a mere decoration. Work it is she needs who is surfeited with leisure, upon whom it has palled and whose condition has become pathological as a consequence. Of course, all women do not have leisure; many have work, too much of it, and do not necessarily want votes to burden them more. Some have the so-called better part — the one that carries with it duties to home and children, and opportunities for sanctified motherhood, which does not necessarily deny or preclude self-expression in the least, we are told. But beware; these striking ladies will corrupt the working-women and the home-keepers. They will make them believe woman has a fuller function than merely to breed, make a home, and be the puppet and plaything for a man, or pretty idler and parasite, as the case may be. They are already doing it, inciting them to sedition, calling them to arms, and leading them on pilgrimages of protest. There really is imminent danger that the working women go on a labor strike out of sympathy with this widespread leisure strike of their sisters. There is greater danger lest a new tyranny arise — that of women over men — and as a conse-

quence that the lot of leisure may fall to the lords of creation themselves unless the voice of the new woman is heard and heeded.

Behold, twelve states and Alaska have already entrusted women with the ballot. And, *mirabile dictu,* a million men in the man-ruled and moribund coastal states of the East the other day declared themselves in behalf of equal suffrage. Surely evil days have come, even those feared by the sage legislator of Massachusetts when in 1879 suffrage on school questions was extended to women. Hear his wisdom: "If, Sirs, we make this experiment we shall destroy the race, which will be blasted by Almighty God." Such is the work of the ignorant rabble; and it will do worse yet. It will even make this a woman-ruled republic if the "superior manhood" of the nation does not assert itself in defense of the ancient order of things. Let strong men then take heed to the danger in which stands their right to work, to think, to have dominion over all creatures upon the earth. Let them make haste to re-establish their supremacy. Let the heels of male man be set once for all on the neck of every lesser creature. Let all the crafts arouse themselves to this end: all the gillies' guilds, all the enfranchised crafts of illiterates, all the fraternities of pawnbrokers, all the corps of conservatives, all the federations of the opponents of progress, all the associations of child-exploiters, all the famous *Vereins* of mercantile freebooters, all the amalgamated clubs of political corrupters, all the antiquated law-mongers' associations, all the medieval and learned priestcrafts, all the virtue-mongers' unions, all the *Bunds* of befuddled beer-drinkers, all the federated brewers' and whiskey-makers' organizations, all these "noble," "wise," "honorable," and "patriotic" men of every sort, who truly understand the science of the state and are pre-eminently fitted to direct its destinies. Let America's "sturdy and most superior manhood" join itself in one solid phalanx of con-

servatism, prejudice, ignorance, superstition, corruption, and bigotry, and march to the rescue of our endangered civilization. Let it march proudly and fearlessly beneath the banner inscribed with the legend, "Labor for men, Leisure for women, that Liberty may be for all!"

The real meaning for society of this rise and rebellion of the new woman is that it is indicative of a most tremendous and deep-seated depreciation of leisure. Ethically and economically significant, it is a movement for equality. It spells the disintegration of class distinctions upheld by aristocracy; for when leisure is challenged in one quarter, the whole institution of which it is a part is put on the defensive.

Here we sense the spirit of the new age brooding over the weltering social chaos to speak it eventually into ultimate democracy.

4. *The Heightening of Economic Inequality*

A further characteristic incidental to the industrial age and giving impetus to the democratic movement is the heightening of economic inequality. Contrasts have always existed in the economic world. Let Israel Zangwill draw them for us in his picture of the Doge's galley of Venice, as such appeared during the Middle Ages—and still appears now:

> But the marvelous model reconstructed by Ferdinand of Austria in 1837 at a cost of 152,000 francs reveals, if it be exact, that seamy side which is always the reverse of Magnificence. At first the eye is taken up with its opulence of decoration, as it seems to take the water with its proud keel, and its great all-topping flag of the lion and the cross. For its upper deck is of mosaic, overhinged by a huge lid, red velvet without and gold relief within, and from the water-line rise winged figures, and over the arch through which pass the many-flashing oars of red and gold is a frieze of flying horses with the rape of Europa, Centaurs, and what not; and above this are winged figures flying toward a gold sky, and gold figures on a balcony, which is supported at the prow by winged lions and a pair of mermen, and at the bowsprit couches

the winged lion with two little angels playing behind him; and on the hull is a naiad pouring out her urn, and a merman blowing his trumpet, and the protrusive heads of alligators; and lest you think that Venice meant nothing but gold and fantasy and the pride of life, behold dominant over these Justice with her sword and scales, and Peace with her dove and her olive-branch.

But below, hidden behind and beneath the gilding, at the unseen end of the red and gold oars,

"Which to the tune of flutes kept stroke,"

sat one hundred and seventy-eight galley-slaves, chained four to an oar; and here in this fuscous interior the benches are no longer of plush, but of rough deal; here is no play of Fancy — here in the hard seats we touch Reality. But not herein lies the supreme sordidness of the Bucentoro — the crowning touch is given by the oars, which, at the very point where they disappear over the rowlocks under the gay arches turn from their red and gold into plain dirty white, like shirt-cuffs that give on soiled sleeves. 'Tis the very magnificence of meanness! The horny-handed wretches, to the rhythm of whose tired muscles this golden vessel moved along in its music and sunshine, to whose caged gloom no glimpse came of the flags and purple, the angels and the naiads, could not even be conceded the colored end of an oar. But could there be an apter symbol of civilization, ancient, medieval or modern, than this gilded oar, whose gaudiness fades as it passes from the bravery of the outer spectacle to the grimness of the inner labour? Upon such sweating slaves rested all the glitter and pageantry of the ancient world — not only of Babylon and Carthage, but even the spiritual and artistic greatness of Greece. *In hoc signo vinces* — in the sign of slavery; in the sign of the lion and the cross — the lion for yourselves and the cross for the people.

And in every land of today, the same State-Galley glides along in bannered pomp, parading its decorative images of Peace and Justice, and the radiant creations of its Art, while below are the hard, bare benches and the labouring, groaning serfs. The serfs are below, even in another sense, for it is their unsightly hands that have built up every square inch of this splendour. Beatrice d'Este went to see a galley a-building, her velvet cap and her embroidered vest stuck full of jewels; complacently recording the ejaculations of admiration for her diamonds and rubies, while the Venetian women, and even children, were toiling *at making* sails and the ropes. Yes, the social order too must be

gazetted bankrupt. It has, indeed, never been solvent. It has never paid its real creditors, the slaves of the uncolored oar.

Before the industrial revolution there was relatively just as great wealth and just as great poverty as now, but there was no such consciousness of the contrast as with Zangwill much of the world today shares. While it is no longer in political but in economic conditions that wealth must be sought, says the author of *The State,* the distribution of wealth has not changed in principle.

Just as in feudal times, the great mass of men lived in bitter poverty; even so under the best conditions they have the meager necessities of life, earned by crushing, stupefying, forced labor, no longer exacted by right of political exploitation, but just as effectively forced from the laborers by their economic needs. And just as before in the unreformed days, the narrow minority, a new master class, a conglomerate of holders of ancient privileges and of newly rich, gathers in the tribute, does not render any service therefor, but flaunts its wealth in the face of labor by riotous living.

Though it be true that no change in the relative class conditions has taken place, the rate at which the economic status of individuals changes today is a unique phenomenon. As a consequence of it, inequality has become more apparent and obstrusive than ever before. Fortunes originate with unparalleled suddenness, compared to past ages, when to all appearances there was for the average generation an economic *status quo.* In the past things moved —

Not slower than Majesty moves; for a mean and a measure
Of motion — not faster than dateless Olympian leisure.

There was nothing precipitate. Sudden crises, panics, displacements, quick adjustments and readjustments were almost foreign to the realm of fortune. Millions were not made in a moment, nor were laborers reduced to utter poverty in a day. Colossal riches *did not* rise with such incredible rapidity, and

overshadow whole continents, races, and hemispheres like vast mountain peaks while the plains of poverty grew dizzy with the sensation of subsidence into abysmal misery. The point is, contrasts were not so striking nor men so conscious of them. Wealth did not seem so flagrant; it did not gall men so. Indeed, men were not so sensitive and so capable of being galled by it. They were inclined to be stolid like dumb, driven cattle; not keenly conscious of their worth. With the marked improvements in living conditions and the broadening of minds, for which industrialism itself is largely responsible, there has come about a keen feeling regarding disparity in material things. This new consciousniess of unequal distribution and inequality of opportunity is intensified by the observation that the toiler is making concerning the source of wealth. He finds that it is largely himself; that he is the force that has upheaved mountains of money. He is therefore possessed with a strong feeling that he himself should be uplifted by this expenditure of his energy as he is not and has not been. His dominant mood has as a result come to be the feeling that the mountain must be made a plain. Sir Horace Plunkett observes that—

> the town artisan or labourer, who sees before him vast masses of property in which he has no share, and contrasts the smallness of his remuneration with the immense results of his labour, is easily attracted to remedies worse than the disease.

Others have seen in this heightening of inequality an effect directly opposite to that pointed out. Notable among them is E. A. Ross, who in his *Changing America* has put this phenomenon down as one hostile to democracy. This is what he says:

> The striking inequalities of wealth that have sprung up in a generation threaten to establish class distinctions hostile to democracy. For the tendency of such abysmal contrasts is this: the ultra-rich vie in extravagance. The spectacle of their baronial estates, princely houses, liveried lackeys, Sybarite luxury, and elaborate ostentation infects even the worthy with the worship of wealth. Success comes to be meas-

ured by the sheer cash standard. The young and ambitious realize it, and shape their course accordingly. People fall apart in as many social groups as there are styles of living, and forget how to meet their fellows on the level. The rule is snobbishness toward those below you, and toadyism to those above you. The rich are gangrened with pride; the poor with envy. There is no longer a public opinion; there are only clashing class opinions. Honest labor is felt to be more disgraceful than mean parasitism. The toiling millions cease to be respected, even by themselves. The upper class claim and are conceded the right to lead, finally the right to govern.

There is much but not all truth in these words. On the present basis democracy is confessedly not being fostered; but nevertheless ultimate democracy is, for the conditions under discussion are breeding the spirit of change by which a new economic basis is to be given society. This "class opinion" is therefore more good than bad. It takes contrasts to bring out values. The value arising from seeing poverty over against wealth as never before is a new motive to self-respect on the part of the toilers, which respect we have made clear. Never did they respect themselves so much, nor was ever self-respect so much promoted by revulsion against colossal wealth. The upper classes are positively not being conceded the right to rule, either. Ross is quite right, however, in his conclusion that "unless democracy mends the distribution of wealth the maladministration of wealth will end democracy."

We hear much said about society's growth in wealth and welfare under the present régime. Many take pride in this unparalleled prosperity. They like to boast that Americans are the richest people in the world. They find pleasure in contemplating the fact that while England has only $1,500, France $1,400, Belgium $1,100, the United States has $1,965 of wealth per capita. They gloat over the fact that there has been a clear gain of $647 per capita in the last decade. But what of it? Does the aggregate of wealth make us rich? In a sense it does, for it gives an increased surplus to society. Yet

again, it does not, since, so far as millions of Americans are concerned, it might as well be in China or at the North Pole. And the millions are of more social importance than an economic surplus. The average is the most unreal and fictitious figure that statistics employs, and, it may be added, the most fondly cherished device of the wealthy class for covering up gross inequality. The important thing is the distribution of wealth; and the present distribution of it makes the American as poor as any and poorer than some others of the western world. If the inequality remains and the very improvement of industrial processes whereby the accumulation of wealth is accelerated makes that mal-distribution all the more oppressive and dangerous to the well-being of multitudes of individuals, is there any ready mitigation of conditions merely through this increase of the aggregate wealth? If so, it remains to be demonstrated to the masses. They can see only the heightening inequalities. Says W. M. West in *American History and Government:*

> This modern poverty is harder to bear than the older poverty of colonial times, because it seems less necessary. Then there was little wealth to divide; now there is ample for all, but it is engrossed by a few.

Strange it is that many of the independent middle class, though seldom themselves the victims of the rapidly changing distribution of means, do not see eye to eye with the masses. Strange it is that the plutocrat himself should be amazed at the growing discontent and new consciousness towards wealth. Sheer ignorance and bigotry it must be that leads him to think anything under the sun but himself can cause a society which, even as it increases in wealth and improves in welfare, grows in discontent and misery also. The existing correlation between these opposing phenomena may long continue to escape him. He may go on, within sight and sound of swelling tides

of restlessness, piling higher and higher fortune's tower. He may even rise above the tumult and the shouting and be all deaf to the clarion voices of the age. He may withal grow in the sense of peace and satisfaction, and exult in scornful pride, but nevertheless the day draws nigh when the misery and discontent of Demos will become vocal — the *vox Dei* — speaking confusion upon the pilers-up of fortunes.

Let it be repeated that out of this situation is rising the impulse to change — a movement towards democracy. And let it not be forgotten that "the plutocracy which denies the possibility of a democratic revolt is making such a revolt possible."

5. *The Decay of Decorum*

Concomitant with and growing out of the idealization of common labor, the depreciation of leisure, and the recognition of the heights and depths of economic inequality, is the decay of decorum. In this we see the spirit of our age making democratic sentiments. Decorum is indicative of both a mental state and a social relationship. On the subjective side it is the feeling of inferiority and on the objective it is the status of servitude that makes it possible. It is the mode of communication which the superior in position or the otherwise exalted imposes on the inferior. It therefore flourishes where classes reign and fail where Demos rules. The régime under which the present-day world is living tends to destroy the mental attitude which is indispensable to decorum. It is doing so by giving to humble men a sense of their own worth and power. It is enhancing their self-respect. There is something in the very atmosphere of the times as well as some more tangible things whose influence is observable in this direction.

The industrial age has raised the standard of living for great numbers. The psychological result is that they "feel their

oats"; they have risen in consciousness of self along with their ascent in the use of a better grade of clothes, food, houses, etc. There may be just as great extremes of economic conditions as ever, but nevertheless a great equalization in the standard of life has taken place. Much the same things are consumed by all; a difference of quality there is, to be sure, but that is not so important. The consciousness of having and using the same kind of goods is a subtle influence in the equalization of manners. Again, this age of communication that scatters abroad knowledge has done much in the way of promoting familiarity, which in turn has bred contempt for persons once respected. The doings of nobility and aristocracy of all sorts may still interest immensely, but it is not an interest that leads to adoration and worship so much as one that leads to aping. Princes are commonly known nowadays not to be divine and not to live on different food from that of ordinary mortals. Moreover, many potentates in the industrial world have themselves been peasants once; and the knowledge of that fact cannot be concealed behind any courtly customs with which they may surround themselves.

There is, therefore, a widespread decay of decorum. Even kings themselves feel it. The experience of a certain French king of old, who is said to have given his life for the sake of good form, is hardly possible any more. It is related that in the absence of the lackey whose office it was to shift his master's seat, the king sat uncomplainingly before the fire and was toasted to death. But neither kings nor servants are such willing martyrs to manners any more. The one is less dependent and the other more independent; and as the distance between them closes, they become more familiar than formal. Fairly typical of present-day conduct is the story related by De Tocqueville of an American assembly through whose crowd certain distinguished politicians were trying to *pass.* "Make way there!" they shouted. "We are the repre-

sentatives of the people." "Make way yourselves," was the answer. "We are the people."

Indeed we hear from many quarters the complaint that there are no manners any more. Even the Negro of the South has forgotten that he was once a slave. He does not well remember his inferiority. Much to the disgust of the old aristocracy, he often lets it be known that he too is a "gentleman" and his wife a "lady." The respectful, abject helot is fast passing, it would seem. The author of *Social Organization* says:

> In an English tale written about 1875, I find the following: "The peasantry and little people in country places like to feel the gentry far above them. They do not care to be caught up into the empyrean of an equal humanity, but enjoy the poetry of their self-abasement in the belief that their superiors are indeed their betters." So in the South there was a kind of fellowship between the races under slavery which present conditions make more difficult. A settled inequality is the next best thing, for intercourse, to equality.

And Walter Weyl very aptly says of the American people, that there is much "looking-down" still, but the real "looking-up-to." "They themselves in their collectivity feel their own superiority. They are aggressive, impolite, and irreverent."

Mrs. Stuyvesant in a relatively late issue of *Harper's Bazaar* has said:

> There is in society at large less self-restraint, less chivalry, among men toward women, less respect among women toward men. And the world is worse for this state of affairs.

But is it worse? For the favored class which wants to maintain an unequal status, it is confessedly worse. For the women with a desire for political equality but with a greater instinct at the same time for social inequality, it is certainly worse. For society as a whole, though, it is indicative of better conditions, where all *noblesse oblige* has gone, and men meet on a common level. Says C. H. Cooley:

The tendency of manners well expresses that of sentiment, and seems to be toward a spontaneous courtesy, expressing truth and equality, as against the concealment and, sometimes, the arrogance, of mere polish. The best practice appears to be to put yourself, on approaching another, into as open and kindly a frame of mind toward him as you can, but not to try to express more than you feel, preferring coldness to affected warmth. Democracy is too busy and too fond of truth and human nature to like formality, except as an occasional amusement. A merely formal politeness goes with a crystallized society indicating a certain distrust of human nature and a desire to cloak or supplant it by propriety.

Our industrialism no doubt vulgarizes through the process of exalting and virtually deifying men and destroying subserviency. When domestic servants no longer know nor keep their place; when the boy from the street blusters into the banker's office with hat on head and unceremoniously demands, "Are you the guy that wants to hire a fellow?"; when the section boss does not hesitate to say to the railroad president, if he has a chance, "I am as good as you are"; when "me Lud" finds obeisance turned to ridicule; and when the plain term "man" is preferred to "gentleman"; there is something crude in it all but at the same time something virile and full of promise. The state of decorum may be deplorable, but the state of democracy revealed is desirable. No, it is not that ultimate democracy will have no decorum, but that it will have no subservience that comes of some being superior while others are inferior. The decorum of ultimate democracy will be, to follow Kant's criterion, to "treat all men, thyself included, as ends, never merely as means"; it will be that natural respect which one man has for another man because he is a man. It will be that naïve, instinctive evaluation of personality seen on the frontier, in the forest, or on the plain where—

. . . . there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, tho' they come from the ends of the earth!

It will be that regard and that only which the Indian chieftain Black Hawk evinced when on one occasion he stood before the President of the United States and proudly said, "I am a man and you are another."

6. *The Bankruptcy of Benevolence*

The meeting of men on the basis of manhood and not in the condition of server and served, of inferior and superior, which the decay of decorum reveals cannot but lead to the bankruptcy of benevolence. Through this the spirit of the age is working out democracy. Benevolence is the business of the millionaire and the multimillionaire, not a labor of love. It is an essential department of the institution of wealth; one taken over from paternalized political autocracy; a part of the legacy of insolvent feudalism to the industrial age. Though a most ancient and always honorable employment, ranking first among the rich man's virtues from the times of chivalry, it has come to its highest level in our day. The munificence of its bounty today cannot be matched in history, but the trick turned by it can be matched in any age. It was as cleverly performed by the lords of Egypt millenniums ago. In Roman days it was done by giving great pageants, gladiatorial combats, and public dinners; today by granting pensions to employees, by endowing universities, churches, libraries, museums, "Carnegie Endowments," "Russell Sage Foundations," "Rockefeller Institutes," "General Education Boards," and a host of kindred activities for social service and the public good.

It should be observed, however, that benevolence never lays the ax to the root of the tree of economic and social evils. It seeks no fundamental reforms; it does not provide for nor countenance any alteration in the social structure. It does not as a rule intentionally direct its forces toward any prevention of the maldistribution of goods. The democratiza-

tion of government or industry is far remote from its thought. It has been said truly that "money never established republican institutions in the world." "It has no natural affinity with them, and does not understand them. Money has neither soul nor sentiment." "The profits of the plutocracy, even when directed to social reform, are seldom intentionally enlisted in a war against profits." Nor is this to be wondered at when we remember that benevolence is purely self-regarding in its motive, a mere sop to pride, a bestowal of honor upon the ego. In so far as it deviates from its line of descent, and seems also to become other-regarding, as, frankly, it sometimes does nowadays, it still misses the ethical highway of democracy. The guide-posts on the way Felix Adler indicates as follows: "Neither egoism nor altruism is moral, neither self-regarding nor other-regarding action, but solely that kind of conduct which combines inseparably the interests of the self and the other."

F. C. Howe has summed up the case against charity in the following verdict:

> Organized charity is an obstacle in the way of justice. If we had no such organization men would think of fundamental reforms; they would think of ways and means to abolish the causes of poverty rather than the consequences of it. I know of many instances where organized charity opposes practical movements, like motherhood pensions, minimum wages, and housing reforms. Why? It seems rather hard to say it, but I believe it was because the class which administers charity is the class responsible for poverty. It is responsible through the unjust economic conditions which this class perpetuates.

Verily, charity is designed to cover a multitude of sins and to hide the open sores of the social system. Whenever a noteworthy departure from the accepted *modus operandi* of benevolence makes its appearance, the most bitter denunciations are hurled at it, and he who is its sponsor is ostracized from good philanthropic society. The offense is industrial

treason. The comparatively recent and widely published efforts of a great manufacturer who, eschewing benevolence, turned profits into unheard of wages for his army of workers, met with no applause from plutocracy. Instead, there was heard much impugning of motives and great gnashing of teeth in rage that anything fundamental should be substituted for superficial reform.

The attitude of a certain multimillionaire of an eastern city who objected to being called a philanthropist put him clear outside the pale of the benevolent. His very words antagonize those engaged in the business of charity. He said:

> Charities are the agents of pauperization. We cannot get rich under present conditions without robbing somebody. I have done it and am still doing it, but I propose to spend the damnable money to wipe out the system by which I made it.

When asked to endow a sanatorium for consumptives, he replied:

> I contribute no money to charity. I know that neither your charity nor any other can do more than temporarily relieve a few individual cases of distress. I know that what the poor most need is not alms, but a change in social conditions which will make almsgiving unnecessary. It is to help in bringing about such a change that I give whatever I can spare to the abrogation of monopoly and special privilege.

True to his convictions he devoted his fortune to the cause he considered fundamental, namely, the Single Tax. Here was a new code of ethics for wealth — the ethics that if followed would end benevolence altogether.

Perhaps, though, it is not so new after all; for Maimonides of Cordova, of the twelfth century, had a like notion when he wrote *A Guide to the Perplexed* and in it constructed a "golden ladder of charity." The rungs of that ladder, as Hyman Hurwitz has pointed out, are worth noting. They are as follows:

The first step is to give, but with reluctance Such a gift emanates from the head, but lacks the heart. The second is to give willingly, but not in to the requirements of the sufferer. An inadequ of little benefit to the recipient. The third is to giv and proportionately, but not until one is urged to form of charity which lacks spontaneity. The fc give gladly, proportionately, and even without solici to put the gift into the poor man's hand, thereb in him a sense of shame and a loss of pride. The give to charity in such a manner that the distr receive the gift and know the benefactor without be to him. The sixth is to know the recipients of on but remain unknown to them. Such was the policy cestors, who used to convey their gifts into the dwell poor, taking care that their identity should remain The seventh course, which according to Maimonid more meritorious, is to bestow charity in such a wa benefactor may not know his beneficiaries nor the b know the benefactor. The eighth and the highes charity is the anticipation of poverty by preventin that form of charity manifests itself in assisting brother by means of a loan, by teaching him a tr placing him in such a condition that he may earn livelihood and not be forced to the alternative of stretching out his hand for charity with the resu becomes demoralized.

This is the code of ethics at its summit whi charity superfluous, which aims at the prevention maladies. This, let it be emphasized, is not the r of benevolent endeavors as we see them today.

The ethics of benevolence virtually postulates a social order, one that is ultimate in its institutions. fore, suggests the writer of *The New Democracy,* ac

ing no evils, proceeds to cure them; finding the economic world theoretically perfect in all its points, proceeds to patch it up; and attributing the failure of others to those others' failings, endeavors to give relief by failing on its own part in everything save charity. The ethics of benevolence says, "The poor you have with you always"; it says, "Billions for benevolence but not one cent for justice." Says Ruskin:

> The mistake of the best men, through generation after generation, has been the great one of thinking to help the poor by almsgiving and by preaching of patience, and of hope, and of every other means emollient or consolatory except the one thing which God orders for them — justice.

Benevolence is lavish in tribute for the purchase of fidelity and peace, but miserly in any gift toward permanent amelioration. It is fairly eager to confer pensions and bonuses to placate employees, and so to bind them more securely to the job, but it makes no provision for men to become anything more than job-holders and objects of charity.

Under the industrial régime benevolence has been put to a test it never before underwent, and thus its inadequacy has become revealed. With all its unparalleled gifts, it is unable to cope with the situation and to placate the populace. It is obviously bankrupt. Were it able to supply a cure in its superficial way until there were no more starvation and need, no more murmuring and tugging at the fetters of present conditions, it would still be acceptable, perhaps. But the gold with which it is willing to part does not cure; it does not mollify any longer. Its bounty only aggravates the discontent. It creates a situation quite like that of the lady and the cat. She, having rushed out to stroke and pet the animal astray upon the merciless street, found the more she petted, the more the cat writhed, squalled, and spat. The ungratefulness of the animal was beyond her comprehension, until a bystander pointed out that while she was caressing the cat's

head she was all the while crushing its tail beneath her foot. Charity will be received with increasing ingratitude and snarling so long as the heel of wealth crushes and grinds down the poor.

A Roman emperor once said, "Munificence in gifts may deceive even the gods"; but that is so no longer. However much astonished the man on the street may be at the measure of philanthropy's dole, he is not satisfied with it. He has no real thankfulness in him. He thinks it only his just due wrongly taken from him and reluctantly returned. This ingratitude charity itself does not fail to note, neither does it fail to be startled by it. The sullen receptivity bodes no good. Even from institutions there comes the talk of "tainted money," the spurning of gifts, and sometimes a loud protest against the incorporation of foundations called "free and independent" because they are not under control of the government or the people but are probably the agencies whereby plutocracy strengthens itself.

In England the repudiation of benevolence has already expressed itself in the constitution of the state. For the principle upon which the Poor Laws rested is repudiated and the state has adopted the policy of social and industrial insurance. This means that the citizen is not to be counted a dependent any longer but an independent individual to whom is due from the surplus of the nation's wealth a definite and assured income. Thus our "social benefactors" are having it brought home to them that charity no longer works.

To the worker, as well, the exigencies of industry have showed the real object of all charity. It does not escape him that to accept any gift in any way is to confess his dependency and inferiority and to acknowledge that he can't care for himself. He, therefore, necessarily asks, "Why this dependence, this inferiority, this inability? Why should some have to give and I have not at all?" Thus he is raising the larger and

deeper question of the age — the question of economic equality. He is answering it too in terms of self-respect and equality among men by sullenly spurning patronage and calling it an insult to brotherhood. How eloquent was the legend, on the banner displayed in a labor parade about a year ago in New York, which ran: "To Hell With Charity!" It voiced the repudiation of the rich man because he is rich and the doom of the rich man's social order. It was the deep tones of brotherhood beginning to speak a world of justice into being.

7. *The Sublimation of Patriotism*

The sublimation of patriotism is another aspect of the promotion of the democratic movement by the spirit of the present age. Evoked when men existed for the sake of the state alone, patriotism long stood at the head of the social virtues and played a leading rôle in the life of society. What egotism does for the individual in the way of self-preservation and the maintenance of a personal self-satisfaction, patriotism, or social egotism, has done for the group. It has kept the social *status quo*. Utilized by the ruling class, it has been made to uphold the existing order both national and international. Lauded by religion, education, art, and trade, it has been the schooling of fighters in the sentiment of sacrificing self for the state and for the god of things as they are.

But somehow the industrial order has given men different sentiments toward all institutions, including the state itself. They now feel that institutions are for men, not men for the institutions. The result is that the virtue of which we speak normally makes little appeal any more. Persuaded that patriotism means the sacrificing of one's self and one's interests for the profit of great industrial barons and parasitic classes, rather than for the good of all, our erstwhile patriots have developed a class consciousness in place of national loyalty. A class flag has been run up where once floated the national

colors; and from across international boundaries men are rallying around it. Professor G. H. Mead, writing on Internationalism has said:

> There was far greater unanimity of the masses of the whole European population against the economic and social domination of the upper groups than of the mass of any nation against another people.

To be sure, the war in Europe seems to give the lie to these statements, but I still hold that the case of patriotism normally in times of peace has been fairly stated. In the western world, the only places where much of it under ordinary conditions is found is in those dismembered lands like Poland, for example, which have long suffered oppression. Even when war drums have been beating to arms, this class consciousness in recent years has been able at times to sound its bugle calls to a general strike with much hope of response, and to menace seriously the mobilization of armies. At least this new spirit has become palpable enough to arouse us to a sense of its reality. The situation as it appears in the United States may be fairly stated in the work of Walter Weyl:

> The plutocrat listens astounded to men who once spoke of patriotism and national consciousness, but now speak of socialization and class consciousness, and he views with bewilderment the precedence which Labor Day parades and speeches seem to be taking over Fourth of July parades and speeches. The plutocracy does not understand all this "sectionalism," "demagoguery," and "incitement to class hatred."

However, the sublimation of patriotism is not all due to class consciousness. It is due as much or more to the very opposite sentiment. There is a sentiment for humanity peculiar to our times. Largely the product of science, which has drawn the world together through the annihilation of distances, it has made all the race acquainted, inter-communicative, more or less inter-dependent, and mutually interested.

Patriotism belonged to a day of isolation, the times of closed nations and hermit kingdoms. It fattened on animosity toward those who were strangers and "barbarians" because unknown. But revolutionizing inventions have done away with strange peoples; they have deadened the national nerve and quickened the "world nerve" in growing groups of intelligent citizens of every land. We are unable to sing any more with much unction, "This is my own, my native land." Instead we are singing "Hands across the sea," and hymns of human brotherhood. In no small measure has the missionary movement of the churches in the last century helped to bring this about. This cause has led thousands to alienate themselves from native land and become "all things to all men" for the gospel's sake. Thousands of others staying at home but in touch with these pioneers of religion have had their racial and national sentiments enlarged as a consequence. A genuine and often passionate interest in other peoples has been awakened, the prejudice of ignorance swept out of souls, until as a result a cosmopolitan spirit has come to be noted in many new quarters; a spirit which renders obsolete patriotic sentiments and gives vital meaning to Lamartine's words: *L'égoisme et la haine ont seuls une patrie. La fraternité n'en a pas.* ("Selfishness and hatred have only one country. Brotherhood has none.")

This humanitarianism has been promoted, moreover, by the economic disturbances resulting from the inventions of the age — disturbances which have necessitated readjustments of population. Voluntary migrations on an enormous scale have taken place. People have been shifting their habitats ever since the birth of the race, no doubt, but their movements have been from external causes or environmental pressure. They have been warlike maraudings and conquests. But today in the industrial world, under environmental stimulation and volitional pressure, there has come about peaceful migration.

Millions have migrated from their ancestral seats to new and strange countries. J. Q. Dealey has well said:

> By joint agreement of states a person now may withdraw himself from his parent state, forswear allegiance to it, secure citizenship in the state of his choice. If in his new home he prefers to retain his natural citizenship, he will be as carefully safeguarded in his rights, though an alien, as any citizen in the land. This great privilege, now so freely granted, is rapidly breaking down narrow racial barriers, as citizens of many states, persons of different races, mingle in social and business life, exchange ideas, intermarry and develop a cosmopolitan race and civilization that ultimately may banish entirely the spirit of suspicion and war.

The coupling of this phenomenon with that of the globe-trotting habits of a multitude of the middle class gives us an explanation for the existence of the dampened fires of patriotism. Love for any land or for any people exclusively has thus been made to cool down to a platonic temperature. This is, of course, largely confined to the great cities and busy centers. Isolated regions, untraveled and untouched by the life of industry, and those encysted in the cake of racial tradition and animosity through long oppression still retain much of the pristine patriotism of the world.

In general, then, internationalism, humanitarianism, brotherhood, a "world conscience," are ascendant. World movements, meetings, and organizations of labor, science, art, education, commerce, finance, industry, literature, amusements, etc., give evidence of a world mind modifying the national mind, of the desire for world well-being and human well-being growing at the expense of state well-being. A further word from the writings of Professor Mead on internationalism will not be out of place here. Says he:

> There never has been, within a shorter period than a century, so highly organized an intra-national life and consciousness in any country of the western world as the international life of Europe before the first of last August [1914].

Patriotism is, therefore, not only a sublimated but a fallen virtue. Its honors are less prized than ever before. Their place is being usurped by a desire for more enduring fame — the purer fame of those who, as Mrs. Jameson aptly says,

> lived not for an age, a country, but for all ages, for all mankind; who did not live to preach up this or that sect or party, but who lived to work out the intellectual or spiritual good and to promote the progress of the whole human race, to kindle within the individual mind the light which is true freedom or leads to it.

One class more than any other in present-day society is fulfilling this mission, perhaps almost unconsciously but nevertheless truly. The phenomenon of the sublimation of patriotism and of the rise of the sense of brotherhood is not much manifest in the sphere of the leisure class, and even less almost is it evident in middle-class society. In the latter there is dominant rather a persistent self-sufficiency, a narrow calculating independence, and a disposition to follow traditional disgusts and racial and class animosities. Broad world-sympathies and large fellow-feelings are only rarely found. But the group that is promoting progress by the means under discussion is the property-less, laboring mass. Within it the spirit of brotherhood richly abounds. Within it the "we-feeling" is strong. Having no other thing upon which to lean — neither wealth, nor assumed income, nor personal achievement, nor family prestige, nor any other self-centering or individuating resource — men of the laboring class find their support in the group itself. Above all else, "they have a vast preference for social intercourse, friendly interchange and mutual dependence by which their life is refreshed, strengthened, and sustained," says W. H. Wilson. They must take refuge in the Adullam cave of humanity and in that elemental sympathy, helpfulness, unselfishness, fraternal spirit, and charity which for untold ages have been the strength of primary groups and the power other than one's self making for progress in the world. Compelled

by the exigencies of life to rely upon his fellows, the laboring man comes into a social consciousness that tends ever to widen its periphery and to embrace a larger company of fellow-men. Out of that consciousness come cooperation and unitary action, which in turn react mightily to the further enlargement of that consciousness.

Says S. N. Patten:

> It is a great emancipation [of the laboring man] when he can think in a friendly way of former enemies, and learns that his union is broader in its aims and more extensive in membership than any of the groups with which he may still be affiliated. So he slowly advances in social consciousness, leaving behind the class consciousness of other conditions, which can now only perpetuate suspicion and arrest growth.

It was this social consciousness of the masses that first became a world-embracing consciousness in modern times. And it is this consciousness that remains the only great force making for brotherhood today.

Says Jane Addams in *Democracy and Social Ethics*:

> They were the first class of men to organize an international association, and the constant talk at a modern labor meeting is of solidarity and of the identity of the interests of workingmen the world over. It is difficult to secure a successful organization of men into the simplest trades organization without an appeal to the most abstract principles of justice and brotherhood.

The significance of the sublimation of patriotism and the growth of the spirit of brotherhood is due largely to the fact that the masses particularly are affected. For this means that the stock criticisms of democracy no longer have the validity they once had. If the rabble, the mob, the ignorant masses, the dangerous classes of society, against which the state must supposedly be safeguarded, are really those and only those whose social consciousness is big enough and flexible enough

to safeguard society, wherein are they dangerous? If to them brotherhood is a living reality, a practice, and not a theory, a growing fact and not a mirage, what have the rest of us to fear from them — unless perhaps it be that brotherhood is bad? Rather may it not be that they, the most numerous body and the one ever growing more numerous, have much to fear from us, the lesser group, as the real menace to democracy? Let us be honest for once. Is it not the middle class, striving as it does to rise into independence and aloofness from large human interests and contacts, that is the one centripetal group, whereas the laboring class, seeking human brotherhood, is the centrifugal class and consequently the genuinely social class, to which are committed the issues of democracy? I think we shall be compelled to admit the fact; and as we behold the sublimation and disappearance of patriotism through the widening social consciousness of a growing proletariat, to rejoice that ultimate democracy is thus being furthered.

8. *The Analysis of Authority*

In the changed attitude of man toward man and of man toward the state, discussed in previous sections, there is evidence of the thorough-going analysis of authority encouraged by the spirit of the scientific-industrial age, through which the way of democracy is being made straight. Assuming that everything has a history, and proceeding by the method of working up from the earth instead of reasoning down from the heavens, science has opened up all things to criticism. The very source of "all authority" has fallen under investigation. Out of this has come the discovery that the particle of dust has at least equal claim to ultimate reality with personal deity. As a result there is a disposition to think of authority as evolving instead of descending; as rising, in place of being imposed. Consequently the whole hierarchy from Deity through Pope, church, Bible, prince, custom, precedent, law,

and institution, losing its sky-roots like the tornado's twisted trunk when shot to pieces, has come tumbling to the ground. Therefore the "powers that be" are now found to be "self-ordained" and no longer sacrosanct.

The writing of its history reveals everything to be neither sacred nor secular, but natural. So man has found out at last that from man have come all things social, with the result that his respect for customs, law, institutions, and all the rest has shifted to himself. Science has nothing final. The last word is never said, the perfected scheme is never recognized. Nothing is closed. No institution is in the judgment of our age really ultimate, no policy inviolate, no established order unalterable. Nothing is accepted as authoritative by virtue of its long existence. The spirit of the Orient, which makes the ancient authoritative, is not the spirit of the scientific-industrial part of the world. On the contrary, it is more true to the situation to say that the very fact that a thing is old or of long standing condemns it, and is *prima facie* evidence that it ought to be changed. All is change and the spirit of change.

Constitutions of long standing were once sacred and inviolate; but not so to this age. Wisdom is not accorded to the past to the exclusion of the present and the future. We assume today that we are as wise and as capable as any people; yes, more so. While the legalist and theologian may prate of authority, the spirit of science says, "We are our own authority, the makers of our own destiny, revelation, constitution, and institution of whatsoever sort." So the new and untried is often more authoritative to the man of this age than is the old and established; for the latter he knows and its merit he has measured, but the untried is impelling and cannot be escaped until tested by experimentation. This open-mindedness toward the new is on the whole praiseworthy and of far-reaching import for society.

While this process of analysis has gone on only along the

surface of society and seldom if ever penetrated the social stratum very deeply with its thoughts and methods, its general attitude and the new respect for man's power that it evokes has, nevertheless, gone pretty far down, until the sense of sovereignty — of being a law unto himself — has come to possess Demos. Real evidence of the effects of this are not by any means wanting. The lack of ready submission, the chafing under restraint, the dissatisfaction with long-established customs and traditions, the growing lawlessness, irreverence, and even immorality of certain kinds, of which we see and hear not a little, are the fruits of the spirit of criticism. Even in practical matters, the oldtime authority no longer impresses. In military affairs, for instance, there has appeared in some quarters a wholesome disregard for the first principles of military duty, which require implicit obedience to authority. Civil ideas, which mean rational, sensible, and self-governing motives in place of brute force and servile obedience to powers that be, are becoming transcendent. There is a disposition to honor nothing save as it serves and works for the welfare of men. The rising tide of divorce over all the western world shows at least that the "sacred" marriage institution is no longer respected save as it works for personal happiness and well-being. A rapidly declining birth rate betokens an evil race only in so far as it violates the old injunction of patriarchal tradition to "be fruitful and multiply," and runs athwart the custom that made woman's chief end, as well as her quick one, to produce many offspring. Respect for the old despotic family based on the authority of the husband, backed by ecclesiastical sanctions, and bulwarked by the Roman law of *paterfamilias* is dead. Thanks for its demise are due to the loss, brought about by criticism, of fear of present or future punishment. The widespread lawlessness of the day is owing to the fact that law does not conserve the interests of the average individual. Respect for law because it is law is already gone

or passing rapidly from the moral codes and practices of America at least. The court, however supreme it may be in name, is, in fact, no longer supreme over the people, for it is recognized to be a fallible creature of their own making. Much immorality is only a disregard for customs once divinely established but no longer found serviceable. Even that inner authority, conscience, unto which we are driven when all external authority is thrown down by criticism and which has been esteemed really ultimate and invincible, has been found wanting. Tested, its nature reveals nothing either divine or omniscient but much that is feebly human. Its behests are discovered to be nothing other than man's own fallible reason rendering judgments based on fragmentary and faultful experience. Reliance upon the voice of conscience, therefore, grows hesitating. Says M. Guyau: "It becomes ever less and less authoritative, ever more and more feeble in the face of doubt."

Does not all this look like social disintegration? Undoubtedly it does to some; and they are not altogether deceived. There are certainly grave dangers lurking near if this present-day type of self-respect means disrespect for all else. It may lead to an ultra-atomic society bordering on anarchy. If to that end it be trending, it is to be deplored. But it may also lead to those very changes that will give a better organized society. If the latter be the goal, it is only the assertion of democracy, concerning which there need be no apprehensions. This I am inclined to think it, and to welcome the new spirit as essential to any society that would make progress toward ultimate democracy.

9. *The Rise of a New Morality*

Among the social processes encouraged by the critical tendency of our age is the rise of a new morality. This has already been implied in much that has been said in preceding

sections, but here we propose to give this morality definite recognition as an element in democratic advancement.

Morals signify to the scientist those social customs which appertain to or serve the group's welfare. Professor William G. Sumner has brought into vogue the old Latin word *mores*, from which our word "morals" was derived. He uses it "as a name for the folkways with the connotations of right and truth in respect to welfare embodied in them." More accurately, *mores* or morals are then defined as "the folkways, including the philosophical and ethical generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in them, as they grow." They are—

> the ways of doing things which are current in a society to satisfy human needs and desires, together with the faiths, notions, codes, and standards of well living which inhere in those ways, having a genetic connection with them.

Whatever standard of conduct or behavior is sanctioned by the group may be considered its morality. It is well to emphasize the fact that right and wrong are purely relative matters which each group determines for itself. "The terms right and wrong," as Professor T. N. Carver states it, "have no meaning beyond the sentiments of universal endorsement or disapproval in the minds of the people."

Morals of course change. New conditions and interests arise and the *mores* must conform. Says Sumner:

> Under altered circumstances it is found that dogmas and maxims which have been current do not verify; that established taboos are useless or mischievous restraints; that usages which are suitable for a village or colony are not suitable for a great city or a state; that many things are fitting when the community is rich which were not so when it was poor; that new inventions have made new ways of living more economical and healthful.

So it comes about that the scientific-industrial age is working a moral as well as a material revolution. Present-day con-

ditions of getting a living, the fund of knowledge made available, and the marvelous store of discoveries brought to light by science are the proximate causes of the moral transformation that is occurring.

Deferring for the moment consideration of the specific changes that morality is undergoing, let us note that the new morality is a force tending to accentuate and establish democracy. Being itself a product of a democratic age and democratic in the very essence of its valuations, it comes to operate with all that power peculiar to moral forces. Says Professor E. A. Ross:

> Things which conduce to social harmony and to social survival receive powerful social sanction, and these moral standards become powerful instruments of social control, the control extending not only to overt acts of the individuals but to mental attitudes, motives, and intentions. Thus moral ideals come to be formed which function toward a higher type of social life.

The new morality is functioning as an agency of control toward democracy.

In general, the moral revolution may be described as the displacement of a dominant upper-class *mores* by the lower-class *mores*. The former belonged to a religious-military world economy, while the latter in its essential features is peculiar to no age. The former has been called "a gentleman morality" and the latter "neighbor morality." In the following, E. A. Ross contrasts the two as to their most general aspects:

> The morality that the propertied or exploiting classes develop among themselves has its mainspring in pride. We see this in Greek ethics as expounded in the pages of Aristotle, in Roman Stoicism, in the "gentleman morality" of medieval Europe, and in the Samuri ethics of feudal Japan. The humble, working, exploited people, on the other hand, have no such hypertrophied sense of personal worth as the upper class, and hence do not respond so readily to the appeal to pride. The morality they develop among themselves is, therefore,

the morality of consideration, or "neighbor morality." Kindness, helpfulness, and fair dealing, the great desiderata among the humble, are procured not by appealing to pride but by appealing to love. Of this character are the moral currents set in motion by the early Christians, the Franciscans, the Waldenses, and the Moravians. Sometimes "neighbor morality" makes its way upward, as it did in the Roman Empire when associated with Christian dogma. Sometimes "gentleman morality" makes its way downward, as it has in Europe and the United States since the great democratic upheaval.

The new morality that is today supplanting the old, dominant type is, of course, not so new in kind as in power and influence. While it is the "neighbor morality" in content, it is not altogether the same as that of past generations. Its emphasis is different, its ideals and valuations are more general and really new.

In order fully to appreciate the significance of what is transpiring in this moral change, it will be well to set forth the old and the new somewhat more in detail. The old morality pertained to the individual and referred to self as the standard. Among the virtues it prized were success, thrift, obedience, industry, self-sacrifice, courage, conformity, pride, self-assertion, recognition of duty and responsibility, patriotism, and reverence. The rich and successful were counted most righteous. Poverty was evidence of vice. Adversity was sweet in its uses. Says Jane Addams:

> The benevolent individual of fifty years ago honestly believed that industry and self-denial in youth would result in comfortable possessions for old age. It was, indeed, the method he had practised in his youth, and by which he had probably obtained whatever fortune he possessed. He therefore reproved the poor family for indulging their children, urged them to work long hours, and was utterly untouched by many scruples which afflict the contemporary charity visitor.

The old morality inculcated obedience. Submission without reason was praiseworthy. Those in authority, from the home

to the state, were prompted by scriptural commands, such as, "Children, obey your parents"; "Wives, obey your husbands"; "Servants, obey your masters"; and "Obey them that have rule over you." The old morality valued patriotism. It said, "Our Country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong." The old morality put great stress upon the will and fate. It was one's bounden duty to assert himself, for he that willed to do and to achieve could accomplish all things, and if he did not it was proof either of moral deficiency or depravity or sheer wantonness and shiftlessness. The responsibility was the individual's own, if perchance not Deity's. The old morality was severe, vindictive, repressive, and unforgiving. Its spirit is easily sensed in "the parson" of Longfellow's "Birds of Killingworth":

> The parson, too, appeared a man austere,
> The instinct of whose nature was to kill;
> The wrath of God he preached from year to year,
> And read, with fervor, Edwards on the Will;
> His favorite pastime was to slay the deer
> In Summer on some Adirondac hill;
> E'en now, while walking down the rural lane,
> He lopped the wayside lilies with his cane.

The new morality, in contrast to the old, takes the group and its welfare as its standard. Some of its cardinal valuations are sympathy, service, loyalty, kindness, self-expression rather than repression, indulgence instead of sacrifice, mercy in place of vengeance, freedom in preference to submission, and rights before duties. It says, "Beware the man who rises to power from one suspender." No praises are sung to adversity, for it has no uses. In the estimation of this new morality the exceptional individual has lost caste as the ideal type, and in his place the average man should receive consideration. The new morality has caused the rich man to doubt the ethics

of his wealth, by laying down the principle that it is wrong for Dives to fare sumptuously so long as there is any Lazarus in society. It persists in holding up to the face of the rich a picture like the following from John Ruskin:

> If suddenly, in the midst of the enjoyments of the palate and lightness of heart of a London dinner party, the walls of the chamber were parted and through their gap the nearest human beings who were famishing and in misery were borne into the midst of the company feasting and fancy free; if, pale from death, horrible in destitution, broken by despair, body by body, they were laid upon the soft carpet, one beside the chair of every guest — would only the crumbs of the dainties be passed them? Would only a passing glance, a passing thought be vouchsafed to them? Yet the actual facts, the real relation of each Dives and Lazarus, are not altered by the intervention of the house wall between the table and the sick bed — by the few feet of ground (how few!) which, indeed, are all that separate the merriment from the misery.

This picture gives Dives an uneasy conscience, "a broken self-consciousness" at least, and makes him dubious as to the rightness of riches. In relation to wealth, says Jane Addams,

> we have ceased to accord to the money-earning capacity exclusive respect; while it is still rewarded out of all proportion to any other, its possession is by no means assumed to imply the possession of the highest moral qualities. We have learned to judge men by their social virtues as well as by their business capacity, by their devotion to intellectual and disinterested aims, and by their public spirit, and we naturally resent being obliged to judge poor people so solely upon the industrial side.

The new morality is writing new commandments concerning the use of wealth, commandments which have all the validity of the Decalogue. The new morality is also fostering rights of many sorts — the rights of women, children, neglected classes, and even lower animals. An abundant, joyous existence for all men is the goal toward which it looks.

Play is esteemed as moral as work, and the indulgence of our

natures more right than their repression. Obedience is counted virtueless in itself, and is desirable only as it contributes to the good of all. The new morality is lenient in attitude toward the weak, the inefficient, the delinquent, and the criminal. Avoiding harsh judgment, it inclines to the maxim that "to know all is to forgive all." It is prone to relieve the individual of much responsibility for his shortcomings. Edward T. Devine in *Social Forces* expresses the sentiment of this new code when he says:

> We believe in men. In spite of all individual failures and incomplete lives, in spite of war and crime, in spite of suffering and disease, in spite of accident and premature death, even in spite of poverty and dependence, we believe in the inherent nobility and the latent tendency toward good in the human soul. The failure is accidental, partial, temporary. The desire for right living and rational conduct is universal, natural, and in the end dominant.

This attitude is even better expressed, though carried to the extreme, by one who boldly attacks the new morality, Paul E. More. Says he, in *Aristocracy and Justice:*

> He needs only follow the impulse of his instinctive emotions to be sound and good. And as a man feels of himself, so he feels of others. There is no real distinction between the good and the evil, but all are naturally good and the superficial variations we see are caused by the greater or less freedom of development. Hence we should condemn no man even as we do not condemn ourselves. There is no place for sharp judgment, and the laws which impose penalties and restrictions and set up false discriminations between the innocent and the criminal are subject to suspicion and should be made as flexible as possible. In place of judgment we are to regard all mankind with sympathy; a sort of emotional solidarity becomes the one great virtue, in which are included, or rather sunk, all the law and the prophets.

Clearly the new morality makes the individual's status depend upon opportunity instead of will; it repudiates the notion that —

It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishments the scroll,
I am the master of my fate,
I am the captain of my soul.

In place of Nature, it considers the environment to be the determining factor. In this respect it is probably quite as one-sided and wrong as the old, and merits all the criticism directed against it by the reactionary moralists of the day. However, the fact remains that the reformer, the teacher, the social worker, the church, the politician, the press, and a great deal of literature are all throwing on society the blame for the evils that men suffer. Such is the new morality. A single word, "humanism," expresses it, which means something more than "neighbor morality." C. H. Cooley says that it means —

a wider reach and application of the sentiments that naturally prevail in the familiar intercourse of primary groups. Following a tendency evident in all phases of the social mind, these expand and organize themselves at the expense of sentiments that go with the more formal or oppressive structures of an earlier epoch.

This humanitarianism, needless to say, is essentially democratic; it charges the moral atmosphere with the notion of the fundamental equality of all men. Whether wise or otherwise in all the judgments it makes, it must be reckoned a potent agency in the making of democracy.

The justice and the value of the new morality can only be judged by its fruits. The test must be pragmatic. And two things should be held in view in estimating its worth — adaptation and adjustment. Adaptation on the part of the group to the world order, and adjustment on the part of the individual to the group are the essentials for social survival. The two factors are really inseparable. In neither case can we be certain of what is needed; there is no absolute criterion of adaptation and adjustment. The will of the majority deter-

mines it, and the trial-and-error method tests it as we pass along. Adjustment is said to be approach to the normal, but what is the normal? It can only be the average, the greatest number, or their condition that is meant. To bring them all to the status of the greatest number, which status is, of course, fluctuating and undetermined, is the present norm or goal of adjustment. Practically, it appears good, since it enables the individual to develop, the family to survive, and the natural group to grow strong. It gives satisfaction, efficiency, and stability so far as it has been achieved. So to the extent that the new morality promotes this adjustment it must be judged good. That it does promote it better than the old, there can be no doubt, but there is serious doubt whether its emphasis upon nurture to the neglect of nature is not working against ultimate adjustment.

On the side of adaptation it is less clear what is needed. No one has defined the universal social order to which the nation must conform in order to survive, for this too is always changing. Indeed, the nations themselves are creating the environment as they follow the course of empire. If it be fair to assume that the normal is the condition to which there must be conformity in order to have adaptation as well as adjustment, it would appear at the present hour that militaristic activity was demanded, that the national group must hold its own in a war-mad world. However, the times are abnormal, and the abnormal should not be mistaken for the normal, for we should remember that normally the world environment in this age is characterized by internationalism, humanitarianism, and the spirit of universal brotherhood. Only the pessimist sees the end of these in this world crisis, whereas the more sane discern a new birth of them taking place. Humanitarianism, then, so far as we can see, would seem to be demanded for national adaptation, to be the world norm, and the adoption of the new morality to be the wise policy for our nation.

If, then, the new morality be serving the only criteria of adjustment and adaptation that are approved by the present experience and judgment of mankind, it must be pronounced justifiable and sound; and since these criteria coincide with the aims of democracy, it must be prized as a trenchant force working for democratic advancement.

10. The Shifting Emphasis in Religion

The questioning of authority is particularly manifest in the realm of religion. The spirit of the scientific-industrial age is causing the emphasis here to be shifted in such a way as greatly to favor democracy. This shifting of emphasis virtually amounts to the repudiation of what has constituted religion during many past ages, and the approval of what has always been termed "mere morality." The rationality of science and the rationalizing effects of industry have brought this about. The realm of speculation suffused with emotion and ideals sometimes lost in fantasy has been religion's very own. The world of sense and of things palpably material has been traditionally disdained, and the consequence is that this worldly-minded and material-intoxicated age has little in common with the other-worldly and god-intoxicated institution of religion. Instead of religion's admonition to flee the world, there is heard today the voice of research bidding plunge into the world. Baffled and outwitted, religion can only condemn the spirit of the age, not cope with it. The exaltation of things material has come to dominate and the age of science fast supersedes the age of faith.

Science has asserted the supremacy of human initiative over that of Providence. Paraphrasing M. Guyau: it has "become an anti-Providence," weaving a web of inflexible law and reasonable procedure till, caught in the meshes, Providence is paralyzed by the fatal sting of its enemy. Man has become audacious. He stands in the world today much as

did the saint in the Epic of Ramayana, who having prayed to Indra and found his prayer falling back unheard, grew indignant. Then suddenly perceiving himself more powerful than Indra, he began to exercise the creative prerogative. He spake, saying, "Let there be light," and at his word there was light. He spake again, and by his fiat new spheres appeared and the world was refashioned; and he himself was Providence. The man-made machines have become mills for devouring the gods. It was not a century ago that gods were devouring man's defiant creations instead. A typical case was that of an Ohio school board which answered the request for the use of the school house to debate about railroads as follows:

> You are welcome to use the school house to debate all proper questions in, but such things as railroads and telegraphs are impossibilities and rank infidelity. There is nothing in the word of God about them. If God had designed that his intelligent creatures should travel at the frightful speed of fifteen miles an hour, by steam, He would certainly have foretold it through His holy prophets. It is a device of Satan to lead immortal souls down to hell.

However, from the simple fanning machine, harnessing the winds till priests cursed it because it made the messenger of Providence the slave of man, have sprung ten thousand machines till scarcely an agency has remained unfettered. Thus man, once the captive of Providence, has led captivity captive. The situation has been admirably stated by Professor E. W. Burgess in *The Function of Socialization in Social Evolution,* where he says:

> The very character of the mechanical process must of necessity have influenced the attitude and thinking of the proletarian. While the uncertainty of climatic conditions in relation to agriculture tended to make the peasant superstititous and susceptible to confidence in unseen powers; while the control of the artisan over the processes of manufacture made for self-reliance and the abandonment of superstition, the rôle of the workman as an accessory to a mechanical process, to-

gether with a quite total lack of control over conditions of employment and rewards of labor, tended to destroy both self-confidence and, at the same time, faith in divine providence. There was little opening in the monotonous life of the factory workman to perceive the working of an "invisible hand," and every occasion to refer his miserable condition to the unfair advantage of the millowner.

The conflict between science and religion has been declared over. The lion and the lamb, we are told, have at last lain down together. While this is seemingly true, in reality the two are fundamentally irreconcilable in spirit; and the subtle antagonism goes on and apparently must continue to go on until that religion which science combats is vanquished. Science and reason are instinctively at enmity with emotion and religion. Reason, whence comes science, is all power to apprehend truth; it is the trained will capable of moral and intellectual insight. It is more than mere ratiocination such as speculative philosophy approves and practical life condemns. Emotion, on the contrary, whence comes religion as a cosmic attitude, is the want of comprehension and the effective prohibition of self-assertion. It gives mysticism and magic in place of law and machines.

Science has been so disgusted with the bogies which the emotions have created out of mysterious things that it has little patience with that timorous attitude which awaits the thrill. It is impatient not less because of the unreliable character of such impressions than because of the attitude itself, which seems unworthy the dignity of man. Religion, on the other hand, has gone on treasuring the thrills, stressing the sacred, creating myths, explaining its mystery in terms of the un-understood, doing everything, in fact, which science disapproves of.

Thus is the case stated by J. T. Shotwell in *The Religious Revolution of Today*. Instead, therefore, of a day of reconciliation, this age has brought and prolonged a judgment day and an eternal separation. Reason and science have been made to sit on the right hand, where they may exercise dominion over the universe; while emotion and religion have been

made to depart to the left, to wander homeless to and fro seeking a resting place, or to recede clamorously to the limbo of oblivion. The old faith is condemned and cast out. To change the figure to that of Matthew Arnold:

> The sea of faith
> Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
> Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl'd.
> But now I only hear
> Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
> Retreating, to the breath
> Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
> And naked shingles of the world.

The search for the beginnings of religion leads back to naturism. Before the awful in his environment primitive man experienced an emotional reaction of fear and shrinking. The towering hill, the majestic mountain, the rushing stream and waterfall, the furious storm, the belching volcano, the raging sea, and all kindred phenomena caused him to fear, wonder at, and finally worship the "Great Big" that was in everything. If he named it, *Mana* or *Manitou* was the word he used, signifying the big, the mighty, the powerful. But primitive man's religion was not naturism alone; the latest research in the field of religious origin by M. Durkheim, Ellen Jane Harrison, and others makes it appear likely that it was a sort of socialism as well. He saw the "Great Big" and powerful in living creatures, in his own fellows, and especially in the group of which he was a part, quite as much as in the inanimate objects that so awed and terrified him. In living beings of his own totemic group — to paraphrase the familiar line — closer was it than breathing and nearer than hands and feet. In this form it was more familiar, more vital, more to be commanded, more important, and consequently more adorable; "The Big" in nature being awful and giving fear, but "The Big" in the ox and his fellow-man — his group — being use-

ful and giving adoration. The positive or attractive element in religion, whence arose its moral features, probably, therefore, had its source in the latter attitude; whereas the reaction toward nature gave the negative or repellent element, its cosmic aspect. In the midst of the life of emotion, reasoning faculties arose in man, and he began to form crude and naïve judgments about phenomena in general. The emotional and rational reactions together then gave rise to anthropomorphism. The "Great Big" came to be thought of as a living being in everything and everywhere, but more in some things than in others. Personified and definitely localized, it became symbolized in gods and devils, sometimes and eventually always a single god or a single devil. "The Big" was thus by a slow process gradually metamorphosed until it became Theos, and religion came to pertain to the fear and worship of Deity. But Deity at this stage and in subsequent ones became wholly separated from man and the social order, to dwell alone in the cosmic sphere as the infinite, eternal creator, and the first cause. Here he has long dwelt for the worshiper of the monotheistic world.

But in this day of judgment that is at hand Deity is being routed out of his cosmic pavilions; ontologically, cosmologically, teleologically, and ethologically, science is dispossessing him. The efforts of the old order to reinstate him are proving futile and merely the antics of sophists. Those emotions that once made us full of awe before the starry heavens and "the wonderful works of his hands" are not awakened any more as religious emotions. Those who feel after God seek him elsewhere and find him in the only other place in which he can possibly dwell—in the social order. His habitation has too long been too remote for the good of the world, and so now he is called to dwell alone in our hearts. Thus the divine circle has been completed and we are going back to the source whence arose ethical religion in the first instance; namely, in

the group's admiration and respect for the power that was in itself. No longer, therefore, in the uttermost heavens, but in our midst is Deity to be sought. God is consequently a social creature. Man has become God, whereas once it was God who became man.

We may ask, What is this God who is of and in the social order, toward whom yearn the religious aspirations of today? He is not polytheos, as to primitive man; nor tri-theos, as to the cosmic-minded medievalist; he is multi-theos and yet a uni-theos, and still no Theos at all in the old sense, but only Demos. As the early and untimely prophet of the new order, Auguste Comte, was wont to teach, humanity is Deity. While the complete apotheosis of humanity is not yet accomplished, it is daily drawing nearer; worship is fast becoming work and good wishes on the part of men for mankind. And Deity like all else in this rationalized universe has been made subordinate to the great process of evolution; God has evolved and is evolving.

> Man is now making God. God is the sum total of our ideals. There is no King God in a democratic heaven. Every one of us citizens has his chance and his right to play God. . . . . What God will be depends on each of us. This view makes democracy more sacred than ever. When men realize that they are all responsible for what God as well as what the state is to be, they will look as never before to see that each has his chance to do his best and does it.

Thus H. D. Lloyd puts the case of deistic evolution.

This new social deity or deified humanity is not worshiped as of old in emotion toward mere power alone, but in enthusiasm for justice, joy, and common well-being, or in other words, ethical power. It is not magic and mysticism that leads to him; it is morality and magnanimity. It is the original emotion toward the group, ethically refined, divested of emotion toward nature, become the dominant emotion, the true religious aspiration, the real cry of the spirit, the genuine

reverence toward that which alone is very God of very God.

Will this process of incorporating God in the social order continue? Yes, if the scientific age continues, and "knowledge grows from more to more." Theology may labor ever so hard to keep God in the cosmic sphere. He may be thrust back ever so often by all the arts of philosophy and mysticism; but stay he will not, for men have made them an image, not of infinite spirit or like unto a beast, but an image of glorified and socialized Humanity which they are bound to reverence and honor here upon earth. And where the worshipers are, there also God must be. Priests may long continue to repair to the sacred mounts, and bid prayers be made to a cosmic ruler to end the drought or stay the storm, but even though the words do now and then fly upward, thoughts generally tend to remain below. And hardly will words without thoughts ever to heaven go, when the world is so interesting and humanity divine. The rationalization, secularization, and socialization of religion has come to stay and to grow. Asked a priest recently:

> Do you know what you are doing with your progress and democracy and science and all that? You are denuding the soul of man of its sacred woods, soiling its pure springs to manufacture clothes and generate electricity.

The priest is right. As truly as the forest growth has disappeared from the landscape, so have those religious emotions that once enthralled vanished from the soul of man. The "sacred woods," full of ghosts, magical creatures, and miraculous occurrences — creations of dreams, fears, erratic and erotic instincts — that once prevailed, inviting us to unspeakable thrills, have been destroyed. The mysterious has been dragged into the daylight; the crepular has disappeared. Emotions that once were sacred have now become secular. The springs where once nymphs and satyrs were worshiped have been claimed by science for the work of industry.

What is the real significance of the changes we have noted?

Let us seek the answer through a clear understanding of the nature of the state and the rôle of religion in it. We cannot do better than to quote at length from Oppenheimer's *The State:*

> Everywhere the upholders of legitimacy justify dominion and exploitation with similar anthropological and theological reasoning. The master group, since it recognizes bravery and warlike efficiency as the only virtues of a man, declares itself the victor — and from its standpoint quite correctly — to be the more efficient, the better "race." This point of view is the more intensified, the lower the subject race is reduced by hard labor and low fare. And since the tribal god of the ruling group has become the supreme god in the new amalgamated state religion, this religion declares — and again from its viewpoint quite correctly — that the constitution of the state has been decreed by heaven, that it is "tabu," and the interference with it is sacrilege. In consequence, therefore, of a simple logical inversion the exploited or subject group is regarded as an essentially inferior race, as unruly, tricky, lazy, cowardly, and utterly incapable of self-rule or self-defense, so that any uprising against the imposed dominion must necessarily appear as a revolt against God Himself and against his moral ordinances. For these reasons, the dominant group at all times stands in closest union with the priesthood, which, in its highest positions, at least, nearly always recruits itself from their sons, sharing their political rights and economic privileges.

Confirmation of the situation in the state as above conceived may be found by observing some of the present-day states. In Russia we find Leontyeff the representative state philosopher. He is an ardent defender of the autocratic order, identifying church and state. He justifies the state's tyranny on religious grounds and shows that equality cannot be on earth because it is not in heaven. He teaches fear, subordination, inequality, and despotism to the people because God is a despot — the cosmic autocrat, as he believes and argues. Nor is the example of Leontyeff an isolated one, for he is doing only what Martin Luther and Melancthon did in Protestant Germany a few centuries before him, and what the church and

religion in general have always done in greater or less degree, in attitude if not in overt act, even down to the present hour. The Russian upper class and the religious institution of the Empire are one. The common people are the objects of their exploitation by divine right. Bismarck said if he did not believe so strongly in God he would favor a republic. But in his view religion and republicanism were not compatible. What clear logic and what good proof that traditional religion and democracy are antagonistic by nature! Ye cannot serve God and at the same time Humanity by fostering democracy until God be Humanity, which he was not to Bismarck, and is not to the truly orthodox traditionalist. The philosophers of Germany, Von Treitschke and Clausewitz, who have taught the present generation of the ruling class and the army and have been the great justifiers of the military autocracy of that nation to itself and to its subject masses, have put much stress upon the cosmic God and other-worldly and anti-social religion. Consequently, a divine sanction for the present imperialistic bureaucracy has been found without any difficulty. Ruthless might is made to appear right within the state and without because it is declared to be an attribute of cosmic Deity, whose prerogative is to use mortal man for his glory, whether it is for man's good or not as man views it.

It is of course quite like Voltaire to declare: "The most absurd of all despotisms, the most humiliating to human nature, the most repugnant, the most fatal, is that of the priests." But does Benjamin Kidd say in substance anything very much milder when in his defense of the Christian faith he makes it a sedative keeping the masses in submission that they may go down in peace and contentment in the social struggle for existence? Surely not. Dr. F. C. Howe has stated the case with which Kidd was dealing very well in describing the social struggle down to the nineteenth century as follows:

During these centuries religion was the handmaiden of the class which ruled. It aided in the creation of a moral code which kept the masses of the people in subjection, and contented with their lot. It taught the paralyzing ethics of obedience, of reverence, of humility, of duty. All the relations of society were created by the class which ruled. And the class which ruled was the class which owned. Its constant aim was the control of the distribution of wealth.

Nor did Lord Macaulay, who declared religion to be "the servile handmaid of monarchy and the steady enemy of liberty," see it in a different light. Nor again does Seeley fail to note that —

the whole modern struggle for civil and national liberty has been conducted not indeed without help from Christianity, but without help from the authoritative documents of Christianity. In the French Revolution men turned from the New Testament to Plutarch. The former they connected with tyranny; the latter was their textbook of liberty. Plutarch furnished them with the teachings they required for their special purpose, but the New Testament met all their new-born political ardors with a silence broken only here and there by exhortations to submission.

If the social function of religion has been as above indicated, the real significance of the shifting of emphasis regarding it or of its repudiation then is that a great source and sanction of despotism is being destroyed. The meaning of this profound disturbance is that there is an awakening of men to a new consciousness of value which finds the highest in the social and which takes account of authority only as its claims are verifiable and its characteristics human; and that there is in consequence a great deliverance from traditional bondage for both soul and body. Its further meaning is that the bulwarks of autocracy and aristocracy are falling down, that subserviency has no longer an adequate support, that the status of mastery and servitude is less firmly upheld, that class privilege and social hierarchy are pushed hard against the wall, since cosmic deity and the worship of cosmic deity

which has been the mighty sustainer of them all, is being deposed, and Demos himself made God.

Social revolutions have, very naturally, frequently directed their forces against the institution of religion. From the time of the earliest struggles for democracy, this has been the case. Broadly speaking, the ancient republics arose when religion was decadent. Says M. Guyau:

> The ancient republics were comparatively non-religious for their time. The disappearance of monarchy coincides in general, in the history of mankind, with the enfeeblement of faith.

In France, in the endeavor to obliterate class distinctions and to establish equality, all prevailing religion was, as we well know, at one time abolished by law. Likewise in Germany, revolution struck at the church, and in our day the Russian as a political reformer has been aiming his blows at this institution. But violent revolutions have accomplished little and are not likely ever to meet with much success in any undertaking to destroy at one blow religion as the agency of anti-social authority. At any rate, let us remember, revolution is not the method of the scientific-industrial age. Its method is evolutionary; it supplants the old by a new order. This is the process we see going on in the present-day religious readjustment. In the most progressive lands it works through widespread indifference to the church on the part of the industrial population and the most intelligent classes. It is reported that ninety-five per cent of the Jewish youth of Germany are atheistic in the traditional sense, or at best utterly indifferent to the faith of their fathers. In New York it is calculated that only about 120,000 out of the Jewish population of nearly one million are worshipers in the synagogues. These facts give the Christian much worry, but how is it within his own ranks? The Protestant population of Berlin is over two millions, but on a high day in February, 1914, when the attend-

ance at public worship was declared to be above the average, only 35,000 could be counted at worship. The churches, synagogues, and temples of Paris do not afford accommodations for one-tenth of her people. It is estimated that there is never more than about one-twentieth of the population at church. If a church census were taken in England or America, would it reveal much if any better conditions? It is stated on excellent authority that not more than twenty-five per cent of London's population ever enter a house of worship of any sort. In certain places, and even in certain whole sections of the countries concerned, yes; but in the larger centers, emphatically, no, if one may trust at all to general observations and the common complaints of religious organizations. Statistics on church membership mean little in the face of the fact that such membership means nothing to large numbers. Says Dr. Scott Nearing of American cities:

> Generally speaking, the influence of the Protestant church extends little farther than church attendance, and the Sunday newspaper has replaced church attendance for great numbers of men and for some women.

It would seem that but a waning minority at best pay devotion to Deity worshiped as a cosmic Autocrat. The alienation of the majority, particularly of the "world's workers from the world's religion, is a portent whose gravity cannot be overstressed."

This gravity the church realizes, and all too often consumes her energy in hurling anathemas against scientists, reformers, socialists, and all who, like Jesus of Nazareth, stir up the people. But the people are beginning to laugh in derision at all protagonists of autocracy, of "sacred" property rights, and of the might made right by the fiat of a cosmic ruler. They mock at the numerous endeavors to hold all classes in subjection to the doctrines and programs of "blind creeds," as once they mocked at the policies and principles of divine

kings; and so far as the church remains the champion of these things, they mock at her, or at least leave her alone to lead the "neglected rich" whither she will; and they smile when they see her led by the privileged classes instead of leading them. No longer are there employed to delude the common people frescoes of the Last Judgment showing kings, nobles, and even bishops being led away to hell while throngs of peasants are being welcomed by Saint Peter through the portals of Paradise, for such things do not nowadays suffice to blind the multitude at all to the anti-social function of a cosmic and other-worldly religion. To the open-eyed, the Last Judgment is the social judgment of the present. Other-worldly redresses for wrongs no longer lull people into submission to those wrongs, nor even into subordination to the institution that is an apologist for them. "Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord," is practically meaningless to this age. It is esteemed worthless recompense, and, we are being told, smacks too much of government by injunction, anyhow.

So the spirit of the scientific-industrial age is at work repudiating traditional religion. Will it so work that ultimate democracy will have no religion whatsoever? No such outcome has been implied in this discussion. Nor is it by any means likely, for, as Le Bon in his *Psychology of Peoples* observes: "The Gods, no doubt, are not immortal, but the religious spirit is eternal. It may slumber for a while but it wakes as soon as a new divinity is created." The creation of a new divinity is, I believe, now going on. Following Le Bon again, we may say:

> If at the present day our old society totters at its foundations and finds all its institutions profoundly shaken, the reason is that it is losing more and more the beliefs on which it had existed up till now. When it shall have lost them entirely, a new civilization, founded on a new faith, will necessarily take its place. History shows us that peoples do not long survive the disappearance of their gods. The civilizations that are

born with them die also with them. There is nothing so destructive as the dust of dead gods.

But the spirit of alteration will surely work till religion is completely socialized, till fraternity has prevailed over cosmic faith, till liberty has been exalted above autocratic authority and ecclesiastical hierarchy, till godliness is grounded only in moral and social justice instead of in theological justification, till in all and over all Humanity has become Deity and whole-hearted devotion to human welfare common worship. It will work till the praise of Demos has become a song that the processional of society will sing as it gathers to worship in the Temple of Brotherly Love, and the creed of Nazareth's Carpenter, proclaiming the victory of democracy, will be professed as already realized by the joyous multitude shouting aloud:

Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the kingdom;
Blessed are ye meek, for yours is the earth;
Blessed are ye mourners, for comfort is come;
Blessed are ye pure, for justice reigns;
Blessed are ye peace-makers, for war ceases;
Blessed are ye agents of mercy, for love triumphs;
Blessed are ye seekers of right, for wrong prevails no more.

II. A Résumé

In the foregoing sections an effort has been made to express the thought, the sentiment, and the influences of our age relative to democracy. The analysis made does not claim to be exhaustive. It does not necessarily represent the author's own beliefs and convictions, and should not be construed as so doing. It merely depicts certain aspects of the scientific-industrial age as they present themselves to the writer. To others the age may have a very different appearance, and its characteristics call for statement in other terms. For the

most part the things to which attention has been directed are but tendencies, undercurrents, aspirations, inchoate feelings and restive attitudes, lacking clear definition and direction. They are, in a word, spiritual elements. Since not even all who are spiritually minded discern alike the subtle things of the spirit, these with which we have dealt may not always appeal as altogether true to fact.

They are confessedly more or less vague and intangible; they may therefore be taken as realities or unrealities. We have held them to be significant realities. Their significance, however, may easily be overestimated or undervalued. For "when the winds of the spirit blow," be they individual or social, there is great uncertainty as to what will be brought forth. Only the eddying gust of the whirlwind that gets nowhere may be generated, or it may be the tornado's fury, rising to devastate and lay waste, or it may be the trade winds that blow all men good. Spiritual force or feeling forces are, however, the most potent of all, if they be deep and fundamental. Those named may be only superficial. But even so, taken all together, they seem at least to indicate something of basic importance of which they are surely the surface manifestations. That deeper force is the genius of the age, complex, difficult of comprehension, and beyond complete analysis, but nevertheless real and creative of social conditions essential to the making of ultimate democracy.

CHAPTER IX

Democratic Forces—The Universal Peace Movement

The God of War is now a man of business with vested interests.— ISRAEL ZANGWILL.

Equality breeds no war.— SOLON.

ANOTHER force making for democracy is the universal peace movement. This relatively recent cause is manifestly the expression of a social sentiment both wide and deep, for in its various aspects it represents many social elements and is an effort that is extensively organized and that rapidly gathers momentum. There are now seventeen different national peace societies in the United States alone. Moreover, it has not been destroyed by a war involving half the world, nor halted by rumors of the possible embroilment of the other half, but rather has found opportunity in this situation of a world crisis for measuring the real scope of its task and for consolidating and disciplining its forces on the lines of practical endeavor. It is the purpose of this chapter to consider militarism and the cause of peace, and to show how the latter is serving democracy. For our guidance let two propositions be stated at the outset: first, militarism is a tripartite tyranny involving autocracy, aristocracy, and plutocracy, engaged in exploiting humanity; secondly, the peace movement is the war of Demos upon that tyranny in behalf of national and of world democracy.

1. *The Cause of War*

Why is there militarism? Why are there wars at all? If we accept the economic interpretation of history, the answer will

have to be, economic forces. We shall have to say that "the cause of war is as permanent as hunger itself," for from hunger it primarily springs. In the quest for food and the conquest of trade routes we shall see the determining factors from the beginning of time and also for all time to come. Militarism then appears as an impersonal, spontaneous product of natural processes. Such a conclusion is logically necessary. It has but one fallacy; namely, the delusion of particularism. Obsessed with a single theory of causation, any clever scholastic can conjure out of his theory all history, a universe, or what not. Much science and theorizing goes astray and is vitiated for this reason, but none much more than that produced by economic determinism. The bread-and-butter theory does account for some wars, to be sure, but not for all. It is one cause, but only one, and not the only one.

The great-man theory lays militarism to the deliberate thought and premeditation of a few individuals. Hear one of the foremost exponents of it, Thomas Carlyle:

> What, speaking in quite unofficial language, is the net purport and upshot of war? To my own knowledge, for example, there dwell and toil in the British village of Dumdrudge usually some five hundred souls. For these, by certain "natural enemies" of the French, there are successfully selected during the French War, say thirty able-bodied men. Dumdrudge, at her own expense, has suckled and nursed them; she has not without difficulty and sorrow fed them up to manhood and even trained them to crafts so that one can weave, another build, another hammer, and the weakest can stand under thirty stone avoirdupois. Nevertheless amid much weeping and swearing they are selected; all dressed in red and shipped away, at the public charges, some two thousand miles, or say only to the south of Spain; and there fed until wanted. And now to that same spot, in the south of Spain, are thirty similar French artisans, from a French Dumdrudge, in like manner wending; till at length after infinite effort, the two parties come into actual juxtaposition, and thirty stand fronting thirty, each with a gun in his hand. Straightway the word, "Fire!" is given, and they blow

the souls out of one another; and in place of sixty brisk craftsmen, the world has sixty dead carcasses which it must bury, and anew shed tears for. Had these men any quarrel? Busy as the devil is, not the smallest! They lived far enough apart; were the entirest strangers; nay, in so wide a universe, there was even unconsciously, by commerce, some mutual helpfulness between them. How then? Simpleton! Their Governors had fallen out, and instead of shooting one another, had the cunning to make these poor blockheads shoot — alas, so it is in Deutschland, and hitherto in all other lands; still as of old, "what deviltry soever kings do, the Greeks must pay the piper."

Yet to attempt to account for all wars on this "Governors" theory would be erroneous, though by no means any more or quite so much so as on the economic theory. Still, our "Governors" are no longer individuals; they are classes. Let us then consider a third theory of history — the class theory. States are likely to be governed either by an autocratic class, an aristocratic class, or a plutocratic class. These classes may not be practically distinguishable. They may be instead only different sides or functionings of the one and the same class. At the head of some states, and potentially in all, is found in full power this tripartite régime, and in such instances you have militarism. The class theory will account for all but a few wars of the world. The rest may be laid to the masses who were impelled by hunger. Kings have made war for thrones, territory, tariff, and empire. Aristocracies have made war for titles, personal honor, and adventure. It is usually their chief employment. Says Simeon Strunsky of the *New York Evening Post* à propos of present conditions in the United States:

The rich are favoring the growth of military establishments out of that spirit of caste which among all aristocracies the world over finds in the business of fighting the most congenial of occupations. . . . . But military service has its own glamour. . . . . The army and the navy as a high-class occupation for the rich unemployed is a factor *which* enters into the movement toward a heightened military policy.

The English nobility, we are reliably informed, are the principal stockholders in the great armor-making plants of that country. The Turkish shells that sank British ships in the Dardanelles were made by British capital. Economic imperators have provoked war for trade, vested rights, and entrenched wrongs. To them, as Aristotle put it, "the art of war is, in a way, by nature the art of gaining property." They have always adhered to Lord Palmerston's famous dictum, which is the watchword of economic imperialism, that the flag must follow the investments or trade. Loyally devoted to the national emblem, they see that it follows wherever gain is to be had for themselves. They acquire concessions, monopolies, and privileges almost always by foul means. These freebooters thus busy themselves creating situations that embroil nations for their profit. It is estimated that the foreign investments of the plutocratic classes of England, Germany, and France have in recent years been fully $40,000,000,000. Their interests have clashed, have coerced weaker nations, have corrupted the home governments of England, France, and Germany to gain governmental backing, and have occasioned wars again and again. According to authoritative reports, the property owned by English, French, Americans, and Mexicans respectively in the latter's country is classified under some twenty-seven heads, and is as follows: American, $1,057,770,000; English, $321,302,800; French, $143,446,000; and Mexican, $793,187,342. Without question the foreign capitalist has been at the bottom of the wars both civil and foreign, real and potential, that have been menacing that land. An example of their methods has but recently come to light through the indictment by the federal government of a group of California filibusters having large ranches in Mexico. These men attempted to foment an insurrection there and to bring in an American army to seize vast tracts of land for their own profit. The demand for armed intervention in the

affairs of the troubled land is a propaganda which emanates from the plutocrats alone. Chaos is fomented and then loudly deplored by them, not indeed for the harm it does to the Mexican but for the sole reason that it interferes with the greedy foreign capitalists. The demand that the United States step in and restore order is not prompted by any concern for the liberty and welfare of the warring people, but only from the desire for a stable order under which they may be more readily exploited.

Indeed, plutocracy almost certainly arose in the first instance through war and robbery. Certainly without war there could never have arisen such great economic inequality with hereditary and privileged classes. It was by robbery that these classes were formed, and it is by a legalized robbery that they are perpetuated today. Name the dominant element in the majority of states as you will by one or all three of the class names designated, or substitute the word "ruling class," understanding thereby financiers, diplomats, concession-seekers, and munition-makers, and its synonym when viewed in the light of origins is only robbery. When, therefore, in Carlyle's analysis we substitute the word "classes" for "Governors," we have a substantially correct account of the greater part of the world's militarism, whether in the state of armed peace or open conflict.

2. *The State and Militarism*

The origin and curse of militarism cannot be easily comprehended apart from the origin of the state and organized government. Therefore, let us briefly consider two widely known theories of the latter's origin. According to Herbert Spencer, the state grew up as a function of society expanding from a simple, through a compound, to a complex body. There were first family hordes. These uniting formed clans. The clans, multiplying in turn, expanded into tribes, and the tribes united

to form a federation. The federation, growing in population with a definite territory and settled pursuits, finally became the state. In contrast to this view, Ludwig Gumplowicz and his school have put forth the conquest theory of the state's origin. They hold that one primitive group conquered and enslaved another, then the new group thus formed brought others under the yoke or was itself subjugated by a stronger group; and that thus by conflict and union and further conquest the group came to be the state. There are, then, in all save the simplest societies two general classes; the conquered, who are the slaves and toilers; and the conquerors, who are the officials and rulers. These two classes are always in conflict, since their means of existence are distinct. The conquered exist by exploiting nature; they follow the "economic means." The conquerors exist by exploiting men; they follow the "political means."

These two theories are not so opposed in all particulars as they at first appear; for, while they differ as to the means of social expansion, they agree as to the origin of the function of the state proper. In the last analysis Spencer comes to Gumplowicz's position that the state and government as such are the results of war. He says no tribe that has not engaged in war has any government. The organization called the state arose and developed from conflict. It is therefore agreed that the essential function of the state, in the light of its origin, is war. It was organized by and for that business. Thomas Hobbes only put the same thing in other words. The contract which he conceived men entering into with a sovereign in order to escape from the intolerable conditions of incessant conflict, only effected the organization known as the state for the purpose of conquest. Hobbes was fully aware that the supreme evil of the world was "the political means" or warfare. He knew, moreover, that the deliverance which the social contract gave was only from war unregulated and on a

small scale to war well organized and on a large scale. In *The Leviathan* he describes the state as follows:

> In all places where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one another has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of Nature, the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their honor. As small families did then, so now do cities and kingdoms, which are greater families, for their own security enlarge their domains upon all pretenses of danger and fear of invasion.

When Hobbes wrote there were four or five hundred states whose potentates made war without let or hindrance upon one another. The number of sovereign powers is now reduced to some fifty or sixty, but their chief concern is still war. By it the states have grown few in number but great in size, and seek thus to grow ever more. The great business of England, Germany, Austria, Russia, France, Italy, and all the rest has been conquest. The ruling class, single-headed or triple-headed, is, as Louis XIV frankly avowed, the state; and is accountable to none but itself and accustomed to no great employment but military brigandage.

The normal state has ever been a militaristic institution. Why, then, deem it strange when it so declares itself; when Prince Bismarck honestly says, "Every government takes its own interests as the standard of its actions, however it may drape them with deductions of justice and sentiment"; when Karl von Clausewitz earnestly asserts that war is the normal activity of the state, which grows only at the cost of other states; when the Imperial Chancellor, loyal to the traditions of statecraft, tells the *Reichstag* a few years since that the atmosphere of passion the Empire is experiencing has as its cause "the determination of Germany to make its strength and capability prevail over the world"; when von Treitschke candidly declares that—

> Germany has during a quarter of a century of the most dangerous diplomatic friction given peace to the world, not by the means advocated by pacifists, disarmament, but by exactly the opposite means,

and that "Germany's example turned the armies of Europe into nations and the nations into armies"? These ruling-class statesmen are consistent militarists. They deserve praise for being so far honest. The state or ruling classes in most lands are not less loyal to the state's war function; they are only less frank. The spirit of the normal state with its "political means" has fallen more or less heavily upon the subjected people in all lands. The conquering class — autocrat, aristocrat, plutocrat — makes its weight felt everywhere. Its internal as well as its external policy is coercive instead of juridical. Its domestic policy aims at the complete subordination of the individual to arbitrary authority. The militaristic state, says Herbert Spencer, is one where the citizens exist for its glory, in contrast to the industrial state where the good of the citizens is put first. Gladstone asked, "Can anyone put his finger on any spot of the map where Austria has done any good?" A Bohemian replied:

> Since the first Hapsburg ascended the throne of Bohemia my people have suffered persecution and political and economic exploitation. It has continued from the days of Ferdinand II in 1621 to the present time.

A Serbian answers:

> Austrian rule and influence were always a curse to every nation. Freedom shrieks at the sight of the Austrian eagle. It has persecuted the Serbs as no other race was ever persecuted in a civilized state.

In substance these answers might be given to the question, What good has any militaristic state done? since they indicate only the traditional functions of the state that remains true to type. For be it emphasized that in its genesis the state was the child of war and that modern militarism is only that child become mature.

Not every state, however, is type-conforming. Some have become so far divergent that much of the characteristic militarism is wanting. Such has been the case with the United

States for 125 years. In such instances, the "economic means" has generally prevailed over the "political means." The conquered class has dethroned the conquerors and with them the war institution. The state is thus made essentially economic and democratic. The citizens are made sovereign and are enabled to say, "We are the state." It was such an industrial instead of a war contract that John Locke conceived of men as making. It was such a contract our forefathers endeavored to make some seven score years ago. It was a contract to conserve rights rather than to further interests. Unlike Hobbes, Locke dealt, not with the original and typical, but with the advanced and unusual and more ideal state. His was rather the state as it was becoming and ought to be; such a state as England, France, and America have striven to become and as yet so imperfectly exemplify. We cannot say that these, though the most democratic, do more than poorly typify the economic in place of the militaristic state, for the rags of the state's old war function cling so persistently that popular sovereignty has not yet detached them but has itself been held back, strangled, and thwarted by them. Yet the will of the people is being girded to rise and divest the state—the economic state and the war state alike—of the last shreds of its blood-red natal garb and to robe it in the white garments of peace. This done, the will of the people will be free and democracy herself rendered secure on the earth.

In order more fully to appreciate the task to which Demos is rising, the policies of militarism must be set forth somewhat in detail. *First of all,* militarism has a system of philosophy which it seeks to make dominant in the state. This is cunningly devised so as to bolster up the exploiting classes and to instil obedience in the rank and file of the citizenship. Through such institutions as are either supported by the state, closely allied with it, or engaged in the business of maintaining the *status quo* of society, as, for example, the court, the church, the school,

and the official press, the doctrines of this philosophy are widely disseminated. In Great Britain the military party, composed of the aristocratic, landowning wealth-controlling class, makes good use of these agencies to further its course. In its behalf, the Dean of Canterbury declares in his *Imperialism and Christianity* that "war in any just and holy cause is not only desirable, but a positive duty." In its behalf the press, which it controls also, makes England insist upon being mistress of the ocean, and the Englishmen believe that a colossal navy means the very existence of the Empire, and that colonial interests, which in truth vitally interest the average Britisher not in the least, must be protected for the well-being of the realm. The Russian ruling class in like manner backs up its "political means" with the philosophy of Leontyeff. Through the customary institutional channels fear, subserviency, and belief in the right of might and irresponsible power are inculcated. Because God is the almighty lawless and ruthless reality in all and over all, *ergo,* the militaristic régime is necessary and just. German militarism with a unique thoroughness has made its thought system prevail to a limit unequaled anywhere. Nietzsche, von Treitschke, and von Clausewitz have been instilled into the Teutonic mind until the glory of battle and brute force has obsessed it. These spokesmen of Prussianism have been as potent influences in shaping public opinion throughout the Empire as are the newspapers in American society. So general has been the indoctrination and so effective the stoppage or pollution of opposing currents of thought that the mental horizon of Germany has become narrowed to the bore of a gun. But it is only worse, not different from elsewhere, in Germany. In whatever state militarism holds sway or strives to keep its hold, that system of philosophy is studiously propagated. Its doctrines are practically the same in every land, and may be just as well stated in English as in German.

John Ruskin considers war the "foundation of all the high virtues and faculties of men." He says:

> Peace and the vices of life only flourish together. We talk of peace and learning, of peace and plenty, and of peace and civilization; but I found those were not the words which the Muse of History coupled together; that on her lips the words were peace and sensuality, peace and selfishness, peace and corruption, peace and death. I found, in brief, that all great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; that they were nourished in war and wasted in peace; taught in war and deceived by peace; trained by war and betrayed by peace — in a word, they were born in war and expired in peace.

General Bernhardi says the same thing, only with more bluntness, when he tells Germany that war is a biological necessity of the first importance. Says he:

> The knowledge that war depends upon biological laws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it from international relations must be demonstrably untenable. But it is not only a biological obligation, but a moral obligation, and, as such, an indispensable factor in civilization. . . . . Efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily detrimental to the national health as soon as they influence politics. . . . . It has always been the weary, spiritless, and exhausted eras that have toyed with the dream of political peace.

Summed up, then, this teaching of militarism is to the effect that war is the *sine qua non* of social progress and of moral strength. On these grounds it parades itself as a necessity. And no doubt intrepidity, courage, pluck, resolution, audacity, and all else that go to make up human hardihood are called forth by war — but they are called forth without war as well. The pursuits of peace especially amid the hazards of the modern world are not so soft that the sterner qualities of manhood never grow. If the heroism and hardihood evoked by the life of an ordinary day, which pass all unhonored and unsung, were matched with those of a day of war, which are shouted from the watch towers, it is probable that the former would equal if not outnumber and outshine

the latter. War's brazen tongues loudly advertise while the voice of peace is silent. It is easy to call the piping times of peace plethoric or rotting times when there is a motive for so doing. The proof that they are such has yet to be furnished, however. The mere affirmation of blatant, hysterical, patriomaniac militarists that this is the case far from convinces sane men. On the other hand, it would not be difficult to show that nine-tenths of the hardihood that appears in war is the product of peace, war being only the occasion of its manifestation, not its cause, merely utilizing not developing it at all. The labors of peace and especially its organized and strenuous group play give rise to every quality to which war lays claim. Even Wellington, the warrior, gave recognition to this fact when, upon visiting the playground at Eton, he remarked, "Here was won the Battle of Waterloo."

But really it is not hardihood in itself that militarism seeks. Except as it makes surer the spoils of war, hardihood is a liability to a militaristic régime. A hardy people is difficult to manage. What the tripartite tyranny does seek, however, are the virtues of obedience and self-sacrifice. These it says are necessary virtues that only a martial people can be sure of. But are these necessary? It is doubtful. Their value lies in their social function, and they have little social function today apart from sustaining one or all three of the military trinity. To be sure, genetically considered, obedience and sacrifice arose as means to survival. When the group was struggling under a deficit economy, they became prized for their control value. And when the state arose, the conquering class began to employ them to uphold its power; and thus they passed on to militarism. But of what value are they in a world that has an abundance, a surplus instead of a deficit? Very little. Sacrifice and obedience cease to be real virtues with the passing of a deficit economy, for their survival function then largely disappears. Our surplus

economy finds that self-realization, character-expansion, and freedom are needed instead. Militarism, then, only cries up an outgrown ethical code that the demands of the present age cry down when it talks of the indispensable virtues of self-sacrifice and obedience.

But war is necessary to progress, is the current assertion. If so, it is pertinent to ask, How? Is it a biological necessity? The biologists say not, since the fittest are killed and the weaklings are left to breed. Charles Darwin in *The Origin of Species* has this to say on the question:

> In every country in which a large standing army is kept up, the finest young men are taken by conscription or enlisted. They are all thus exposed to early death during war, are often tempted into vice, and are prevented from marrying during the prime of life. On the other hand, the shorter and feebler men, with poor constitutions, are left at home, and frequently have a much better chance of marrying.

Is it necessary to intellectual advancement? If so, no period of war has yet shown it. Nations have invariably been thrown back by war upon instinct, fear, and emotion. Under such conditions, mystical religion, superstition, and poetry have flourished, but not science and reason. Witness the wave of emotion that has engulfed the world, America included, as an accompaniment of the European conflict. Fear, a preparedness mania, a moral decadence, and a widespread mob-mindedness is gripping the United States. Perhaps the progress is moral. Suppose we grant there is some gain of rugged virtue, social cohesiveness, fidelity, etc.; is not the gain pretty sure to be balanced by the loss of other qualities to which society has given equal value? Hatred, injustice, inhumanity, undying enmity, cruelty, ruthlessness, etc., are the inevitable fruits of any conflict. The tree of war bears both sweet and bitter fruit, and never any of the sweet without more of the bitter. If war gives national cohesiveness, it gives also a woful narrowing of men's souls and of the larger human

sentiments. Before it is asserted that war gives moral progress the stubborn fact that wars have always been followed by periods of lawlessness and of moral degradation must be disposed of.

Maybe the progress is economic, for we are told that the eras succeeding great conflicts have been of extensive commercial activity and prosperity. Even if this were so, does it prove that there has been progress because of war? What war has not consumed vast stores of capital and destroyed the wealth of the combatants? Has it been estimated in any case how much commerce and industry have had to be accelerated in order to make up the deficit after the war, or has it been shown that the nation would not have been farther advanced economically if there had been no war at all? Until this reckoning is made, war's claim to promote economic progress cannot go unchallenged.

Perhaps, though, progress ought not to be analyzed but looked at in the large. Very well, then, it is generally agreed that it comes in every organism, including the social, from surplus energy. This energy war generally consumes until pressure is brought into play. By so doing it prevents society with a growing surplus from becoming slothful, inert, and stagnant, since the diminution or the sharp curtailment of the surplus serves to stimulate society and to make it mobile. Thus without doubt war has sometimes served progressive ends, but it has also not infrequently wrought such destruction of energy that stagnation has been caused rather than cured. So at best war is a precarious social stimulant and quite as likely to thwart as to further progress.

But, after all, militarism as the self-appointed sponsor for progress merits no consideration, since it wants no real progress. Its objects are gained only by holding fast the ancient order of things. Intellectual, moral, economic, political, and social advancement in general is fatal to its policy. This

philosophy of militarism which we have reviewed is only clever sophistry; but it is all-sufficient to deceive great numbers in every land and to keep them under the yoke of the insidious tyranny.

A second policy of the tripartite régime in every land is the promotion of nationalism. It stimulates all the jingoists, chauvinists, and patromaniacs in pulpits, politics, editors' offices, counting houses, boards of trade and elsewhere to shout at intervals and with one accord, "Deutschland über alles," "Rule Britannia," or "My country first," as the case may be. It causes them to prate of superior *Kultur*, of democratic civilization, or of whatever serves to incite a pugnacious national consciousness. This policy always involves the periodic appearance of alarming menaces in the shape of barbarous Russian hordes to Germany, of ruthless German invaders to England, of wily Japs, murderous Mexicans, unresistible Germans, imperialistic Canadians or Englishmen to America.

Thus is the spirit of nationalism made dominant, and induced to assert itself in military preparation for defense against potential enemies. This defensive preparation is all that rampant nationalism ever seeks. It emphatically disavows all aggressive or imperialistic policies. We arm against war, not for it; solely for defensive, not offensive purposes, is the declaration of the militarist. It is a curious fact, however, that offensive war has always followed military preparation for "defensive purpose alone." And yet not so curious either, when it is observed that militarism is sponsor for this program, for it knows full well what it does. Herbert Spencer a generation ago exposed the sophistry of this doctrine. In his work on *Sociology* he says:

> Always a structure assumed for defensive action, available also for offensive action, tends to initiate it. As in Athens the military and naval organization which was developed in coping with a foreign enemy

thereafter began to exercise itself aggressively; as in France the triumphant army of the Republic, formed to resist invasion, forthwith became an invader; so it is habitually — so is it now with ourselves. In China, India, Polynesia, Africa, the East Indian Archipelago, reasons, never wanting to the aggressor, are given for widening our empire; without force if it may be, and with force if needful.

Nationalism is being awakened in the United States. It has been stirred up to the defensive pitch. Military preparation, practically without limit, "to defend our democracy" is upon us. And amid the din of munition works, armor plants, and the mustering of armies the voice of the militarist is heard shouting, "Be not afraid of militarism; we shall never have it in America." But let not the citizen be deceived. If this material preparedness be not militarism, behold, it is lurking just behind it. The reality is here in our midst, for militarism in the last analysis is psychological. The mind of militarism is already manifest; it is working in us to will and to do its pleasure.

"To defend our democracy"; indeed? For one hundred and forty years our democracy has saved us from serious foreign wars, and now we are to prepare to save our democracy from the rest of the world. But when this preparation is fully made as the army and navy experts shall dictate, what will then be left of the democracy of America that we are told needs defending? Not so much as would offend a Louis XIV, for where militarism enters, democracy flees; where defensive preparedness becomes adequate, wars for imperial power follow.

Such is the end toward which the tripartite tyranny directs the state when it fosters militarism.

In the third place, the militaristic state fosters brutality. This may not always be its avowed purpose, though likely it is in some cases. Yet the pursuit of war and the kind of preparation it demands inevitably leave callous places in hu-

man nature. It is an old truth that the spirits of men are subdued to that at which they work and attuned to that of which they think. When they bear arms, they quickly come to regard the force of arms as the ground of right and to hold the finer principles that have arisen out of peaceful relationships entirely negligible. Where martial means are given unqualified sanction, the law of sympathy is rejected in favor of the law of natural selection. Pursuant to this choice, Germany has set out to force natural selection on Europe—as though social selection could be natural. Many have been blaming the teachings of the natural selection school for this outburst of savage egotism in central Europe. No doubt these ideas had much to do with it, but they were first born of war practice itself. Militarism brutalizes.

Cæsar wrote of the Germans, "*Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam*" (They consider robberies no disgrace). But might not the same have been said of other savage people in his day? Probably; but since civilization has bred it out of others, is it not reasonable to suppose that it would have bred it out of the Germans had they not been constantly schooled in the pillaging and plundering of war? In recent generations at least, the school and the barracks and much of the social life have been so directed by the war class as to deaden the spirit of humanitarianism and of internationalism, and to create a domineering, bullying national type. The humanitarian policies of the Empire have had for their main object the development of a brawny fighting stock. Roland G. Usher in *Pan-Germanism* quotes someone as saying:

> Bismarck's heavy spirit has settled upon Germany; it has his greatness, it has his brutality, it has taken his criterion of truth, which is Germanic, his indifference to justice, which is savage.

But Bismarck's spirit was that of war-bred Prussia, and it was quite as much effect as cause of the military charac-

terization. The vandalism and barbarism of the past and present conflicts of Germany are but the logical expression of carefully fostered natural tendencies combined with the acquired characteristics of martial training. Adolph Lassen of Berlin has virtually confessed it in asserting:

> Our army is, so to speak, a reduced image of the intelligence and morality of the German people. We do good to all. Louvain was not destroyed; we only burned the houses of murderers. Rheims Cathedral was not demolished; it was the French who provoked the damage.

In 1874 Ruskin wrote:

> For blessing is only for the meek and merciful, and a German cannot be either. . . . . When the Germans get command of Lombardy, they bombard Venice, steal her pictures (which they can't understand a single touch of), and entirely ruin the country morally and physically, leaving behind them misery, vice, and intense hatred of themselves wherever their accursed feet have trodden. They do precisely the same thing by France — crush her, rob her, leave her in misery of rage and shame, and return home, smacking their lips and singing *Te Deums.*

These brutalizing effects are, of course, never mentioned in the philosophy with which militarism instructs the citizenship. They are never alluded to by the armament party that ever cries, "In time of peace prepare for war!" Above all, they are little thought of in connection with the cause of open conflict. To the gross all things are gross; the finer and more subtle are meaningless. But it must not be overlooked that in the very fact that a state organized for war tends to brutalize its subjects there is an efficient cause of war. The formation of martial character is certain to lead to martial activity. This the tripartite tyranny understands full well. It understands it in America even now as it promotes militarism.

In the fourth place, the militaristic state in time of peace plunders the pockets of its people through taxation. Like Scythians of old it sticks up a scimitar as the symbol of deity and offers up to it the nation's wealth. The imagination is

paralyzed at the enormity of the sacrifice. The sum expended, for example, on the army and navy of the United States together with the cost of collecting the custom-house dues, exceeds the revenue which the present tariff law ordinarily yields by $35,000,000. Because of this, plutocratic militarists stand armed with either a protective tariff or a tariff-for-revenue-only weapon guarding the gates of the nation against free trade with the world, and levying a robber's tribute upon poverty and labor whenever it eats or clothes itself to provide the enormous offering for the god of war. Raze to the ground the altars of this savage deity, and the world's trade might then be free and unfettered and the tariff-ridden multitudes delivered from brigandage. Two thousand five hundred millions, Europe's annual tribute in peace times to her Moloch, is an offering that stupefies the mind. And behold, Human Progress, like a chained convict, stands, waits, and worships at these altars! The misery resulting indirectly from militarism, even in times of peace, is well depicted in the following words sent two winters ago to the *New York World* by a homeless man of that city. Written on a piece of soiled wrapping paper with the writer's address given as "Fourth Bench," City Hall Park, they run thus:

> Whether your shell hits the target or not,
> Your cost is Five Hundred Dollars a shot.
> You thing of noise and flame and power,
> We feed you a hundred barrels of flour.
> Each time you roar, your flame is fed
> With twenty thousand loaves of bread.
> Silence! A million hungry men
> Seek bread to fill their mouths again.

But the people must not realize the burden laid upon them, and so the military state drafts art to throw a glamor about its whole hellish business till the common herd like big-eyed bucks flock to the garish light and to their slaughter. And this

is *the fifth policy of that state.* From Thomas Chalmers' *False Coloring Lent to War* we take the following paragraph setting forth the use of this device:

> On every side of me I see causes at work which go to spread a most delusive coloring over war, and to remove its shocking barbarities to the background of our contemplations altogether. I see it in the history which tells me of the superb appearance of the troops, and the brilliancy of their successive charges. I see it in the poetry which lends its magic numbers to the narrative of blood, and transports its many admirers as by its images, and its figures, and its nodding plumes of chivalry, it throws its treacherous embellishments over a scene of legalized slaughter. I see it in the music which represents the progress of the battle; and where, after being inspired by the trumpet notes of preparation, the whole beauty and tenderness of a drawing-room are seen to bend over the sentimental entertainment; nor do I hear the utterance of a single sigh to interrupt the death tones of the thickening contest, and the groans of the wounded men, as they fade away upon the ear, and sink into lifeless silence.

Let us say with Richard Le Gallienne:

> Art, thou hast many infamies,
> But not an infamy like this,
> Oh, snap the fife, and still the drum,
> And show the monster as she is.

But art, like all else in the militaristic state, is a victim, and an easy one, of that tripartite monster—autocracy, aristocracy, and plutocracy.

So, veiling its motives in beauty's dress, *as a sixth policy,* the militaristic state studiously proceeds to embroil its subjects from time to time in conflict with other nations in order to strengthen itself. When armed peace does not avail to preserve the security of the tripartite tyranny, a war of conquest to submerge internal dissensions and to quiet agitation in behalf of reforms is often necessary. For there is nothing more effective for the integration and the unification of a nation than a foreign war. Empires torn asunder by social and po-

litical strife suddenly become one in purpose, and autocracy has a chance to get a new grip on things. Witness England today. It is able to throttle its internal enemies by causing dangerous agitation to be sunk in the fear of foreign foes. Unto wars for this purpose nations have been driven more often than history tells us. The rising tide of socialism and antimonarchical sentiment in Germany, in spite of all the censorship on education and thinking exercised by the ruling class, has jeopardized the position of the Kaiser and his *entourage*. The popular discontent in Austria, the resistance to tyranny, and the growing strength and intelligence of the people have made monarchy fearful. Likewise in Russia the spread of liberalism, and the struggle on the part of the masses for a voice in their government, have aroused absolutism to a sense of its perilous situation. Nor should the waning power of the English aristocracy and plutocracy be overlooked. Weakened in this quarter and in that, hard pressed on every side, a heroic effort to recoup their strength was imperative. These conditions go far to account for the present European war. Autocracy, aristocracy, and plutocracy are engaged in a battle for self-preservation. It is their endeavor to weaken the people, and to checkmate oncoming democracy. On the tottering thrones of Europe wisdom is not wanting, and just in the nick of time, ere subjects have become as wise as kings, the tocsins of war are sounded. While they are yet servile and disunited, the people must be humbled in aspiration, and military absolutism exalted to new heights of power.

Naturally, the military trinity is not so tactless as to disclose its real aim when it has once occasioned war. However much it may have preached the necessity for conflict beforehand, with the arrival of the critical hour it is inclined to shift the responsibility upon the enemy. This serves to divert the attention from the true cause, to placate the populace, and to provoke its feelings and its courage to the hating and the

killing point. So we hear Austria profess her innocence today: "The Dual Monarchy is not engaged in a war of conquest and is acting solely in self-defense — to keep her southern provinces in check." We see the Imperial Chancellor of Germany clearing the skirts of his responsible-to-God-only class, and hear him say:

> We wish to go on living in peace in the empire which we have developed. The whole work of Emperor William has been devoted to the maintenance of peace. To the last hour he has worked for peace in Europe, and he is still working for it. Should all his efforts prove vain and should the sword be forced into our hands we will take the field with a clear conscience in the knowledge that we did not seek war. We shall then wage war for our existence and for the national honor to the last drop of our blood.

Thus are nations plunged designedly into war.

Gog and Magog have awakened to the fray; millions have arisen to their own slaughter. Alas, it was ever thus! From of old were slaves scourged to this hellish work, mercenaries enticed by the hope of plunder, retainers of knights led by a sense of duty, peasants allured by the call of patriotism, conscripts spurred on by governmental proscription, and volunteers prompted by the fear of foes to march, to suffer, to shoot, and to die for their masters' benefit — for "the flag," for "Fatherland," for "country" — so they believed; but, to speak truthfully, for that ancient tripartite tyrant, autocracy, aristocracy, and plutocracy.

What gain the battle-bearers from the conflict? A desolate and homeless land, perhaps. Hear Tiberius Gracchus, whom Plutarch reports, tell what the Romans gained:

> The wild beasts of Italy had their dens and holes and hiding places, while the men who fought and died in defense of Italy enjoyed, indeed, the air and light, but nothing else; homeless and without a spot of ground to rest upon, they wandered about with their wives and children, while their commanders, with a lie in their mouth, exhorted the soldiers

in battle to defend their tombs and temples against the enemy, for out of so many Romans not one had a family altar or an ancestral tomb, but they fought to maintain the luxury and wealth of others and they died with the title of lords of the earth, without possessing a single clod to call their own.

When the Thirty Years' War ended, Europe was in ruins and multitudes homeless. In Germany two-thirds of the houses had been destroyed and yet so many men had fallen that not enough remained to occupy half the houses standing. This, of course, belongs to the history of the darker ages, but is it different today? What of Belgium with several millions of her people ruined, homeless, expatriated, and made wanderers on the earth? What of Galicia with a million and a half of her people likewise expatriated and the country devastated by a deluge of misery? A hundred thousand houses were reported razed and seven hundred millions of dollars' worth of property was estimated destroyed in the early stages of the eastern campaign. What of the starving multitudes of Poland, Armenia, Serbia? Fifteen millions of people homeless and dependent from two years of war. What of the prospect for worse desolation yet to come in every quarter before Europe is *hors de combat?*

But if their reward be not a desolate and homeless land, the battle-bearers gain crushing taxation and abject poverty. At the outbreak of the French Revolution France was paying 80 per cent of her income on war debts. After 1815 England had a debt of $4,380,000,000, and a direct tax of thirty shillings fell upon the head of every toiler in the realm to help devour his living. The Franco-Prussian War, though of only a few weeks' duration, added billions to the debts of the nations involved. Beneath this weight of ages the peasants were bowed again to the earth, just as they have always been whenever they have begun to rise. Since 1897 the taxes of the world have doubled almost wholly on account of war prepara-

tions. In 1911 the bonded indebtedness of the world, caused chiefly by war, was $37,000,000,000, and the annual interest bill was $1,400,000,000. By January, 1916, it is calculated that $25,000,000,000 had been added to this bonded debt by the present war. This makes the national debt of the world something like $62,000,000,000 with interest charges in excess of $3,000,000,000 per annum. The present conflict in Europe is being waged at a cost estimated by the Royal Statistical Society of Great Britain at $45,000,000,000 per annum. Europe's wealth of $281,000,000,000 — the garnering of centuries — is being consumed with a rapidity that will soon exhaust it. It is estimated that at present the debts of the warring nations calculated in percentage of total national wealth are as follows: Austria-Hungary, 34 per cent; Russia, 31 per cent; Germany, 25 per cent; France, 25 per cent; and Great Britain, 20 per cent. Ten million men have been made mad; they have ceased to build up and have begun to tear down the work of ages. "Whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad"; and these desperately maddened men are preparing squalor, misery, and destruction for themselves and their children for generations to come. Even in plentiful America the cost of war has fallen heavily upon the laboring public. The unsuspecting consumer has eaten his bread and worn his coat at the price of a heavy tribute to his government for war purposes. For nearly half a century the greater part of our national income has gone to pay for war. Throughout recent decades nearly three-fourths of all the revenue collected by our federal government has been expended for wars, past, present, and future. To be exact, there was spent for the army, navy, pensions, and interest on our war debt during the thirty-one years between 1879 and 1909 just 71.5 per cent of our total national income. The remaining 28.5 per cent of the federal income was all that was expended on civil affairs. And the cry goes up from a hoodwinked people at the instance of their

exploiters for a vast army and the next biggest navy on the seas, while the Sixty-fourth Congress votes for military purposes more money by $200,000,000 than ever any nation of the Old World thought of doing. That this two-thirds of a billion of dollars which has been appropriated could be voted for war in times of peace by a supposedly democratic government is a fact of ill-boding import, for it reveals the active presence in the body-politic of that arch menace of all human welfare, social prosperity, and power. It is impossible that this nation can advance democratically and consume more than 80 per cent of its federal income for war purpose. Such is the battle-bearer's gain. No sooner has a surplus been accumulated and a people become prepared to enter upon a career of comfort, joy, and creative civilization than war has fallen upon them to rob, to strip them naked, and to leave them half-dead to begin once more the weary struggle upward.

3. *War Upon War*

The masses are becoming conscious of the fact that always and under all conditions militarism is their exploitation, and their protest rises in all lands. As long ago as 1870 the Paris Federation of the International sent this message to Berlin: "War is the direct means by which government stifles the liberty of the people." To this the Berlin Local replied:

> With heart and hand we adhere to your proclamation. We solemnly vow that neither beat of drum, nor victory, nor defeat shall divert us from our efforts to establish the union of the workers of all countries.

From an assembly of thousands in Cooper Union, New York, more than a year ago, à propos of a possible war between the United States and Mexico, come such declarations as these:

> This gathering represents the spirit of the masses who must do the dying and the paying in these wars instigated by economic interests,

which proverbially seek protection, and are fomented by other interests which make war and news of war a marketable product.

When this spirit of protest makes itself heard above the interests, and the people stop, no power on earth can make them go on. Then war will cease. Another mass meeting in Carnegie Hall resolved as follows:

WHEREAS, American workers will be obliged to battle against Mexican workers for issues in which the working class of neither country have any interest; and,

WHEREAS, The fighting strength of Labor should be conserved to win from the exploiters the privilege to live; therefore, be it

Resolved, That this assembly condemn any act by the administration tending to involve the United States in war.

On the eve of war in Europe, protest meetings were held by the labor organizations everywhere. In Trafalgar Square, London, many thousands stood while a Russian, a German, a Frenchman, a Switzer embraced one another in sanction of a resolution expressing "their deepest detestation of the international war that seemed about to break forth," and calling "upon the workers to unite to prevent their respective governments from engaging in it." In Paris, Brussels, Vienna, Berlin, and hundreds of other cities similar meetings took place. The night after Austria had declared war on Serbia the International Socialists' Bureau called an anti-war meeting at Brussels. Thousands attended it and listened to representatives of England, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Holland, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and Italy in addresses the burden of which was "But war's a game which, were their subjects wise, kings would not play at." In Berlin on the same night sixty thousand laborers had assembled in a like protest. The night before Germany declared war, over fifty big meetings took place in Berlin alone. On the day war broke out, the Italian Socialists notified Premier Salandra that if Italy entered the war

they would declare an insurrection which "would be unanimous and terrible." Backed by the middle class of the kingdom, this party was no mean factor in long delaying Italy's entrance into the conflict. In the United States as well, great mass meetings were held to voice labor's protest. The object was to allay racial animosities and to cement the laboring masses together in one purpose to withstand all war. Such is the protest that labor in all the western world is sending up against militarism. Labor unionists, socialists, syndicalists, and the organized common people are everywhere declaring that all men are brothers, and if they fight, they contend with friends, not with foes. They are therefore covenanting together to draw the sword no more, to bathe it no more in brother's blood for the pride and the profit of special privilege.

Moreover, the battle-bearers are not merely protesting; they have a program of war upon war. It is to frustrate conflict by such means as they can control. The general strike is one. American labor has threatened to paralyze our government by resorting to it in the event of war upon Mexico. In the recent Ulster uprising, England found her army actually striking. The resignation of officers and the demoralizing of laboring men in the ranks who refused to fight their countrymen gave evidence of the effectiveness of the workingman's program. It showed that where men are permitted to think for themselves and are no longer the blind instruments of force they are laying the ax at the root of war. To be sure, armies have struck before. Even as early as 494 B. C. it is recorded that the plebs withdrew from Rome to the Sacred Mount, not merely as a band of laborers on a strike, but as an army of Roman soldiers refusing to fight any more battles for the patrician class. Although nothing significant came of that plebeian strike, let it not be thought that nothing can possibly come from such action today. In accordance with the program of labor those who control transportation, com-

munication, and the munitions of war in general were called upon to block the war machine in Europe. The Welsh miners at Cardiff responded by refusing to curtail their holidays in order to mine coal urgently needed by the British navy. Their action caused tremendous excitement in Parliament. And when Parliament declared for war, the leaders of the Independent Labor Party resigned from that body, refusing to cooperate with the government at all. Perhaps the most significant action of any was that of the German Social Democrats, many of whom voted against the war budget in the *Reichstag*. So goes the war upon war waged by those who are the battle-bearers of the nations.

This array of labor is the most formidable foe that has ever arisen against militarism, for the reason that the interests of labor are practical, and its motive self-preservation. It is the real maker of peace, for when the battle-bearers have turned peace-bringers, whence will militarism draw her armies or recruit her navies? And without armies and navies what will autocracy, aristocracy, and plutocracy do to perpetuate their exploitation of the world?

But the devil laughs. All Europe is at war. Militarism is rampant; its policies triumphant. Labor's war upon war has proved artificial instead of real, feeble instead of formidable. The 4,250,000 German Socialists who were to have ended the reign of their Emperor if ever he declared a war, are as ever pawns and puppets in the royal game. The millions of France, Belgium, Italy, Britain, Austria, and Russia, who were but yesterday shouting "*Guerre à la guerre!*" are today singing "Let your hearts beat for God and your fists on the enemy." The masses who boasted their strength and resolution have been hypnotized by their more clever tyrants once again, and the would-be peace-bringers of the earth have become the battle-bearers even as of old. Moreover, many of them have lost heart and are saying, "Our cause was a

house of cards; the solidarity of labor a myth; we are wholly mistaken in our hope."

This utter rout of the army of peace was disappointing but not surprising when we consider the status of its means of mobilization, and the suddenness with which the military tyranny assaulted it. The agencies of communication and information available to labor were feeble at best, and even these were quickly snatched away. We are told that the same night on which martial law was proclaimed throughout Germany, seventy-nine newspapers were suppressed, and later the number interdicted reached eight hundred and sixty-four; clubs and unions of the labor element were not permitted to have another meeting, and some of their members were summarily shot for continuing to protest against war. Days before this, intranational as well as international communication fell under the ban of censorship so far as the common people were concerned. Concerted action was therefore rendered impossible. News as false as the lie of Bismarck that had caused the Franco-Prussian war forty years before went forth from the war offices of the ruling class till darkness was in the land, under the cover of which the common herd could be lured to the slaughter. So it is not difficult to see why there was no general strike, why labor was impotent as an immediate peace factor.

However, had the conditions been most favorable, it is not highly probable that this foe of militarism would have prevailed, for at best it is ignorant and inarticulate, selfish and immobile, factious and fearful. It does not know itself nor how to co-ordinate its powers. It even underestimates the strength and resources of the enemy. Nor is this to be wondered at, for it is immature—but a half-century up from infancy. It is callow with youth, while militarism is ripe with the experience of age. The mills of the gods grind slowly, and social forces can grow brain and brawn only as the grist

is ground to feed them. But in the labor force of the world there is the making of a giant. Full-grown, one day this brainy and brawny champion of peace will slay that tripartite dragon, militarism.

Sister to labor's war upon militarism is the modern woman's peace movement. Having arisen as a new force, the present world crisis has given it occasion to organize its resources and to show the extent of its power. International in scope, practical in motive, and democratic in origin and purpose, it is attempting to prosecute the war upon war from which labor was temporarily forced to desist. It is significant that the growing sex consciousness of womankind has focused upon war and its destruction, for as the feminist viewpoint gains its rightful place in the masculine world order, it means, among other results for democracy, that man-made militarism is to be demolished.

That the international laboring class is thus being joined by an international woman's class in the common struggle for world peace is a fact revealing at once how deep-seated the revolt against militarism has become and at the same time giving promise that its success is nearer than many have dreamed.

There is war upon war in yet another quarter. In the juridical field forces are gathering; two parties are distinguishable. One, largely for æsthetic reasons, champions the cause as a polite profession. Peace palaces, sumptuous dinners, and cautious tribunals are its works. The other party is formed for moral reasons. It is a protagonist with religious zeal. Its works are ideals, treaties, and enthusiasm. As over against the labor and feminist force, which is practical, this juridical force may be termed theoretical. Its aim is an international code of laws, and a supernational court and police force to administer them which shall rule the nations by civil means.

Already the juridical standard has been set against national lawlessness. The principle which Grotius laid down has at least been considered with honest purpose by some and doubtful sincerity by others of the great nations as a feasible proposition. Here it is:

> If no community can subsist without exerting some standard of right, as Aristotle proves by the example of brigands — who are obliged to recognize some principle of equity among themselves — with greater reason the human race, any number of people, cannot dispense with it.

D. J. Hill points out the fact that this ideal was recognized in the Peace of Westphalia and adds that it ended forever the aspirations of nations for universal empire. It settled the point that each state is —

> possessed of jural rights which all others are bound to respect. . . . . It was thus a declaration not only that a society of states exists, but that it is based on law, is governed by law, and that its members may make their appeal to law.

However, in the light of subsequent history, it does not appear that the Treaty of Westphalia settled anything either practically or theoretically. Still the theory remains and the principle of law and justice has been somewhat extended. The folly of force as over against a civilly organized world has become generally obvious. And Hill is justified in declaring that —

> never before in the history of mankind has it been so clearly perceived as at the present moment, that the whole civilization is based upon the existence of guarantees that force shall not prevail until the voice of justice has been heard. In what form justice is to be invoked, and in what manner its decisions are to be executed, may still be problematical; but the fact that these questions are pressing themselves upon the jural consciousness of all the civilized nations is demanding the discovery of some method by which the voice of justice may be heard in the intercourse of nations.

The juridical peace propaganda makes for democracy through the establishment of equality among states. It seeks to remove that natural inequality which necessarily obtains when force is arbiter, and to substitute law and a supernational court before which the least shall be equal to the greatest and reason take the place of might. The fundamental aim of this party is to set right the theory of the state.

The labor and feminist peace movement makes for democracy through the destruction of the means whereby class dominance is perpetuated. It is decidedly practical, for it was long ago determined that the people's will should be law. There is, therefore, no theory at stake, but only the practical assertion of the will.

The masses are overthrowing militarism in the interest of political, economic, and social equality within the state. Their work is primarily for national democracy. The theorists are overthrowing militarism in the interest of equality between states. Their work is chiefly for international democracy. With these forces warring together against militarism, Demos may take heart, for the vanquishing of Mars is assured.

4. War Upon Peace

Before that victory over Mars comes, however, there will be war upon peace in open conflict. Autocracy has never yet surrendered without a battle. And her last stand has not been made. Plutocracy cannot live with peace. A final clash with her is certain. Perhaps wise plutocracy will discover that war between equal and well-established powers is unprofitable, and will yield ground in that quarter. But so long as any chance for exploitation remains, as remain it does over large sections of the globe not yet modernized, she will not give way. She is already attacking peace and our nation-old anti-militaristic policy, even in America. Men in Congress

and out are urging action in behalf of a thoroughgoing militaristic policy. They know no limit. Hear the argument of one:

> The United States is totally unprepared for a war, defensive or offensive, against a real power. In my opinion, the effect of the vast sums of money spent by Andrew Carnegie in his peace propaganda has been to blind Americans to the fact that our national security from a military point of view is undermined.

The armament and munitions makers, with their lust for gold quickened from recent profits of war, in league with the army and navy officers, whose lust for power has also been given new impetus from the same source, have organized a well financed and thoroughly unscrupulous attack upon the nation's pacific and antimilitaristic policy. The mouthpieces of the armament ring, the subsidized newspapers, are letting loose against the public whole salvos of military philosophy and war arguments that have been heard round the world from ages immemorial. The class-serving pulpit, true to its aristocratic interests and plutocratic instincts, has joined in the attack. On Thanksgiving Day, 1915, all but two prominent pulpits of New York spoke against the policy of peace. And the President, spoiled by the pomp of power, enticed by plutocracy, carried away by the war-fear of the times, or dominated by what motive I know not, has betrayed the Republic in virtually becoming the champion of militarism. For permanent world peace also he speaks in exalted, prophetic tones. None has spoken more nobly than he — and none more inconsistently. The policy of peace, which for nearly a century and a half has made America the hope of the world, is now put in jeopardy, just when it could be most effective. So begins the war upon peace in the world's stronghold of peace.

The celebration of Peace Day by the public schools of Baltimore was prohibited not long ago by the Board of School Commissioners of that city. Their order ran: "That the in-

struction of public-school children at any time and in any place in the propaganda of 'peace at any price' be prohibited." They gave for their reason that "peace at any price" meant disloyalty to country and flag. Of like significance was the attitude of the Attorney General of the United States toward those who threatened a general strike to thwart war on Mexico. He made it clear, it is reported, that such a move on the part of the people would be sedition and would be summarily dealt with.

Autocracy also is on the defensive. It would be only recapitulation to relate its doings in Russia, Germany, and Austria. There we expect to see it most desperate; but also in England, France, and America, where we do not expect to see it at all, it is fighting. For promulgating peace among the men of the standing army of the United States Waldo H. Coffman and others were not long ago imprisoned. Of late, rather frequent arrests are being reported of men charged with "reviling soldiers," "insulting" or "desecrating the flag," voicing treasonable doctrines, etc. These acts of autocracy in suppressing free speech come chiefly from New York, where military conscription has already been enacted. Anti-militarists like Tom Mann and other labor leaders in England served prison sentences for promoting this cause even before the present war broke out. And now England treats all who are pacifically inclined, however mild they may be, as enemies of the realm. Even Bertrand Russell, one of her most eminent scholars and philosophers, is imprisoned, forbidden utterance and hounded as a traitor because he has dared to speak for peace in the name of democracy and humanity. In France the eminent Socialist, Jean Jaurès, was recently assassinated by one who considered himself a patriot for removing this enemy of military service and of war — a patriot, forsooth, for a price offered by the plutocratic power. Upon his arrest he cried, "Jaurès was an enemy of the three-year law. He was

an enemy of my country. I have done my duty." Is it too much to charge autocracy enthroned in the French government with indirect responsibility for this crime? When in the name of liberty a Servian struck down an autocrat, the Archduke of Austria, it was *casus belli;* but when, in the name of autocracy a "patriot" struck down a democrat, Jean Jaurès, it was only *casus doloris;* for war is not of the people; it is only of autocrats. But war upon war and the counter-war upon peace will come to an end and democracy eventually stand victor over tripartite militarism. She will dissolve this triple alliance by decentralizing the political power of autocracy, by decentralizing plutocracy, by destroying aristocracy. In so doing she will end militarism and with it the enemy of democratic progress. Then will democracy be secure, for, as Emerson wrote in his essay on "War":

> Whenever we see the doctrine of peace embraced by a nation, we may be assured it will not be one that invites injury; but one, on the contrary, which has a friend in the bottom of the heart of every man, even of the violent and base; one against which no weapon can prosper; one which is looked upon as the asylum of the human race and has the blessings of mankind.

CHAPTER X

Democratic Forces—The Purposeful Utilization of the Social Surplus[1]

> I do not call him who lives in prosperity and has great possession, a man of *Olbos*, but only a well-to-do treasure keeper.— EURIPIDES.

FORCES of a more or less impersonal nature, together with certain others consciously telic in character which are working for the socialization of wealth and the establishment of equality, have been under consideration in other chapters of this work. Now, a definite recognition of the part played by purposeful action in the case of the individual, especially in his utilization of the social surplus, is in order.

The making of democracy raises the question of progress and its fundamental factors. Progress is frequently assumed to be the result of pressure exerted upon a social group by untoward conditions, such as poverty, lack, calamity, or necessity of any sort; and to this assumption much foundation has been given by economic science. Ever since Thomas Malthus attributed improvement to the vice and misery arising from the tendency of population to press ahead of the means of subsistence, the theory of pressure as a factor in progress has played an important rôle in our thinking. But an opposing theory maintains that progress is due to a surplus, to the energy that abundance gives. This latter theory has found

[1] This chapter in the main appeared as an article in the *American Journal of Sociology* for November, 1916. It is here reprinted by the kind permission of the editor.

verification in biology and apparently holds good in society as being more true to the facts than the former. For if there remains no energy unconsumed in the struggle for existence, if it is just possible to live and nothing more, the possibility of any change at all for the better is out of the question. There must be an overplus of energy available, a margin unused in the struggle, if any organism or any social group is to be more than static.

However, this does not mean that the role of pressure is excluded from the process of change or even from progress itself; but only that without some surplus the pressure cannot operate beneficially at all. Given a modicum of surplus energy sufficient for pressure of any sort to play upon without bringing very existence itself to an end, there will result such emotional disturbances in an organism and such crises in a society as may lead to new adaptations or adjustments of an advantageous nature. In the case of society, the change to another environment or a change of the existing environment may be the result. The fact that the pressure thus operating is commonly observed, rather than the energy back of it upon which it plays, making plausible the theory that progress is due primarily to pressure instead of to surplus. While in human societies progressive change often comes as indicated through the play of pressure upon a group with a surplus, in advanced societies it may and usually does come without it from that conscious and purposeful directing of marginal energy of which such societies are capable.

The purposeful utilization of its surplus by any society is a matter of vital importance. It bears intimately upon the making of democracy, for energy may be directed to social advance or it may be dissipated to no good end. How it is being used by present-day society in America is a question that has received and still merits the deepest consideration.

But before attempting to arrive at the answer, let us take an inventory of the social surplus itself.

1. *The Surplus Inventoried*

Scientists are pretty generally agreed that the amount of energy in society is limited; that at any given time there exists only a definite fund of it that can be expended in effort. However, it is not a definite amount such as an organism has at its disposal, for social energy is more than the total energy of the human organisms that compose society. There is in addition energy stored up in the form of knowledge, achievement, and accumulated wealth. "The force accumulated through personal effort in training, education, and discipline is similar to capital," says G. T. Fairchild. These forces represent effort; and the superiority of one society over another is reckoned very largely in terms of them. The organic energy of an African tribe may equal or exceed that of an American community of like size, but the social energy of the latter is far greater on account of the extra-organic store it commands. J. M. Gillette has estimated that production "consumes some ninety-five per cent of the energy at the disposal of collective man." He has reached this interesting conclusion on the basis of the numbers employed in the various occupational groups of the United States. It is practically a meaningless and erroneous deduction, because only organic energy is considered.

But even if this figure had any real significance, it would not help much in determining the amount of social surplus. We certainly should not be justified in assuming that the surplus was only the remaining five per cent of the collective energy, since clearly not all of the productive effort exerted is demanded for mere existence nor even for comfortable existence. A considerable share of it is supererogatory. This means a surplus both organic and otherwise; how great

cannot be said. There is no measure for this quantity; there is not even any means of approximating it. We can, therefore, speak only in crude generalities based on common observation. Yet even such observation leaves the impression that our surplus is enormous, that we are indeed living under what S. N. Patten has so aptly termed "a pleasure or surplus economy" in contradistinction to a "pain or deficit economy."

Consider our society by classes from the top well down into the lower strata, and everywhere there is evidence that surplus energy abounds. The wealthy class has tens of millions in money, much talent and much leisure. Someone has calculated that there are three billion leisure hours every week in the United States. Not all of this leisure, of course, is monopolized by the rich. It is estimated that forty-four families possess incomes that amount in the aggregate to at least fifty millions per year. The personal income tax report for June 30, 1916, showed 120 persons paid tax on one or more millions of dollars of income. The middle class is endowed with fortunes. For instance, it has been estimated by a rather careful manufacturer that there are not less than one million families in the United States that can afford automobiles. This number, moreover, includes only those whose incomes range from $3,000 to $60,000 per annum. As a matter of fact, 600,000 people bought some 703,000 automobiles at the price of $500,000,000 in 1915. On January 1, 1916, nearly two and a half million automobiles were registered. They paid $18,250,000 in license fees in 1915. These figures probably give a much fairer index to the surplus wealth of the middle class than do those of the personal incomes compiled by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the basis of the federal income tax. The first published report of the Commissioner indicates that 352,384 persons have incomes ranging from $2,500 to $50,000, and that 5,214 persons have incomes above the latter amount. The report for the year ending June 30, 1915, gave the total amount as

$41,046,162. The number of persons paying this tax was 357,515, and of these 210,202 had incomes ranging from $2,500 to $5,000. The total personal income tax collections for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916, were $67,957,488.50. Professor W. I. King attempts to estimate our annual capital savings or "national dividend," and for the year 1910 puts it at $2,000,000,000. Though this is only a rough guess, it is as nearly accurate as any yet made of the extent to which surplus wealth is accumulating.

The developed talent also of the middle class, which is not, of course, exhausted in bread-winning, is almost immeasurable. In addition, the amount of leisure, despite the much emphasized strenuousness of the times in the commercial world, is very large. Labor-saving devices in our industries, business, and homes, quick means of communication, and rapid transportation are in virtually every walk of life continually adding to the store of leisure either actually or potentially. By this development and other tendencies of the age, the women of the middle class in addition to those of the upper have become in a large measure a leisure class. Before the industrial era was so far advanced, the burdens of the household fully consumed women's time. The preparation of foods and clothing from the raw materials was a task never finished. But under the present order foods of every kind are brought into the house ready to eat, and garments are purchased ready to wear. The household arts of curing, preserving, spinning, weaving, knitting, sewing, and, in a measure, even laundrying and cooking have passed out. This is true of the town, and in only a slighter degree of the country. Nothing has come to take the place of these arts. Moreover, the modern house or the house of the modern day requires less labor to keep than did the house of days gone by. It is not overstating facts to say that woman's task is now easy and her burden light. In addition, fewer children are being born and reared.

The number is not half that of a generation ago. There consequently has been a great piling up of leisure in woman's sphere. It has become so abundant that it palls upon multitudes. Among the laboring class, of course, surplusage of any kind is found to be greatly curtailed; yet it is not altogether eliminated. In the better skilled and more organized trades there is a fair margin of time not employed in bread-winning and at the laborer's disposal. The well-organized and well-paid workers at least have a surplus of energy in this form, if not in the form of wealth or developed talent. When it is all totaled, there is a vast amount of surplus energy in America; and it is continually being augmented. Compared with societies such as China and India afford, where energy is consumed in the struggle of a teeming population to live and reproduce itself till the marginal surplus is kept at a minimum, our society has marvelous possibilities of advancement before it.

But the mere fact that an enormous social surplus exists is no guaranty that social progress is taking place. All depends upon the use to which it is being put. Let us then turn to the question raised above, How is the marginal energy being employed?

2. The Present Use of the Surplus

Normally, according to cosmic laws, all energy flows in channels of least resistance or greatest traction or the resultant of the two. The animal's surplus is therefore expended in play, and out of the abundance of a social group spontaneous activities of a pleasurable nature arise. Even purposive employment of surplusage in human society tends to conform to the cosmic law. Consequently accumulated wealth is directed, as we should naturally expect, very largely to the gratification of pleasurable instincts. Very much of it is consumed in satisfying the appetite, the desire for luxury, and the taste for futile display. It is said that at least fifteen

millions of dollars are spent in New York alone for New Year's dinners. Some headlines from the dailies showing into what courses money flows were recently exhibited in a current periodical. They run in the following vein: "Gilded Room for Toy Spaniel at Waldorf-Astoria"; "Baroness's Dog Wears Ruby"; "Mrs. S. of New York Loses $15,000 Muff"; "Ex-Senator Buys $12,000 Dinner Set for $7,000,000 Home"; "$250,000 Tennis Building Opens in New York"; "Half Million in Gems on Mrs. L. at Ball"; "Countess Spends $50,000 to Have German Emperor One Day." Thus it is evident that fortunes are lavished on social functions. And just as freely are they spent for the "purchase of the past," to buy its broken urns and statues, musty scrolls and manuscripts, rotten tapestries and grimy pictures, rusty armor and bent sabers, unstrung lutes and broken pillars, decaying mummies and their desecrated tombs. One has only again to consult the headlines for proof of this. "$28,000 for a Salt Cellar at Christie's"; "$42,800 for a Book at Hoe Sale"; "$28,000 for Eight Chairs"; "$80,000 for a Helmet"; "$14,000 for an Antique Soup Plate"; "$500,000 for a Picture"—millions upon millions for the junk of the past, multimillions for art collections, for the trappings of fallen nobility, for the faded glamours and sullied lusters of heraldic creations, for ancient castles, for everything that is musty with age or classed with art. There is absolutely no way of telling what incalculable sums of the surplus wealth are annually locked up in these things. Nor does this reckoning take account of all. It is estimated that in normal times two hundred millions are spent annually by Americans in globe-trotting. What hoards are squandered in amusements no one can say. But into this last channel a constant stream of surplus flows from the upper and middle reaches of society, until the stream rolls down like a flood over the plains of life. Besides, lavish gifts are devoted, generally with good

intent, to charity, missions, endowments, and other benefactions. Three hundred millions chiefly from American coffers is reported as the aggregate amount of public benevolence for 1914. Of this something like thirty millions went to religious missionary enterprises alone. The benefactions of two American billionaires in recent years are put by themselves at a figure exceeding five hundred and seventy-five millions of dollars. Above all this, wealth that no one can begin to estimate is sequestered from any social use at all by those who possess it. Professor C. H. Cooley has summed up the situation very well in the following:

> While there are some cheerful givers on a large scale among us and many on a small one, I am not sure that there was ever, on the whole, a commercial society that contributed a smaller part of its gains to general causes. We have done much in this way; but then we are enormously rich; and the most that has been done has been done by taxation, which falls most heavily upon small property-owners. The more communal use of wealth is rather a matter of general probability and of faith in democratic sentiment, than of demonstrable fact.

The surplus energy represented by leisure is enormous in amount, but what of its utilization? Much is expended in mere slothfulness and more on the empty rounds of futile amusements. In this way especially the women of the upper and the middle classes dispose of it. The leisure of the men of these classes is employed to a considerable extent in the effort to increase their surplus wealth. What remains is directed to the pursuit of fads and pleasures. The leisure surplus of the laboring classes is not large, but it is put to fairly creditable use. Apart from the time given to recreation, this class consumes much of its time in self-improvement. A study was recently made of a typical group of about a thousand workingmen in New York to determine how they use their spare time. It was found, as one might suppose, that the longer the working day, the greater the percentage

of available leisure spent for recreation. It was discovered also that those having shorter hours, that is, eight to nine and nine to ten, for work spent a greater percentage of the leisure allotted them in seeking to improve their minds. The agencies of which they availed themselves for this purpose were public lectures, libraries, private study, night schools, magazines, books, and newspapers. Arranged by hour groups according to the percentage of choices of these agencies out of the total choices for expenditure of leisure, the figures in Table I are extracted from the data of the study:

TABLE I

8 to 9 hrs.	9 to 10 hrs.	10 to 11 hrs.	11 hrs. and over
30.6%	31%	28%	24.8%

Arranged again in like manner with respect to the percentage of spare time in each week that was devoted to educational matters, Table II is compiled from the data furnished by the study:

TABLE II

8 to 9 hrs.	9 to 10 hrs.	10 to 11 hrs.	11 hrs. and over
26.2%	26.3%	23.2%	21.8%

The author of the investigation says that the shorter-hour groups considered reading the most profitable expenditure of spare time, while the longer-houred groups put "staying at home" first. From the facts revealed by this study, if they be reliable and really typical, it is clear that the laboring classes are making good use of such surplus leisure as remains over and above that which must be expended in necessary rest and recreation. They are utilizing it for their own mental and social development.

If then the foregoing analysis be fair and if it at all approximates the truth, it is evident that the channels into which surplus energy is naturally flowing are not those that lead to

social advancement. Giving full credit to that part of wealth, leisure, and talent which is purposely dedicated to the ends of progress, we must admit that it is after all but a small portion of the whole surplus. The wealth that is devoted to the advancement of education, research, and discovery is in the main well employed, but not even all of this really contributes to social betterment. Except for the fact that useful information is often a by-product of the best directed charitable endeavors, the large sums laid out in benevolence do not get us far, since little or nothing fundamental is aimed at or achieved. Society is made no better and ultimate democracy brought no nearer by mere financing of charities that, perpetuating the underlying causes of poverty, create the necessity for their existence. What fields for social experimentation lie open to wealth, if wealth would but enter them! It might subsidize new ventures in industry and husbandry, such as cooperative management, profit sharing, better wage-paying enterprises, etc. It might establish laboratories of various kinds to test theories. It might finance new schemes of municipal and state government and taxation in the same. It might make possible accurate knowledge on many social and economic problems and disseminate the information gathered. It might make possible useful propagandas, for the elimination of disease, for the breeding of better men, and for scores of other things. In a word, it might seek out the ways and means of democratic progress. But, as a matter of fact, the wealth surplus in the main avoids such channels.

Likewise does the leisure surplus. There is, to be sure, an effort to utilize it wisely on the part of women who are engaged in the feminist movement. This is good, for it is operating to the advancement of democracy. Labor, too, as we have seen, is devoting a fair share of its leisure surplus to its own improvement; and this also is good. But the leisure of the great majority is little utilized for their own develop-

ment or for any thing that furthers the social well-being. A corrective example for our consideration may be cited in the citizens of ancient Greece. Those having leisure, as a rule gave attention to art, literature, philosophy, and statesmanship. They sought self-improvement, and through it social betterment. Our leisure is reabsorbed in most instances to economic profit or to no profit at all. The average American spends little or none of his time or money or talent in seeking a broad and intelligent outlook upon the social world of which he is a part. Someone very aptly said of the last Congress and the people it represented, that the majority "are enjoying that immunity from mental action, that separation from intellectual effort, and that absence of brain-filling which makes life, after all, just what it is, in Congress as well as out." E. L. Godkin has pointedly remarked:

> The number of persons who have something to say about political affairs has increased a thousandfold, but the practice of reading books has not increased, and it is in books that experience is recorded. In the past, the governing class, in part at least, was a reading class. One of the reasons which are generally said to have given the Southern members special influence in Congress before the war is that they read books, had libraries, and had wide knowledge of the experiments tried by earlier generations of mankind. Their successors rarely read anything but the newspapers. . . . . In fact, I may venture the assertion that the influence of history or politics was never smaller than today, although history was never before cultivated with so much acumen and industry, so that authority and experience may fairly be ruled out of the list of forces which seriously influence the government of democratic societies. In the formation of public opinion they do not greatly count.

Enjoying ignorance and being unwilling to invest anything of his accumulated surplus for a deeper comprehension of conditions as they are and for a knowledge of how to make them better, the middle-class American withholds from progress its rightful due. At least, he does not strive to meet the

demands of "a pleasure or surplus economy," which Professor G. N. Patten says—

> are to utilize the surplus for common good, not to undermine energy and productive ability or to create parasitic classes, but to distribute the surplus in ways that will promote general welfare and secure better preparation for the future.

Not that progress in many lines is by any means wanting, especially in technical, mechanical, industrial, and scientific spheres; but real social progress, which the people of the western world associate directly or indirectly with the furtherance of democracy, is not commensurate with that achieved in other fields. The present utilization of the social surplus is not conducive to the promoting of democracy. It is not so much positively as negatively anti-democratic in its effects. For when devoted to other ends, whether good, bad, or indifferent, the surplus is not available for anything else. It cannot be applied to movements of a democratic nature; and the other ends to which it is directed are prone to foster undemocratic conditions.

There are numerous ways of social advance. Until trial is made no one can say whither they will lead, and, until more of our social surplus is focused upon them, they will remain untried, and the democratization of society continue unrealized.

3. *The Cause and Effect of Crises*

When the purposeful direction of the social surplus fails to promote it, progress may come through the pressure of critical conditions which serve to turn the energy into new channels. Crises often bring this about. A typical instance of the operation may be cited in the experience of a certain rural village. A crisis was there precipitated by the proposed removal of its leading institution, and by the necessity of competing with a rival community for a projected railway. The

loss of the institution would clearly mean cutting of incomes, reduction of wages, curtailment of business, depreciation of property values, and loss of community prestige. But to keep the institution a large amount of accumulated wealth would have to be given up by the community as a whole. The projected railway promised many advantages either to this town or its rival, with a corresponding handicap to the loser in the contest. It asked, however, in return for its benefits large subsidies from the wealth of the chosen village. The pressure was so great, and the exigencies of the situation so imperative that the community yielded up its surplus to meet the demands. This new utilization of its energy under pressure led to a further purposive direction of its surplus into new channels. A radical program of public improvement was immediately inaugurated. Once started, it has gone on from stage to stage, gathering momentum as it has advanced.

What is found true of a single community often holds good of society as a whole. In its life crises not infrequently bring about progress by causing a redirection of energy. Such calamities as fire, drought, flood, plague, and war may turn the streams of power into new courses. Many a burned or shattered city has fallen ingloriously in heaps of brick to rise magnificently in piles of marble to honor its age. Galveston, Texas, emerged from the storm of 1900 with a new type of city government. The Black Death of 1349, which left Europe weak and impoverished, greatly affected the status of the working classes. It gave rise to a long series of legal enactments aimed to reattach the laborers to the soil. The Thirty Years' War was followed by the freeing of the serfs throughout Europe. Our Civil War gave rise to unprecedented mechanical invention. During that period were patented those machines which have given America such prestige in the agricultural world. After the Napoleonic Wars the democratic movement began in England. Brought to the verge of ruin

by the disastrous war of 1864, Denmark had to seek a new course. Cooperative action in agriculture unequaled anywhere was the result. These changes just enumerated were all correlated with crises. The two things seem related as cause and effect on the principle under consideration. The present European war is beginning to turn the social surplusage to new enterprises and causes, industrial, political, moral, and intellectual. If the belligerents are not completely exhausted and the surplus of every kind wholly consumed at the end of the conflict, radical changes will follow in the several countries concerned, new ways will be discovered in many fields, and an era of progress will probably be entered upon.

This redirection of energy following upon crises is due to the stimulating effect that is produced by a limited curtailment of the surplus.

Of course, we are not forgetting that crises cause change only — merely redirection, not necessarily progressive change. Retrogressive movements often result from them. Sometimes, when too severe, they leave little or no energy above that which is actually required for existence — then there is stagnation.

Although we are not here primarily concerned with the origin of crises, it may be pointed out incidentally that areas of unequal social surplus and of unlike usage of the same can give rise to them. For a situation then obtains not unlike that in the physical atmosphere where unequal pressure areas produce storms. If certain classes consume vast stores of wealth, talent, and leisure futilely and foolishly, and reabsorb their surplus for themselves alone, while other classes employ their meager supply for the enhancement of ability and for the acquisition of knowledge directed toward social advancement, crises are in preparation. The existence of such inharmonious areas in present-day society is evident. Where the surplusage is large and employed without respect to the present or future

good of the group as a group, there is a static or low-pressure area. Where the surplus is small and consciously put to good use, there is a dynamic or high-pressure area. If now two such areas reach a state where the differential becomes too great, a storm follows till the pressure is equalized; or, in other words, till energy is turned into new courses. The American Civil War was thus precipitated. The North and the South were areas of unequal surplus differently utilized. The stress became too great and conflict followed. The French Revolution came about in the same way. Crises of greater or less moment are, on the grounds pointed out, always gathering. Storms may break at any time. In fact, they are of frequent occurrence on a small scale in the form of strikes, riots, and raids of the unemployed groups, and of clashes between reform and reactionary classes. These are just little eddying gusts, but they may grow until whole sections of society are swept into the whirlwind of revolution.

These little crises should serve to call attention to the need of a different utilization of the social surplus in much of our society. Total and future interests must prevail over class, individual, and present interests. Social equalization must take place, if not in a purposeful manner, then by the operation of the law of crises, and the "fierce beating of blind rebellion against blind obstruction" come into play. It may be, however, that these little crises will so continually stir the static areas of our social life that the undemocratic utilization of surplus energy will be transmuted into an employment of the same for progressive purposes; and thus will great crises be avoided. In fact, there is evidence that this is precisely what they are doing.

4. The Spirit of Service and Its Promise

Not only are incipient crises tending to redirect purpose relative to the surplus, but in a much more effective and potent

way is the spirit of social service working to this end. Already it has become a strong current drawing along with greater or less velocity almost the whole of modern life. The criterion of the day is rejecting art for art's sake, knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and life for the mere joy of living, and demanding that all must "shine in use." The significance of this can hardly be overestimated, for, as Seeley has said, "a state rests ultimately upon a way of thinking," and here we have a way of thinking of the utmost social importance. When some great purpose begins to run in the minds of men everywhere and to pervade their activities, the time is opportune to look for the dawn of a new epoch. When in medieval times the rescue of Jerusalem from the Saracens became the common notion of European peoples, the era of the Crusades was at hand. When during the twelfth century the idea of classical learning took possession of the Italian mind and subsequently of that of Northern Europe, the age of the Renaissance had dawned. Thus again and again have the times passing over the world undergone change. Not infrequently, of course, transitory modes of thought or ephemeral purposes have arisen to rule for a day and then ceased to be without working important alteration. But the modern spirit of service is not of the moment, if we may estimate the probable length of its duration from the fact that its rise has been gradual. To be sure, like all things that become ascendant, it must eventually decline and give place to some other purpose, but that does not lessen its present influence. With all classes awakening to the call of service, the beginning of an epoch of widespread emulation in good will and good works among all men appears to be at hand.

Albeit much social service now prevailing is superficial, dilettanteish, merely imitative and purely for conspicuous display, there is more that is genuine, earnest, and constructive; and, above all, the good and the praiseworthy kind seems to

be rapidly transforming the rest. Mere conscience-salving philanthropy, that was all too common but yesterday, is apparently discovering nobler motives and beginning to desire the good of the other fellow. Sumptuous leisure, and talent without employment, which have been so long approved by themselves and only less heartily by society, are now becoming apologetic. Conspicuous and wasteful consumption and display of goods, which from the time of the first Croesus to the present have passed without condemnation, are growing covert and conscience-smitten before the demands of the age. Many of the rich are assuming a new attitude toward fortune. The spirit of service is prompting them to recognize that what is socially given is to be socially employed. They are therefore asking concerning wealth the insistent question of the age, How shall it be used? The answer that is being made is all that even the most ardent democrat could wish. If we take Mr. Andrew Carnegie's response as typical, nothing could be finer. Some of his widely published sentences will bear repetition here:

> The higher use of great fortune is in public work and service of mankind. This is the true antidote to unequal distribution and would pave the way for the communist ideal in the great unrevealed future.

The rich man is—

> to ask himself if he is not to consider all surplus revenues coming to him as simply trust funds which he is called upon to administer in the manner that, in his judgment, is best calculated to produce the most beneficial results for the community. . . . . Rich men must avoid all forms of extravagance and ostentation.

He gives hearty support to the leveling of high income and inheritance taxes, for these, he says, mark the state's "condemnation of the selfish millionaire's unworthy life."

All signs indicate that this policy is commending itself to not a few; that the rich are really beginning in various ways

to turn back into the commonwealth their consciously unmerited gains. While the public sensibilities are still offended all too frequently by the frivolous, careless, anti-social, and criminal use of money, as for instance, when the Duke of Portland dedicates a subterranean gallery beneath his castle costing thirty-five millions of dollars, or when Mrs. Gary offers blocks of United States Steel bonds for prizes at a bridge party, the number of instances where wealth is commendably used is multiplying. Such a noteworthy demonstration of the new spirit as Mr. Henry Ford gave the public in breaking all precedents and outstripping all public opinion by dedicating numerous millions to the payment of unheard-of wages, was a kind of surprise which we may reasonably expect to greet us from many sources fairly often in the future.

Industrial capital also is being caught up by the spirit of service and is being taught a new sense of obligation to labor. All sorts of welfare work is the result. The means employed may be neither far-reaching, fundamentally just, nor good; but of the motive there can be no doubt, for it has arisen in response to the question, Am I my brother's keeper? Though the answer has been hesitating, it is now rising in crescendo to a clear affirmative. And from its initial committal to social use, capital may be expected in the natural course of events to come presently to such a utilization of the surplus as democracy approves.

Voluntary action must therefore, in the writer's judgment, be counted among the vital forces of democracy. Aroused by the clarion calls to service that have begun to reverberate throughout the world, it appears a great new champion just entering the arena in behalf of Demos. And America above all is the arena, for here voluntary action is most at home. It is pre-eminently our characteristic way of doing things. Of his own initiative, the American is wont to respond gener*ously and* nobly to proposals involving justice and to causes

that are humanitarian. Democracy, then, may be assured of the support of voluntary effort. Not, of course, that the equalization of opportunity, wealth, and talent, and the achievement of all that ultimate democracy necessitates can be wholly left to good will, for it cannot. Much in every way must doubtless devolve upon the coercive power of the masses, and the veritable tyranny of majorities, as we have often stated or intimated throughout this work. But voluntary effort and that due to compulsion are important forces, playing supplementary parts in society. The first, adhering to liberty and cherishing its ideal, conserves the interests of the individual and develops the individualistic side of democracy. The second, seeking solidarity and prizing fraternity more than liberty, strives for the welfare of the group and promotes the social side of democracy. The two working together as counterbalancing forces, furthering liberty and restraining it, creating solidarity and limiting it, give as the resultant product equality and eventually that degree of equality which we are pleased to call ultimate democracy.

CHAPTER XI

Prospects for Ultimate Democracy

> We think that a wise mean, between these barbarous extremes, is that which self-preservation ought to dictate to our wishes.— HALIFAX.

AGAINST a background of undemocratic and anti-democratic customs, sentiments, ideas, policies, and institutions in American society, which have been expressly named or implied, an effort has been made to project the forces that are positively democratic. It can hardly be claimed that all the possible or even all the important factors involved in the making of democracy have been made to appear. Such, indeed, was really not the aim of this work; it was rather to bring into view a sufficient number of factors to make it clear how the achievement of ultimate democracy is a process of persistent conflict between aggregations of forces; and withal, to note to which side victory steadily inclines. The conflict may be epitomized and better comprehended if we liken it to a tug of war.

1. *The Array of Forces and the Hope of Victory*

On one side appears the undemocratic coalition in formidable array made up of many ancient and familiar warriors and not a few recruits. The latter have a tendency to enter through response to the peculiar and ever-changing conditions of modern society. The whole forms a compact body with great unanimity of purpose and action. Ignorance, Indifference, Unsocialized Individualism, Love of Inequality, Militarism, Aristocracy, Autocracy, and all the rest of them taken together are animated by a remarkable *esprit de corps*. If

now and then this combination is swept off the field till scarcely a foothold is left it, as again and again for a time it has been, there is little slacking and no lacking of grip. With dogged effort it holds on, and it recovers itself with such alacrity that presently it is found standing as firm as ever. The very ardor of the conflict and the ever-increasing amount of enmity which this union of contestants arouses against itself apparently serves only to awaken in it greater determination and to spur it to gird itself anew for the ceaseless fray.

There is nothing in the least fictitious about the solidarity and persistency of the anti-democratic aggregation. Attention has been directed to these characteristics by W. J. Ghent, T. B. Veblen, and others, until there can be no doubt of their reality. Just as the European nobility is united by a real and conscious purpose as well as in blood, so are the opponents of democracy in America, though more or less unconsciously, bound together by common interests and aspirations. There is a veritable republic of Aristocracy, Autocracy, and Plutocracy within our nation. Though there are few traitors like Louise of Saxony to the nobility, there are fortunately many who renounce allegiance to this unauthorized republic. For all that, however, the solidarity of the opponents of democracy continues, and every challenge of Demos is met by a counter-stroke.

On the other side stands the company of democratic forces numerous but unorganized, and scarcely less confounded than were the builders of Babel. Those composing it hardly know, and do not at all understand, one another. They are mostly youthful and unseasoned, and consequently flighty and unstable. The coalition they form is very much wanting in unity and coordination of effort. Its actions are wasteful and at cross purposes with themselves. One part lays hold for a ready and a steady tug while another lets go to upbraid and kick it. Some will pull with frantic zeal while others pro-

ceed to ride the rope and hinder. A tug of war demands a team, but there is little team work in this company. Pulling there is, to be sure, but it is just as likely to be pulling apart as pulling together. This lack of concerted effort has always handicapped the champions of democracy. In a thoroughly factious manner they have always "muddled through" to victory, and still continue to do so in America as elsewhere. The only merits of the democratic aggregation are its might of mass and its resolution of mind to win.

Such are the two contesting groups in the great see-saw that is on today as it has been on for aye. Despite all their lack, the democratic forces have the best of it; indeed, they seem to have all but won. But will they continue to gain and be the ultimate victors? This is the question here raised.

Once before the forces of democracy had complete victory within sight, yet they were worsted. That was in ancient Rome, where the present stage of the conflict had been almost reached when the undemocratic forces rallied, snatched away all that had been gained, and for nearly two millenniums gave the world over to the lust of autocracy. When Benjamin Disraeli said "Democracy, like death, gives back nothing," he was mistaken; for in Rome democracy gave back everything. Will she give it back again in France, England, America, in all the Occident and the awakened Orient of today, as in Rome of yesterday? Really to answer this question would be to tell the fortune of democracy — a thing no man can do; and yet advocates of democracy almost invariably attempt it. Says E. L. Godkin:

> Every writer about democracy, from Montesquieu down, has tried to answer it by *a priori* predictions as to what democracy will say, or do, or think, under certain given circumstances. The uniform failure naturally suggests the conclusion that the question is not answerable at all, owing largely to the enormously increased number of influences under which all men act in the modern world.

One may, therefore, safely tell only his hopes and voice only his beliefs about democracy; he cannot prophesy her future. History must run its course, and one man, be he historian, philosopher, or scientist, is not able of himself to see that course; for to see it is to make it. And millions of men — yea, Man himself must make it, for he is the great creator; but he, even he cannot accomplish it alone. Forces wholly impersonal, such as flood, drought, and the vicissitudes of nature in general, play their part — and it has often been the larger part; they are Man's allies or his enemies. Were it not for them, the way of history might be more readily prevised and made straight. However, these impersonal forces are being subdued by the will of man; their rôle is a diminishing one. To the extent they are brought under control, the predicting of history becomes more accurate and the assurance of democracy doubly sure. Apart from them, however, the deepening confidence of existent democracy in itself, and the supreme hopefulness of the rapidly growing company of democrats, makes the future full of promise for ultimate democracy. If, therefore, one dares not assert that the triumph of democracy is assured, neither dares he do other than expect that it is.

The ground of his hope defies better statement than M. E. Haggerty has made in a recent contribution to the *Popular Science Monthly* on "Science and Democracy." He declares:

> That the upward strivings of democracy should have issued in innumerable abortions of social ideals is what on his [the scientist's] theory was to have been expected. That these same strivings should have brought to maturity one well-born child of promise is much more significant, for it is augury of the future. Not the level of his attainments, but the direction of his going concerns him most. His faith in democracy is not a doctrine of comfort; it is one of effort; he believes not so much in something attained as in something attainable. It is not something to be preserved, but something to be achieved. Just as science is an intellectual inspiration, democracy is a moral inspiration.

Together they constitute an idealism toward which the will to live strives with an ever-increasing measure of success.

The democrat is emboldened then to profess his well-grounded faith and to declare that he discerns, as a social astronomer, if observation deceives not, a ring around the present social order, thrown off by it, yet a part of it, growing wider and wider while the world that projects it diminishes. This ring is the disintegration of the old and the integration of the new. It is a new world in the making. It is ultimate democracy glowing in the white heat of creation unto full and certain existence.

2. *Three Alleged Dangers*

The future of democracy is said to be fraught with three dangers lurking both within the ranks of its champions and among the citizens of the state in general, whose cooperation is indispensable. They are radicalism, conservatism, and indifferentism.

Radicalism seems the most imminent of the three. It is feared that the zeal of democracy will consume her, especially if the struggle for economic equality be carried to excess without the accompaniment of an adequate preparation of the social mind to receive and sustain the advance. Many profess to see this as a not far-distant prospect. They see the number of extremists multiplying and hear the murmur of unrest growing louder on every side. They are disturbed by the "dangerous" causes that come up as though the earth gave fruit of itself to swell the already too abundant yield. They view with alarm the growing prestige of radical leadership, and with greater alarm the eager responsiveness to it. They make bold to declare that revolution, such as many proclaim must come, threatens indeed to succeed evolution any day. Even some of the good friends of democracy fear that radi*calism* may sweep her forward to positions she cannot hold

ecause of her unreadiness, and expose her to such a defeat hat all will be lost in the inevitable retreat. But we may ask vith J. H. Robinson, "Have fiery radicals ever got possession f the reins and actually driven for a time at breakneck peed?" If they have at any time in the world's history, here is some reason for believing they may do so again. We nay answer with Robinson's penetrating conclusion that —

he conservative would find it extremely difficult to cite historic exam-les, but doubtless the Reign of Terror would occur to him as an nstance. This certainly has more plausibility than any other alleged xample in the whole recorded history of mankind. But Camille Des-noulins, one of its most amiable victims, threw the blame of the whole ffair, with much sound reasoning, on the precious conservatives them-elves. And I think that all scholars would agree that the incapable and raitorous Louis XVI and his runaway nobles, supported by the threats f the monarchs of Prussia and Austria, were at the bottom of the vhole matter.

The only conclusion that history seems to justify is that adicalism is never so dangerous as it appears.

But the appeal to history does not settle the matter; for his-ory settles nothing. Its verdict is overturned by the higher ourt of actual events more often than it is confirmed. Though istory gives no clear warning, the fear of radicalism may for ll that be warranted. Let us then see under what condition adicalism flourishes. F. H. Giddings has pointed it out in he following law of choices:

A population that has varied interests, which are as yet inharmo-iously combined, is radical in its choices. Only a population that as many, varied, and harmoniously combined interests is consistently rogressive in its choices.

In accordance with this law, it is a curious fact that the adically thinking German common people have not made revo-lutionary choices. They are the promulgators of the most xtreme Socialism, fully one-third of the nation adhering to

the Socialist party, and casting between four and five millions of Socialistic votes. Yet during the history of the present Empire, they have made no extreme choices. Why? Chiefly for the reason that such a combination of all interests exists that every man feels he has a dividend-yielding share in the social order. Numerous forms of state insurance provide assured income and relief for all in a way that acts as a powerful brake on movements tending to alter or overturn the existing system. The choices of the German people, therefore, in so far as political choices are theirs at all, are progressive but not revolutionary.

The American people with even more varied interests than the German have them far less harmoniously unified in many respects. They are consequently more likely to make extreme choices. However, our radically thinking element is as yet comparatively small, although rapidly growing. The situation, then, virtually resolves itself into the question whether harmonious combinations or the radically minded element is going to increase the more rapidly. If the former, democracy normally will proceed processionally: if the latter, the chances are that it will advance cataclysmically. But even though the process of unification should become stalled, and the radicals wax mighty in numbers, extreme choices would not be as likely as the promise of them. For there is always great inertia to be overcome in the body of the social structure, and, as history shows, it has seldom been overcome. This inertia, says Professor C. H. Cooley, is—

> something so massive and profound that the loudest agitation is no more than a breeze ruffling the surface of deep waters. Dominated by the habits which it has generated, we all of us, even the agitators, uphold the existing order without knowing it. There may, of course, be sudden changes due to the fall of what has long been rotten, but I *see little* cause to suppose that the timbers of our system are in this *condition*: they are rough and unlovely, but far from weak.

Any assumption that American conditions are most favorable to radicalism is unfair, for nothing is more surely taking place than a gradual harmonization of interest. Indeed, this is the very essence of democratic advance, which of itself constantly tempers radicalism and serves to render it progressive instead of revolutionary in its choices. Taking this into account with respect to American society particularly, James Bryce is thereby moved to say that radicalism "is of all dangers or bugbears the one which the modern world has least cause to fear."

Conservatism considered as a menace to democracy cannot be better set forth than in the words of Maeterlinck, quoted by the author of *The New History,* J. H. Robinson. He says:

> There are men enough about us whose exclusive duty, whose precise mission, is to extinguish the fires that we kindle. At every crossing on the road that leads to the future, each progressive spirit is opposed by a thousand men appointed to guard the past. Let us have no fear lest the fairest towers of former days be sufficiently defended. The least that the most trained among us can do is not to add to the immense weight which nature drags along.

That dead weight, nevertheless, has a tendency to augment itself by mechanically acquired increments. For let the most radical agitator run across ever so small a bag of gold and he is very likely to become a niggardly conservative and a drag on the chariot of social advance instead of a propeller. Let even the extremist be given political office and he perchance soon changes to such an extent that his brethren must dub him a lost leader, a deserter, and a betrayer of their cause. Of course, neither bags of gold nor places of political responsibility are so plentiful as greatly to concern us, but notwithstanding this fact, there is a great recruiting agency for conservatism in conditions that give relatively moderate prosperity.

The economic basis on which this statement rests is excel-

lently set forth by G. T. Fairchild in *Rural Wealth and Welfare:*

> Capital, especially in fixed forms, being in its nature the conserving of energy, is necessarily an incentive to conservatism in society, since any great and sudden changes in the habits of a community involve rapid consumption or destruction of capital. Capital is said to be "timid." This statement means simply that all owners and users of capital who realize the time required for accumulating it hesitate to risk its destruction in doubtful enterprises, uncertain confidence, or venturesome experiments in Government financiering. War, riots, or even revenue laws may destroy fixed capital that has been the growth of a century. A small change in tariff laws has rendered useless immense factories. For the same reason farmers, having so large a fixed capital in farms and farm machinery, do not take kindly to political changes involving doubtful consequences. States where the capital is still circulating may readily venture upon experiments financial or political, since little time is lost even in destructive results. People in new countries take risks readily because they have less to risk.

The French people apparently afford striking exemplification of the influence of accumulating capital. Having won the right to possess their native soil, they have gradually become landlords. A larger percentage of them than of almost any western nation owns and lives on the soil. Wealth is more equitably distributed among them than perhaps among any other people in the world. For a half-century each succeeding decade has added to it, until the Frenchman is moderately rich. The result has been and is a growing conservatism. The farmer, the bourgeoisie, and even the mechanic, it is said, have acquired property, and along with it "an extremely calculating individualism." The emotional and revolutionary temper of the French people has cooled down to a state of peaceful satisfaction. Stability and contentment are now widespread in the Republic. Wealth has accumulated, and democracy decayed — or at least activity in its behalf has almost come to a standstill. In contrast, the commonalty of England has remained poor, and is energetically leading the staid old nation

a merry chase after democracy, till the English have become the progressive and the French the reactionary people of the West.

In America over certain areas we may look for developments not unlike those that have taken place in France. The rural regions are growing in wealth, and a conservatism beyond that which already exists will likely follow. The census report for the last decade calculates that farm property increased in value twenty billions of dollars. It is estimated to be now worth forty-one billions. The gross income from this wealth, says the Department of Agriculture, increased in the same period from five to nine billions. This increase of wealth for the rural population was far more than a proportionate one for the whole country. The percentage of increase of wealth per capita is on the whole much greater in the agricultural sections of America than elsewhere. According to the government census for the last five years, even the absolute increase in several cases has been greater than in the manufacturing or non-agricultural states. The farming states of the West, the Northwest, and the Mississippi Valley are leading the nation in the *per capita* accumulation of riches. A recent bulletin of the Census Bureau, *Estimated Valuation of National Wealth,* gives the *per capita* wealth of the several states. For the United States as a whole it is $1,965. The average is higher in the West than in the East, with the Northwestern agricultural and mining states monopolizing the top places. The twenty states having the highest *per capita* wealth, which if averaged amounts to $2,747, are with but six exceptions mainly agricultural. While there are twenty-three agricultural states which fall short of the average for the whole country — and some of those of the South very far short, too — the fact remains, nevertheless, that a number of agricultural states take precedence in riches *per capita* over any of those devoted largely to commerce and industry.

There is, moreover, in these agricultural states a more even distribution of wealth. In such states as North Dakota, Iowa, or Nebraska, for example, there is a far greater degree of economic equality than in New York, Massachusetts, or Ohio. The American farmer is evidently growing rich, and will probably continue to grow rich; and modest though the fortune be, it means that certain solid sections of conservatism are in the process of formation. As Kansas prospers, we may expect to see her mildly radical tendencies disappear; as Nebraska waxes rich, we may look for her to become reactionary; and as Wisconsin accumulates, we may behold her looking backward. In fact, we already see the grip of conservatism tightening upon these states and upon the West pretty generally. Once the frontier lands were turbulent and radically inclined. Indeed, that naturally conservative penchant of the farmer under whatsoever condition he is found was so far overcome in Western America that he became almost a revolutionist. From about 1870 to the close of the century, many of the great agitating causes, such as the Grange movement, the Greenback Party, and the free-silver disturbance, were born of the soil. Lack of prosperity in the rural regions caused this discontent. But as agriculture has gradually become profitable, and as the farmer has begun to accumulate wealth, the spirit of the last quarter of the nineteenth century has disappeared and has been supplanted by a very temperate disposition. Prosperity has dampened the fires of progress and reform.

And the end is not yet; for a landed aristocracy with absentee ownership is slowly forming in rural America. It gathers in the towns and villages, and leaves the open country to the tenant. Such a class wherever found has always been ultra-conservative and reactionary. It is so in England today, and there is nothing to indicate that it is in anywise different in America. Nor is a counteracting attitude to be looked for

in the tenant class. For besides having all the natural conservatism of the soil, it too is experiencing prosperity, at least in the better land regions. But even if it fails to prosper and eventually degenerates, through the aid of foreign immigration, into a semi-peasant class, little of the dynamic spirit and perhaps nothing of the radical attitude can reasonably be expected of it.

The accumulation of modest fortune proves almost everywhere detrimental to progress. A thrifty middle class, however desirable it may be in itself, bodes ill for the ongoing of democracy to its ultimate goal.

> Irks care the crop-full bird?
> Frets doubt the maw-crammed beast?

Doubt and care spur on Demos; and to the degree that these are removed will his movements be retarded. Karl Marx was right, so far as the propagation of his cause was concerned, in contending that the misery of the poor was increasing; for therein lay the dynamic of Socialism, as he must have been fully aware.

Conservatism is far more threatening to democracy than radicalism; for, unlike the latter, it has often held sway in the past and is only a lightly slumbering force in the present. In different imagery, it is as retarding to the progress of society as fog is to the traffic of the ocean. Its sources seem quite as inexhaustible. It falls from above, it rises from beneath, it drifts in from every quarter, it holds back the ships of state that hasten to havens far and near; yea, it even hides the havens themselves, till we do not so much as remember that they are. It cannot be escaped, for it is latent in every element of society. Economic conditions are doubtless to be feared the most in America, but they are by no means the only source whence it may rise with power today.

However, when viewed in the light of other considerations,

there is after all little likelihood that conservatism will seriously menace American democracy. The danger therefrom is actually much less than rural developments would seem to presage. Recent studies of our wealth and income by W. I. King and other statisticians tend to show that the middle class, where conservatism has its chief stronghold, is decreasing rather than growing. Scott Nearing has demonstrated that one-half of the adult males of the United States receive less than $600 a year. Others have shown that from four-fifths to nine-tenths of all wage-earners in the land receive wages which do not suffice for the maintenance of efficient family standards. This situation alone renders the dominance of conservatism a rather remote possibility. Then, too, the rapid urbanization of the population must not be lost to view, for every degree of advance in this direction is at the expense of the area of most probable conservatism. Above all, the spirit of the American people is to be reckoned with, and this is essentially progressive. It is their pride. Even the conservative American is sensitive to the criticism that he is a "back-number." It goes hard against the grain to be dubbed a "mossback." The social art of orderly change is so well developed that the American people do not fear change. As a whole, they have the habit of alteration, and it tends to grow upon them. They are truly "dedicated," as Felix Adler has said, "not to the preservation of what has been, but to the creation of what never has been. They are the prophets of the future, not the priests of the past."

But have radicalism and conservatism only menacing features for democracy? Have they not a useful part to play in its making? I believe they have. Radicalism is essential to all progress. Without hesitation it casts aside tradition, rejects the outworn and outgrown, and champions the new. It is therefore originative, performing for the social world the same *function* that variation does for the animal kingdom. Its dis-

ciples are the prophets of change. By stirring up the people, they overcome social inertia and prevent stagnation. Without them social degeneration is inevitable. The Golden Age of Athens lasted just one generation; then came decline and decay. These came because Athens banished all "the holy malcontents" and disturbers of the peace from her midst. She was satisfied with herself, would brook no agitation, would tolerate no visionaries, would give no chance for the play of the agencies of advancement. Thus did she prepare her certain doom. So have the golden ages, so called, of history generally prepared dark ages for society because they have invariably stoned the prophets of the better social order.

Whatever dangers may lurk in radicalism, to its keeping the social future is intrusted. The radical calls attention to the sore spots in the social organism and proposes a remedy. His remedy may not be applicable; it may even appear fatal; but the need for some remedy to become the public concern is the important thing; for it means that some remedy will eventually be applied and that a sounder social organism will result. In this way do the Socialists, the Syndicalists, the Single Taxers, the Anarchists, and all the other radicals serve society. They perform an indispensable function. For instance, the extreme ideas and measures advocated and carried out by the unemployed in New York during the critical winter of 1914 called attention to a situation, which, as a result, New York for the first time attempted really to remedy in 1915. What was true in this case is also true all the while in any progressive society. The radicals are focusing attention upon the social situation, upon its deficiencies, maladjustments, and maladies; they are bringing corrective forces into play and thus promoting social advance. Without them democracy has absolutely no future and ultimate democracy no making.

Conservatism also is essential to all orderly progress. Its function is holding fast that which the radicals of other days

have achieved. It is the appointed keeper of the tombs of those it once slew, but whose works it now cherishes and appraises as the consummation of all wisdom. It is the elected guardian of the existing order, whose chief business is to see that none suddenly overturn society. It is delegated also to bring to account all social adventurers, to intercept all agitators, and to kill as many reforms and to prevent as many changes as possible. If it did not do this, the radicals might run away with the world. Democracy would perchance often become "mobocracy" if it were not compelled to respect the past, to reflect, to revise its proposals, and to compromise its principles. Since it has little history to appeal to and but few precedents to rely upon; since it is a pioneer that would lead into an undiscovered country, it is well that there is something to compel it to spy out every step of the way, to report favorable to all every proposed move, and to safeguard the interests of everybody. Though conservatism causes generations to pass away with hopes unfulfilled, and leaders to perish while yet unable to possess the land of anticipation; yet by the very delays it occasions and the wanderings it causes, it becomes a real servant of democracy.

Either radicalism or conservatism by itself is a menace to democracy, for one means revolution and the other stagnation. But working together, they are essential to evolution and progress. In India both the tiger and the wild boar are a menace. The tiger, however, has long kept the wild boar down. Now that the tiger is being exterminated, the fear of the boar has become widespread. Herein is a parable of society. The conservative has always been the great peril. He has long kept the radical suppressed, but now the latter appears as a new danger and the source of a new fear. Left to themselves, however, these antagonists mutually limit each other, just as nature unmolested establishes a balance in the jungle. These static and kinetic social factors are counterbal-

ancing. From their reaction a dynamic situation results, which makes possible a moving equilibrium or a progressive society. Only under such conditions does democracy flourish; and such being the conditions normally to be expected in the western world, the making of ultimate democracy seems assured.

The third menace to democracy is said to be indifferentism. This is something more than conservatism, for it implies not opposition but want of interest. Its essence is sometimes mere temporism, or living just to live—a sort of vegetativeness all oblivious to the past and heedless of the future. Sometimes it involves disregard even for the present, in which case it is a veritable pan-temporism. This, of course, amounts in any form to a lack of interest. The baneful influences of indifference were long ago pointed out by Aristotle in his *Politics*. He said:

> That which is a common concern to us all is very generally neglected. The energies of man are stimulated by that which depends on himself alone, and of which he only is to reap the whole profit or glory. In concerns common to him with others, he employs with reluctance as much attention and activity as his own interest requires. He neglects that of which he thinks other men will take care, and as other men prove equally negligent, the general interest is universally abandoned. Those families are commonly the worst served in which the domestics are the most numerous.

That democracy suffers because of a selfish indifference must be admitted. It may suffer also not from lack of interest, but from the absorption of interest in other things; and when some one thing which seems of paramount importance chances to appear, as did the Christian religion in Rome, then all other causes fail, and the cause of democracy falls a victim to the chloroform of indifference. But what, pray, could effect such a monopoly of interest today? A calamity, widespread and persistent, like pestilence, flood, or famine, should such befall

the world or any considerable part of it, could do it. For then the more primordial interests of very existence itself would supersede all others, and nation would rise against nation in merciless battle for bread till, the sword having devoured the many, a remnant might eat and live. Under such conditions democracy would be the thought of none, but autocracy become the guardian of all; since great crises very often bring society to the one-man power. At least, this has always been the case, and will continue to be until democracy lays in equality a foundation so deep and stable that all heaven and hell cannot shake it.

That any such foundation can be laid for society in a universe subject to vicissitudes and change may be an open question, but that need not trouble us. Calamity is not certain; nay, not probable; for man grows ever more able to forestall it. We at least need not capitalize catastrophe to thwart democracy. Nor need we fear the vast amount of indifference that ordinarily prevails; for at present it tends to disappear. Interest in the problem of social welfare is growing. Many planes of life hitherto unconcerned are alert with attention. Others are slowly awakening. A great reveille is stirring the citizenship of many lands—a reveille which presages the dawn of a greater day for democracy.

If the rule of the mob from radicals is not to be feared; if the rule of custom from conservatives does not threaten; if the *laissez-faire* rule from the indifferent is being dissolved into either radicalism or conservatism; and if the general social attitude is thus being rendered securely progressive, the prospects for ultimate democracy in western society are fairly bright. Of course, judged by the past, these prospects are all a delusion; for not only has such equality as that contemplated never prevailed among civilized men, but there is nothing to justify any expectation that it ever will. Even judged by the *present*, perplexed as it is by grievous maladjustments, dis-

concerted by sore antagonisms, confused by frightful inequalities, distracted by bitter broils that nothing seems to ease, baffled by the difficulties of achieving any thoroughgoing reform, and overwhelmed by the enormity of the task of reconstructing the social order, the verdict is apt to be that ultimate democracy is unattainable and quite as remote as communication with Mars. But judged by the real criterion of the prospects, that is, by the restive, changeful, critical, dynamic, world-loving, serviceful, creative spirit of the age, by the forces inherent in the age and busily at work, by the demonstrated power of these forces to triumph, giving assurance that striving brings results and courage for further endeavor, by the actual achievements of those forces in the line of democratic advancement, and finally by the determination of a self-conscious and purposeful society that knows its needs and recognizes no insurmountable obstacles in the way of the social will, the decision must be that ultimate democracy is in store for tomorrow.



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